Doctoral dilemmas : towards a discursive psychology of postgraduate education by Stanley, Steven
Loughborough University
Institutional Repository
Doctoral dilemmas: towards
a discursive psychology of
postgraduate education
This item was submitted to Loughborough University's Institutional Repository
by the/an author.
Additional Information:
• A Doctoral Thesis. Submitted in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University.
Metadata Record: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/7702
Publisher: c© Steven Stanley
Please cite the published version.
 
 
 
This item is held in Loughborough University’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) and was harvested from the British Library’s 
EThOS service (http://www.ethos.bl.uk/). It is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
Doctoral Dilemmas: 
Towards a Discursive Psychology of Postgraduate Education 
by 
Steven Stanley 
A Doctoral Thesis 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of 
Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University 
September 2004 
© by Steven Stanley 2004 
Dedicated to my grandfather, John Minshall, who values learning for its own sake 
Abstract 
This thesis presents a critical analysis of the dilemmas of doing a PhD in the social 
sciences from the perspective of discursive psychology. It aims to contribute to 
qualitative studies of higher education, especially work in the sociology of education 
on social science doctoral research and training, and discourse analytic work on the 
dilemmas of education. It argues that there is a crucial bias in the literature on 
doctoral study. Much of the theory and research on doing a doctorate has been written 
and carried out by doctoral supervisors and established academic researchers, rather 
than doctoral students themselves. As a result, researchers have tended to study 
supervisor rather than student dilemmas and have left certain gaps in their studies, 
including the experiential dimensions of doctoral research, the discursive construction 
of postgraduate identities, and the patterns of ideology and power at play in doctoral 
student life. The present doctorate on doing a doctorate attempts to fill in these gaps, 
and at the same time introduces a distinctive critical, discursive, and reflexive take on 
postgraduate education. Detailed discourse analyses are carried out of in-depth semi- 
structured interviews with PhD students in various psychology and social science 
departments in the United Kingdom. The analysis pays attention to the 
conversational, rhetorical, and ideological patterning of doctoral postgraduate 
discourse. In particular, it concerns the academic identity work done by the 
postgraduates, the ways in which they manage particular interactional, self- 
presentational, and ideological dilemmas in their talk, and the different forms of 
power that are at play as they carry out their doctorates. In addition, a form of 
practical, analytic reflexivity is developed in the thesis, whereby the authors' own 
methodological and interviewing practices are analysed, along with text of the thesis 
itself. The general argument is that the topic of postgraduate academic identity proves 
a good case study for the investigation of some of the hidden dynamics of power, as 
well as the use of wider ideological values, in the construction of identities in 
contemporary institutional settings. 
Key words: doctoral postgraduate education; discursive psychology; ideological 
dilemmas; identity work; power; reflexivity. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
At some point during the course of doing a PhD you are more than likely to be 
asked what your thesis is about. I myself have been asked this question many 
times over the last four years. When you tell a person that you are doing a PhD on 
the dilemmas of doing a PhD, you are pretty much guaranteed to get one of three 
replies, or some kind of variation on one of them. The first, and the most common, 
is laughter. Often it is unclear whether the person is laughing at you or with you, 
of course, but at least one of you gets a good laugh. The second involves the 
person saying something like `oh, that's very interesting isn't it? ' or `oh, what a 
fascinating topic! ' after which they then proceed to ask what you are actually 
doing. (Often there is some puzzlement over exactly what such a thesis would 
involve. ) The third and final reply begins with a long silence, and tends to be 
accompanied by a blank, expressionless face. (The person appears to be struggling 
over whether you have offended some deeply held belief they have about research, 
education, or what should happen in a university. ) `Hmm, ' they say, `that's very ... 
reflexive ... 
isn't it? ' (This is if they are being polite -I have received more direct 
criticisms. ) As if in response to the enquiries of an interested friend or colleague, 
the present chapter describes what the present work is about, and makes the case 
for doing a PhD on doing a PhD. It provides an introduction to the present thesis, 
as well as a general overview of the thesis argument as a whole. In a similar way 
to how a person will often evaluate how entertaining, interesting, or important 
they believe a person's PhD to be in everyday life, so the present reader must do 
the same of the present written thesis, albeit in a more formal, readerly way. 
Hopefully the reader will be persuaded to read on, convinced of the value of 
exploring some of the dilemmas of doing and writing a PhD in the social sciences. 
With the introduction to the introduction out of the way, and before taking 
questions from the floor, it is important to stress at the outset that the present 
thesis does not aim to be of `help' to PhD students who are contemplating, or in 
the process of doing, a doctorate. No practical advice will be given about how to 
succeed as a postgraduate, or how to manage your supervisor effectively. There 
are already plenty of self-help guides available on how to `supervise' yourself to 
quick and successful thesis completion, as we shall see. I am not a supervisor, and 
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this is not a self-help guide. Indeed, I will go on to suggest that it might actually 
be unhelpful for postgraduates to read the present work whilst doing their 
doctorates. 
The present thesis also does not seek to contribute to policy debates over 
PhD submission rates in the social sciences. I am not aiming to `improve' the PhD 
process by making practical suggestions about how supervisors might better 
supervise their students, or how departments can make better provisions for their 
postgraduate cohorts. The literature on doctoral education is replete with policy 
oriented work which addresses concerns such as these. 
Instead, the present thesis offers a critical analysis of the dilemmas of doing 
a doctorate in the social sciences, from the perspective of discursive psychology. 
Specifically, it will be concerned with the ways in which doctoral postgraduates 
relate with themselves, with their newly emerging academic identities, and with 
the academic world in general. There will be an interest in the power dynamics of 
doing a doctorate, especially the hidden or subtle forms of power at work in liberal 
educational settings, along with the wider ideological aspects of higher learning. 
The thesis will also consider specific topics in postgraduate education, such as 
doctoral publishing, myths and stereotypes of academics and academia, and 
disenchantment with the scholarly life. The general argument of the thesis is that 
the topic of postgraduate academic identity proves a good case study for the 
investigation of some of the hidden dynamics of power, as well as the use of wider 
ideological values, in the construction of identities in contemporary institutional 
settings. 
The thesis aims to contribute to qualitative studies of higher education, 
especially work in the sociology of education on doctoral research in the social 
sciences. Delamont, Atkinson and Parry (2000) claim that there has been `far too 
little qualitative research on doctoral students, their work and training. Many of 
these important aspects of higher education remain stubbornly invisible' (p. 134). 
It will be suggested that the `invisible' nature of doctoral education, along with the 
`invisibility' of particular aspects of doctoral postgraduate life, are a result not 
only of doctoral students' ambivalent or marginal position within the academy, 
but also because of the particular characteristics of research into postgraduate 
education, and the positions of the social researchers who have so far studied and 
written on the subject. There is a crucial bias in the literature on social science 
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doctoral research which has yet to be acknowledged. This is that much of the 
theory and research on doing a doctorate has itself been written and carried out by 
doctoral supervisors and already established academic researchers. These 
researchers have left certain gaps in their studies, including the experiential 
dimensions of doctoral research, the discursive construction of doctoral identities, 
and the patterns of power and ideology at play in doctoral postgraduate life. The 
present doctorate on doing a doctorate attempts to fill in these gaps, and at the 
same time introduce a distinctive critical, discursive, and reflexive take on 
postgraduate education. As such, the thesis is addressed primarily to researchers 
working in the field of doctoral educational studies, especially those supervisors 
and academics carrying out qualitative research on the doctoral education process. 
The thesis might also be of interest to academics in general, however, given that 
`[t]he vast majority of academics bear the scars of their postgraduate research' 
(ibid., p. 32). 
The present thesis is framed within various general debates, both within and 
beyond the social sciences, about the values of higher education, the marketization 
of academic life, what happens to identities in institutions, the purposes and 
contradictory tensions of higher learning, the dilemmas of liberalism, the analysis 
of discourse in social psychology, and the development of critical and reflexive 
approaches to social research. The experience of doing a doctorate is thus found to 
be implicated in a wide range of pressing intellectual concerns. In the remainder 
of this chapter, we will briefly consider how the social science doctorate bears 
upon some of these diverse themes, firstly by courting questions from an 
imaginary reader, and secondly by giving an overview of the structure of the 
thesis as a whole. 
What is a PhD? To some extent the present thesis is an attempt to answer 
this question, and indeed you are reading one right now, but nevertheless some 
introductory pointers can be given. My Collins English Dictionary defines a 
doctorate as the highest academic degree in any field of knowledge, and a Doctor 
of Philosophy as a doctorate awarded for original research in any subject except 
law, medicine, or theology. The social science PhD degree is considered both an 
investigation of a particular topic area, as well as a qualification which credentials 
a person as an academic, researcher, or scholar. The classic division is between 
the PhD as an original contribution to knowledge on the one hand, and comprising 
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advanced research training on the other. In pursuing a PhD degree, then, one is not 
only acquiring and generating knowledge, but also transforming oneself and one's 
place in the world. In the social sciences and humanities a doctorate is often 
considered a rite of passage to the scholarly life, a status passage through which a 
person enters the academic world. The bearer of a doctorate is expected to become 
an `expert' in their chosen field of enquiry and `doctored' in the sense that their 
self-identity becomes transformed. This transformation can be said to take place 
`inwardly' (through a process of personal development and knowledge 
acquisition) and `outwardly' (through a change of social status or esteem). The 
PhD confers a change of title on the bearer such that the successful candidate 
becomes qualified as a `Doctor. ' The study of doing a PhD is therefore both a 
study of knowledge (re)production and a study of academic socialisation. 
What are doctoral dilemmas? The change of title and change of status 
inherent in the PhD process neatly brings us to the topic of doctoral dilemmas. 
From the perspective of the present thesis, to say that doing a doctorate involves 
the negotiation of `dilemmas' is not to claim that doctoral students have trouble 
knowing what font to write their theses in, how to make the most stimulating cup 
of tea, or what to say when faced with the question of what their PhD is about. 
Rather, doctoral dilemmas refer to those wider, unresolvable dilemmas of 
common sense and ideology, which structure our thinking and our relationships 
with ourselves, others, and the world (Billig et al., 1988). They are the dilemmas 
that postgraduate students inherit through culture and through history, and which 
are bound up with the organisation of society, patterns of social equality and 
inequality, and the values of liberalism. Essentially they comprise the contrary 
themes which allow thinking and arguments about postgraduate life to take place. 
The PhD degree, for example, is bound up with the dilemmas of liberal ideology, 
in the sense that the expertise and authority which the qualification confers upon 
the bearer have the potential to conflict with the values of democracy, where it is 
believed that everyone should be considered equal. The holder of a doctorate is 
warranted to speak on matters on which other people might be considered 
`unqualified' to speak (Gergen, 1989). Thus, the possession of a PhD has the 
potential to conflict with the egalitarian ethos of a society imbued with democratic 
norms. Doctoral dilemmas is a phrase designed to capture how the contrary 
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themes of common sense and ideology come to be negotiated in doctoral study. 
and represented in the experiences of individual postgraduate students. 
What do you mean by ideology? The approach to ideology adopted in the 
present thesis is most readily associated with the `ideological dilemmas' 
perspective as developed in social psychology (Billig et al., 1988). According to 
this approach, ideology comprises shared common sense, and is represented 
through contrary themes, rather than a coherent totality. People are not the blind 
dupes of ideology, nor are they entirely free to think how they please. Rather, 
people's thoughts are structured around abstractly opposed contradictory values, 
such as justice and mercy, prejudice and tolerance, democracy and 
authoritarianism. People think and argue with these contrary themes as they 
interact with one another and participate in social life. Thus, ideology provides the 
basis for thinking, rather than working to stop thinking from taking place. There is 
also a critical edge to the way in which ideology is understood in the present 
thesis, in the sense that ideology is studied for its effects, and for how it is used to 
maintain relationships of power and inequality (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). The 
focus is not so much on how ideology `distorts' social life, but rather with how 
ideology as a discursive practice works to establish and legitimate patterns of 
dominance and oppression. 
What is discursive psychology? This is the particular theoretical and 
analytical approach adopted in the present thesis. A discursive psychology of 
postgraduate education involves paying attention both to the practical and active 
uses of language, and the wider dilemmas which people can be managing when 
they interact with one another (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Edwards and Potter, 
1992; Billig, 1991). This approach is part of critical traditions in social 
psychology that involve movements between the personal and the social, the 
micro and the macro, the contemporary and the historical (Wetherell, 1998; 
Hepburn, 2003; Parker, 2002). A critical approach to doctoral education involves 
looking both inwardly to the psychological, subjective, and relational, and 
outwardly to the societal, cultural, and ideological. Specifically, a discursive 
approach to doctoral education allows the researcher to acknowledge: firstly, the 
centrality of talk and text in the constitution of doctoral identities and experiences; 
secondly, how the particular discourse that is used by doctoral postgraduates is 
informed by interactional and ideological dilemmas; and thirdly, how the 
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relationship between the researcher, methodology, and participants are reflexively 
constituted. 
What did you actually do in your study? In-depth semi-structured interviews 
were carried out with 16 doctoral postgraduates and young lecturers who were 
registered as PhD candidates and in the process of either carrying out or 
completing their doctoral theses, or waiting for their viva voce examinations. 
Interviews took place mostly in psychology and social science departments in a 
variety of institutional locations, including `new' and `old' universities and 
colleges associated with universities in the North West and East Midlands regions 
of the United Kingdom. Participants were asked about their experiences of doing 
doctorates, whether they considered themselves to be academics, their views on 
academia more generally, and so forth. Crucially the interviews were analysed as 
activities in their own right, rather than as routes through which to gain access to 
doctoral experiences, views, or memories. As well as studying participants' 
answers, I also analyse the questions which I asked of them, paying particular 
attention to how versions of postgraduate life are discursively constructed and 
sustained by postgraduates in their interview encounters. Thus, the approach to the 
analysis has a decidedly reflexive spin. 
What do you mean by reflexivity? In the most basic sense I understand 
reflexivity as self-reference. The present thesis comprises research about research 
and as such it is about itself and refers to itself. Often social researchers do not 
study themselves, or the practices of those near to them, but rather look `down' 
the social ladder to those who are less fortunate. The poor, the dispossessed, and 
the disenfranchised often constitute the participants, or focus of analysis, in 
contemporary social research studies. In the present study, the researcher looks 
`across' the corridor and indeed `within' himself, turning the tables on academic 
enquiry, and taking intellectual development and practice as his object of study. 
Specifically, a form of practical, analytic reflexivity is developed, which involves 
studying my own discursive practices, along with the practices of my respondents. 
Thus, I become a participant, and the thesis as a whole becomes an analytic 
resource. Along with this self-oriented reflexivity, however, there is also an other- 
oriented reflexivity, in the sense that academic texts themselves are treated as 
objects of study, and as locations where postgraduate life and experience are 
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imagined and negotiated. I apply this approach specifically to the genre of the 
self-help guide on how to do a doctorate. 
Are you not just navel gazing? Not at all. It is argued that a reflexive 
approach to doctoral education, studying our own research activities and writing 
practices, is an essential political injunction in the present research context, where 
the role of the researcher is routinely neglected. It is in this sense that reflexivity 
can complement an ideological analysis of discourse, revealing the workings of 
power in liberal academic settings. As such, it allows the researcher to pursue 
serious ends through non-serious means. A reflexive approach also allows one to 
talk about other things, such as wider social issues, and develop new lines of 
enquiry, in a creative and interesting way (Ashmore, 1989). 
What do you not cover in your thesis? The thesis does not discuss the viva 
voce examination, how developmental psychology relates to the doctoral 
experience, and also structural themes on doing a doctorate, such as completion 
rates. 
Overview of the thesis and a cautionary message 
We will now turn to how the thesis as a whole is organized. After this introductory 
chapter, there are two theoretical or literature review chapters (which respectively 
outline the social scientific study of doctoral education and a critical discursive 
approach to doctoral education), one methodology chapter, four chapters of 
analysis (content and discourse analytic), before the final conclusion chapter. The 
overview will be followed by a cautionary message. 
In chapter 2, the literature on doing a doctorate in the social sciences is 
critically reviewed, especially work on the experiential dimensions of doctoral 
study. The chapter sketches out the cultural, historical, and policy background of 
the British social science PhD, and considers the contradictory views about the 
nature of the PhD itself Various research literatures are presented and discussed, 
including the sociology of education, higher education policy documentation, and 
guides on how to do a doctorate. It is suggested that the research on doctoral 
education has so far been largely descriptive and designed to address policy 
concerns, rather than pursuing critical, theoretical, or analytical agendas. In 
particular, the themes of discourse, ideology, and power have been mostly 
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neglected by researchers of doctoral study. Furthermore, the practical role of the 
researcher is routinely ignored in studies of postgraduate life. For example, 
researchers of doctoral education rarely consider the questions they ask of their 
respondents, and the ways in which their position might impact upon what their 
participants say. This chapter therefore establishes the need for a discursive 
psychology of doctoral education. 
In chapter 3, the theoretical background of a discursive approach to doctoral 
research is introduced, drawing particularly on forms of discursive psychology 
which combine the study of ordinary language use with broader social analysis, or 
`critical' discursive psychologies. The discursive approach stresses the practical 
and active uses of language, especially of lay psychological language, where 
people invoke mental states and inner feelings to perform social actions. From a 
discursive perspective, psychology lies between people in their discursive 
interactions, and should be studied as such. This chapter also reviews work in 
discourse analysis on the dilemmas of identity and the dilemmas of education, 
especially work concerning the ideological patterning of how people negotiate 
these topics. The main argument is that it is possible to do a critical analysis of 
doctoral postgraduate identities and experiences by paying attention to the detailed 
specifics of discursive interaction. 
Chapter 4 comprises a reflexive approach to the issue of methodology, 
describing how the study was carried out, and at the same time taking my own 
practice as a doctoral postgraduate researcher to task. The chapter discusses the 
theoretical and practical issues relating to how the participants were contacted, the 
interviewing procedure, ethical considerations, transcription, and the procedure of 
discourse analysis. By `going reflexive' new avenues in the study of doctoral 
education are opened up, including how the dilemmas of professionalism are 
practically managed by novice researchers, and how the practice and writing of 
`ethics' can be taken as a topic of academic enquiry. 
Chapter 5 presents a content analysis of some of the identity work done by 
doctoral postgraduates during the course of their interviews, specifically in 
response to the `academic questions' they were asked, such as `do you consider 
yourself an academic? ' It is argued that a content analytic approach can prepare 
the ground for a discourse analysis, tracking themes and trends, identifying 
patterns and divergences, across a data set. By analysing my own questions as an 
8 
interviewer, for example, it is found that particular assumptions are displayed 
about the participants through the questions which are asked of them, which have 
consequences for the answers they subsequently give. Also, postgraduate identity 
work is found to be a rhetorical project, involving the argumentative use of 
justificatory warrants, as participants variously claim and disclaim academic 
identities for themselves. The criteria of what it takes to be an `academic' 
according to the postgraduates are discussed, along with the limitations of the 
content analytic approach. 
Chapter 6 is the first of three discourse analytic chapters, in which the 
discursive domain of doctoral postgraduate interview talk is analysed. This 
chapter continues to substantiate the rhetorical basis of postgraduate identities, 
taking three participants from the content analysis who each claimed academic 
identities for themselves. Discursive analysis is carried out of them being asked 
their respective academic questions. From a discourse and rhetoric perspective, 
the participants Ben, Fiona, and Rachel employed quite different strategies in 
making their academic identity claims. Each participant negotiated a different 
`dilemma of stake' (Edwards and Potter, 1992) not identified in the content 
analysis: how to claim an academic identity without coming across as a non- 
academic; how to create the impression that `academic' is a discredited identity 
while at the same time claiming that identity; and how not to claim too much or 
too little of an academic identity. The subtle discursive patterning of the status and 
anti-status and the desirability and undesirability of an academic identity is also 
outlined. This chapter illustrates discursively the rhetorical nature of postgraduate 
identity work. 
Chapter 7 stays with the topic of identity work and considers ambivalence in 
the claiming of an academic identity. The chapter looks in detail at a single 
participants' extended response to their `academic question. ' Will attempted to 
claim both an academic and a non-academic identity and the analysis focuses on 
the interactional dilemmas that this provokes. Along with the local contingencies 
of the young lecturer's identity work, the analysis also explores the ideological 
dilemmas of claiming an academic identity. Traditional ideas of academia come 
into conflict with contemporary university teaching realities, and the snobbery of 
minor differences between the 'PhD' and the `non-PhD' is also highlighted. In 
addition, a hidden hand of power is identified. 
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Chapter 8 is the final discourse analytic chapter of the thesis and concerns 
some of the power dynamics that can be involved in doing a doctorate. In earlier 
chapters, the changing nature of power in higher educational contexts was 
highlighted, and the analysis therefore pays close attention to the particular ways 
in which power is discursively oriented to in the talk of doctoral postgraduates. 
The general argument of the chapter is that liberal power, when it is working 
successfully, is often hidden and buried within particular discursive practices in 
complex and subtle ways. For example, through the use of pronouns and informal 
terms of address the student-supervisor relationship can be presented as an 
egalitarian relationship between colleagues of equal status, and the pressures to 
publish doctoral work appear to be the result of `distal' forces that are difficult to 
speak of and hard to identify. Even when an implied abuse of power on the part of 
a supervisor takes place, resulting in disillusionment on the part of the doctoral 
postgraduate, the traumatic nature of the crisis may still in a sense be 
`unknowable. ' 
Chapter 9 is the conclusion of the thesis and brings together what has been 
lost and found in this study of doctoral dilemmas. The chapter turns back upon the 
thesis as a whole and considers whether its findings can be applied to itself. 
Through exploring the presences and absences in the text, another hidden hand of 
power is identified. As such, it is suggested that the present doctoral thesis both 
resists and reproduces the power dynamics involved in doing a PhD. 
Before moving on to the next chapter, a cautionary message must be given to 
doctoral postgraduates reading the present thesis. If you are such a person, then it 
is likely that you are reading this thesis either because you want to know what a 
doctoral thesis looks like, or because you want to know how better to do your own 
doctoral thesis. I have learnt from experience that reading other people's theses is 
not such a good idea. In comparing oneself with the imagined individual who 
wrote the tome in hand, one often becomes anxiously competitive. In this sense, I 
would recommend putting this weighty work down, and returning to your own 
studies with dignity in hand - try not to think or worry about what anyone else has 
done in their doctorate. A further reason why reading this thesis might be 
unhelpful is that becoming aware of the power dynamics and ideological 
dilemmas of doing a doctorate might not in itself be emancipatory. Indeed, the 
present work might even be dispiriting for the postgraduate reader, in part due to 
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the sheer number of dilemmas and contradictions identified therein. The thesis 
might draw your attention to issues which you need not know anything about, or 
draw your attention away from your own work, feeding your desire to 
procrastinate. (There is nothing more ironic than a doctoral student reading a book 
on doing a doctorate as a way of avoiding doing their own doctorate. ) More 
importantly, reading the present thesis might damage, rather than improve, your 
relationship with your supervisor. Considering that power is productive as well as 
oppressive, changes to the supervisory relationship as a result of your newly found 
`bolshiness' might have adverse consequences in terms of the knowledge that is 
produced, and the insights that are made. Far be it from me to supervise you 
though. In the end it is your choice whether or not to turn the page. 
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Chapter 2- Doctoral Study in the Social Sciences 
In this chapter we will review the mainstream literature on doctoral study in the 
social sciences, paying particular attention to work in the sociology of education, 
the self-help guides on how to do a doctorate, and also higher education policy 
documentation; strands of work which tend to be overlapping and mutually 
constitutive. Throughout the review we will be concerned mainly with the 
experiential rather than the structural aspects of doing a doctorate. Research on 
postgraduate education has given relatively little attention to `the experiences, 
perceptions and value stances of graduate students and their supervisors' 
favouring instead themes such as completion rates, selection procedures, and 
quality control measures (Becher, Henkel and Kogan, 1994, p. 2). The present 
chapter critically evaluates how the experience of doing a doctorate has been 
conceptualised and studied in the social science literature so far. 
What we will find is that research on doctoral education has tended to be 
descriptive in character, following policy debates and concerns, and lacking in 
critical analysis and theoretical discussion. There has, for example, been relatively 
little discussion of the role that power can play in the doing of a doctorate. In 
addition, there has been a general reluctance in sociological work to theorise and 
analyse in detail the experiential dimensions of doctoral study; the psychological 
and discursive aspects of doing a doctorate have largely been neglected. What is 
needed, then, is an approach to doctoral education which bridges both psychology 
and sociology. This chapter will justify why a discursive psychological approach 
to doctoral education is needed, which stresses the centrality of rhetoric and 
ideology in the constitution of doctoral student life and experience. 
Values of higher education 
In recent decades the United Kingdom has seen large scale changes concerning 
the value which is placed on higher education, relating specifically to the 
strengthening ties between universities, government, and industry (Thompson, 
1970; Anderson, 2001). Concepts such as modernisation (Cole, 1998; Rustin, 
1998), marketisation (Fairclough, 1993,1995,1996; Chouliaraki and Fairclough. 
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1999; Gibbs, 2001; Pugsley, 1998), managerialism (Deem, 1998; Ozga, 1998; 
Miller, 1998; Trowler, 1998), commodification (Fairclough, 1992,1994), 
consumption (Fulton, 1994; Piper, 2000), alienation (Harvie, 2000; Mann, 2001). 
and even McDonaldization (Hartley, 1995) have come to the fore in recent higher 
educational studies. Much of this work has brought attention to, and criticised, the 
way in which university institutions have come to adopt the values of the market, 
rather than traditional academic values. Writing of the political climate around the 
time of his inaugural lecture in the late 1980s, one academic has suggested that 
`the British government directly threatens the values of academic enquiry. 
Universities and polytechnics are not expected to pursue knowledge for its sake, 
but to compete successfully as commercial enterprises. Knowledge must be seen 
to have its price' (Billig, 1991, p. 31). Although this comment referred to the 
previous Conservative government, the trend towards economic instrumentalism 
in education is similarly evident in the policies of the present government. In New 
Labour, New Language? the critical discourse analyst Norman Fairclough (2000) 
claims that the present New Labour government considers learning to be an 
economic rather than an educational process (p. 75, p. 49). The purpose of higher 
education is deemed to be to cater to the needs of the national economy, rather 
than for the advancement of knowledge, or the creation of new generations of 
academic scholars. In part as a result of these governmental concerns, institutes of 
higher learning are increasingly marketing themselves as though they are business 
enterprises, treating students like `customers' and positioning them as the 
`consumers' of education (Fairclough, 1992,1994; Fulton, 1994; Piper, 2000). In 
the contemporary academic market place it appears that `[e]very academic product 
can be assigned a commerical value, as the balance sheets of academic activity are 
regularly drawn up' (Billig, 1996, p. 9). 
Tensions between instrumental economic and traditional academic values 
can be found in contemporary postgraduate education policy making. In Graduate 
Education in Britain Becher, Henkel and Kogan (1994) highlight `the increasing 
emphasis given to economic instrumentalism' (p. 183) in recent postgraduate 
education policy provision. 
Policy making for graduate education in the UK is in transition. It has increasingly moved 
into the more visible political arena as its relevance to the economy is identified by 
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government. It is moving, too, from a state of considerable academic freedom to a regime of 
central guidance and control, partly caused by the shift from an elite to a mass system of 
higher education (p. 11). 
Moreover, specific concerns have been expressed in graduate education policy 
making about external examining, completion rates, how long students should 
take to submit their theses, as well as the balance between general research 
training and candidate's individual thesis topics. Partly as a result of concerns over 
submission and drop-out rates amongst its social science PhD candidates, in 1985 
the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) initiated a sanctions policy, 
setting institutional targets for thesis completion rates (cf. Rudd, 1985). 
Candidates were required to submit their theses within four years of initial 
registration. Institutions that failed to meet this requirement were `blacklisted' and 
some became ineligible for postgraduate research support. ' The ESRC also 
commisioned an enquiry, indicating there to be a lack of knowledge about 
postgraduate training in the social sciences (Winfield, 1987). This was 
accompanied by an empirical study concerning the `management' practices and 
procedures of social science doctoral education in six universities (Young, Fogarty 
and McRae, 1987). The study established that there was a lack of agreement about 
the nature and purpose of the social science doctorate: should the PhD consist of 
an original contribution to knowledge, or involve advanced research training? 
In response to the findings of the 1987 study, the ESRC reduced its number 
of doctoral candidates and developed a studentship `competition' to which 
students and supervisors were to submit research proposals, outlining the research 
training which candidates would complete during their first year of study. The 
ESRC had essentially adopted a `training-based model' for the social science 
PhD. 2 This was despite the fact that `[t]he traditional British emphasis had, up 
until that time, been on students' individual research and on the thesis as the sole 
' Even the University of Cambridge was on this list for a period of time (Noble, 1994, p. 29). 
2 For their subsequent training guidelines, see ESRC (1991,1996,2001). In 1999 the ESRC 
developed a '1+3' system whereby students who have not previously completed any substantive 
research training are funded for a one year research training masters degree, followed by three 
years for a PhD. The empirical work for the present research was carried out before this system 
was implemented. 
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outcome of the research training period' (Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 2000, p. 
189). In 1994 Becher, Henkel and Kogan observed that the then recent history of 
the ESRC had included `attempts to justify its subject domains in the face of 
political scepticism about their usefulness' (p. 33), and that perhaps because it 
feels it has the most to prove, it is `amongst the most directive of the research 
councils' (p. 34). 
It is only in the social sciences that systematic research training seems to be relatively 
common. To what extent this reflects the internal needs of the disciplines in question, and to 
what extent it is a result of the particularly heavy external pressure from the main public 
funding agency, the Economic and Social Research Council, is a matter for debate (p. 105). 
It is somewhat ironic that research into the social science doctorate has tended to 
follow government concerns about the state of postgraduate education and 
training, and in turn has been funded by governmental research councils. Indeed 
most studies of the PhD have come about as a direct response to broader policy 
concerns and research council initiatives. For example, in 1988 the ESRC 
sponsored a national research initiative on social science doctoral research in the 
United Kingdom (Burgess, 1994). This project was concerned with `the process of 
supervision in years one, two and three; the activities of supervisors and students; 
the relationships between them and their perceptions of doing a PhD' as well as 
issues to do with `writing, examining, completion rates and labour market studies' 
(p. vii). Studies under this initiative included qualitative and quantitative 
investigations of the socialization of doctoral students in sociology, business and 
economics, as well as their entry into the disciplinary knowledge cultures of such 
fields as social anthropology, human geography, and town planning. 
The Doctoral Experience study was part of this initiative (Delamont, 
Atkinson and Parry, 2000). It concerns `the cultures and the cultural reproduction 
of academic disciplines ... 
[and] how the tacit knowledge and cultural forms of 
academic knowledge shape the identities of academics themselves' (p. 17). The 
authors draw upon the sociological work of Bourdieu (1988) and Bernstein, 
adopting a largely structuralist approach in making sense of postgraduate 
disciplinary enculturation. Through ethnographic analysis of qualitative interviews 
with 286 doctoral candidates, supervisors and departmental heads in the natural 
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and social sciences, they have illustrated how students become socialised as 
knowledgeable academics and researchers within particular disciplinary traditions 
(Parry, Atkinson and Delamont, 1994; for a recent reflection on this project, see 
Delamont, 2003). 
Around the same time as the ESRC initiative, between 1987 and 1990, a 
five-nation study was carried out, sponsored by the Spencer Education 
Foundation, encompassing Germany, Britain, France, the United States, and Japan 
(Clark, 1993). This study investigated the `research foundations' of graduate 
education and aimed to `examine comparatively the historical development and 
current state of research organization and advanced education in the five leading 
countries of the Western world' (p. xvi). It combined `macro' studies of the 
general structures of research and graduate education with `micro' analysis of the 
`faculty-student relationships within university departments' (ibid. ). In terms of 
subject domains, physics was taken to represent the sciences, economics the social 
sciences, and history the humanities. The study involved analysis of national data, 
previous studies, as well as interviews with faculty, graduate students, and 
national officials. 
The British component of this study was carried out by Becher, Henkel and 
Kogan (1994; see also Henkel and Kogan, 1993; Becher, 1993). This project is a 
contribution to higher education studies, as well as the wider study of public 
policy. Central to the study are `the qualitative issues associated with graduate 
education' rather than the structural themes (Becher, Henkel and Kogan, 1994, p. 
2). Together with interviews in physics, economics and history, the researchers 
also investigated sociology, modern languages, and biochemistry. 
Altogether, 80 members of academic staff and 55 graduate students were interviewed across 
the range of six chosen disciplines in sixteen different institutions ... 
Detailed notes were 
taken of each interview, and written up in a fuller and more systematic form as soon as 
possible afterwards (p. 4). 
These and related studies form the basis of the subsequent review of doctoral 
study in the social sciences. 3 It will be suggested that much research into doctoral 
3 The Winfield Report so radically altered the terrain of the social science PhD that the present 
review does not consider pre-Winfield era policy making (see Rothschild, 1982; Swinnerton-Dyer, 
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education has so far been designed to address issues of policy, and that in order to 
address issues of theory, it needs to take a next step into critical and reflexive 
analyses, acknowledging and challenging its own incorporation in the university 
political climate of the times. By adopting such a stance we can open the way to 
understanding the `ideological dilemmas' of doing and studying the social science 
doctorate, as developed in the present thesis. 
Purposes of the doctorate 
The PhD has had a long and complicated history. It took over a century for it to 
arrive in Britain after it was first introduced in Germany in the early nineteenth 
century (Simpson, 1983). The lower doctorate was introduced by the University of 
Oxford in 1917, some fifty years after Yale University in the United States had 
done the same. 4 Why did it take so long for the PhD to come to Britain? 
Traditionally, British universities such as Oxford and Cambridge have focused 
primarily on providing `liberal education' rather than opportunities for advanced 
study and research. 
Historically, the emphasis in British universities was placed on teaching, not research. 
Emphasis on conducting research, which first gained prominence in German-speaking 
universities and which was later adopted by universities in the United States, then Canada, 
was generally not of primary and widespread importance at the universities in Britain until 
the early to mid-twentieth century; emphasis being given to high quality baccalaurate 
education (Noble, 1994, pp. 19 - 20). 
The introduction of the doctor of philosophy degree is bound up with changing 
ideas about the concept of the university. In 1812 Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767 - 
1982). For more detailed accounts of the development of postgraduate education policy in the 
United Kingdom, see Hockey (1991), Becher, Henkel and Kogan (1994), Noble (1994), Delamont, 
Atkinson and Parry (1997a, 2000, Appendix 2), Taylor (2002). 
4 The modern PhD is considered a `lower' doctorate and is commonly undertaken `for the purpose 
of gaining employment in an academic or research institution' (Noble, 1994, p. 2). The first 
`higher' doctorate - `granted for prodigious research and scholarly accomplishments over a 
lengthy period' - was awarded in Paris in around 1150. Although both lower and higher doctoral 
degrees continue to be awarded, the doctorate of philosophy is now the most common (p. 11). 
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1835) founded the University of Berlin, a research institution where the creation 
of knowledge was deemed paramount. Humboldt believed that the state should 
support the university financially, `but that it had no right to interfere in its 
internal affairs' (Simpson, 1983, p. 13). By the second half of the nineteenth 
century, Germany's overall research productivity exceeded that of all other 
countries, and '[s]tudents from all over the world were converging on her 
universities to enjoy the higher studies which they could not find at their own' 
(ibid., p. 27). It was only at the beginning of the twentieth century, however, that 
the campaign to introduce the PhD to Britain began to take hold, `not so much to 
entice British students away from Germany but, ironically, to divert to Britain the 
continuing stream of young American scholars to that country' (ibid., p. 18). After 
all, before the doctor of philosophy degree was introduced, neither the University 
of Oxford or the University of Cambridge could offer systematic instruction for 
graduate students seeking advanced study or research. 
It was in this international context and against a backdrop of increasing 
educational, economic, and political pressures that the universities of the United 
Kingdom began to improve their provisions for postgraduate education, and 
introduced the PhD degree. This introduction was both hastened and hindered by 
the onset of the First World War, for while there was a need to maintain national 
prestige and superiority in an age of difficulty and transition, the PhD with its 
German association `was an unpopular concept' (ibid., p. 132). Nevertheless it 
was predicted that the coveted title of `Doctor' would attract American students to 
Britain, and Oxford in its `traditionally individualistic fashion' designated the PhD 
the `DPhil' (ibid., p. 134). A headline in the New York Times at the time read 
`Oxford Innovation to draw Americans' and the Times Educational Supplement 
reported that Oxford was `renewing her golden youth at the fountain of national 
necessity' (ibid., p. 140, p. 143). The new doctorate was intended to reward `the 
earliest advanced work of young graduates' (ibid., p. 139), predominantly in the 
natural sciences, and would involve lengthy study, original research and thesis 
preparation (Noble, 1994, p. 64). It was essentially to function as an `entrance 
ticket' or `passport' to the international academic world. 
In recent times there have been numerous debates about the purpose of the 
social science doctorate. Some propose a traditional knowledge-based PhD, in 
which an original contribution to knowledge is made, along the lines of an 
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educational apprenticeship. While others suggest that the PhD should involve 
significant elements of structure and formal research training. Becher, Henkel and 
Kogan (1994) have suggested that a `good case can be made for stipulating that 
every doctoral student should begin his or her programme by undertaking an 
element of research training' (p. 101; see Hockey, 1991 for the arguments for and 
against). From specific to more generalised conceptions of the doctorate, the 
division has been expressed in a number of ways: as process or product (Young, 
Fogarty and McRae, 1987; Salmon, 1992); education or training (Hockey, 1991); 
general research training or individual thesis work (Becher, Henkel and Kogan, 
1994); explicit training or implicit enculturation (Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 
2000), and so on. Overall there seems to be a general lack of certainty about the 
precise nature of the social science PhD (Noble, 1994). `It takes a good deal of 
hard labour, and no one is quite sure what it is' (Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 
2000, p. 35). 
Some examiners see the aims of the PhD to be a training for a career in research, some as an 
introduction to writing books, some as preparation for the academic life and some, as we 
have suggested, to become a fully rounded professional (Phillips and Pugh, 2000, p. 28). 
Despite this disagreement, however, 
A common view across the social sciences and humanities is that the doctoral thesis is an 
individual and original piece of work, the production of which, at minimum, provides the 
foundation for a career as an individual researcher or scholar (Becher, Henkel and Kogan, 
1994, p. 85). 
According to this view, the thesis should not be seen as the student's life's work, 
but rather as a first relatively large-scale research study, representing an initial 
foray into the world of research and scholarship. It is a `foundation' for a 
subsequent academic career. Delamont, Atkinson and Parry (2000) point out that 
while the doctoral students in their study stressed `how they adored their subject 
and how doing a PhD was an emotional and intellectual quest for personal 
fulfilment 
... 
[i]t would be naive to accept such accounts at face value, because the 
same students saw a PhD as a vocational qualification: they wanted to be 
university lecturers and career researchers' (p. 49). 
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At the level of the individual student, then, doing a doctorate is not only 
about acquiring knowledge and making an original contribution to a field of 
academic enquiry. It is also about the transformation of identity. `[D]octoral 
research produces and reproduces not only knowledge, but social identities as 
well' (ibid., p. 4). For many the doing of a doctorate plays a central role in the 
development of an `academic' identity (Austin, 2002; Henschen, 1993). Becher 
(1989) suggests that while it may begin at the undergraduate level, the process of 
developing this identity `is likely to be at its most intense at the postgraduate 
stage, culminating in the award of a doctorate and, for the chosen few, the first 
offer of employment as a faculty member' (p. 25). Doing a social science 
doctorate is therefore considered part of a `rite of passage to the scholarly life' 
(ibid., p. 108). It constitutes a `relatively prolonged process of status passage' 
(Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 2000, p. 4), as the successful candidate becomes 
not only an `expert' in their particular subject area, but also a `Doctor of 
Philosophy. ' 
A PhD is a badge of legitimate membership: a badge to be worn by the student, helped by 
the supervisor and tested by the examiners (ibid., p. 34). 
PhD `examiners are indeed testing the students' attempts to join the world of autonomous 
scholars' (ibid., p. 35). 
Overwhelmingly, the assumptions were that the doctorate was a preparation for an 
academic career and centred on research and, in some cases, scholarship (Becher, Henkel 
and Kogan, 1994, p. 55; emphasis added). 
[W]riting a thesis appears more and more to be a test of stamina -a hellish rite of passage 
into the academic world (Renouf, 1989, p. 91). 
Although it is routinely stated that a social science doctorate is a stepping stone to 
an academic career, it is often unclear the extent to which doctoral postgraduates 
consider themselves to be becoming `academics. ' We do not know much, for 
example, about how students experience the transition from the student to the 
scholarly life, their levels of consent and resistance to that process (cf. Coupland, 
2004). In their study of graduate education in Britain, Becher, Henkel and Kogan 
(1994) report that of the 55 postgraduate students they interviewed, 54% said that 
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they wanted an academic career. Of those remaining 30% were either undecided 
or did not express definite views and 16% said that they did not want such a career 
at all (p. 155). While this is interesting data, we are left somewhat in the dark 
about the actual reasons why doctoral students say they want, or do not want, 
academic careers. What do postgraduates think it takes to become academics, and 
how far along the scholarly status passage do they consider themselves to be? 
We are also left wondering about the experiential dimensions of the 
development of academic careers. How do doctoral students relate to both 
themselves and their newly forged identities? In the following sections we will 
consider attempts to address the experience of doing a doctorate in studies of 
postgraduate education. Unfortunately there appears to be a general lack of 
engagement with `experience' in such studies. Even the authors of The Doctoral 
Experience do not articulate what they mean by the term. While they present 
interesting examples of the `experiences' of doctoral postgraduates, both social 
and intellectual, they tend not to explicitly theorise those experiences, explaining 
how we are to understand them. In Experiencing Identity, Ian Craib (1998) 
suggests that `any sociological account of our world must imply something about 
the way people experience the world' (p. 1) but that sociological explanations 
often tend to deny or ignore people's experiences. While helpful observations 
have certainly been made about the experiential dimensions of doctoral study in 
sociological studies, especially pertaining to the supervisory relationship, 
researchers have tended to neglect the role that discourse can play in the 
constitution of doctoral identities, views, and experiences. The following 
discussion therefore foreshadows chapter 3, in which we will map out a discursive 
approach to doctoral experience and the study of `inner' postgraduate life. 
Doctoral and supervisory dilemmas 
Merton and Barber (1976) have proposed that social roles display a `sociological 
ambivalence' in the sense that they are structured around incompatible normative 
demands. For example, they point out that while doctors are expected to be 
clinical and objective in their encounters with patients, they are also expected to 
display a compassionate friendliness. The central argument is that social roles 
necessarily consist of abstractly opposed normative requirements. In order to carry 
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out their roles acceptably, social actors must balance and negotiate these 
contradictory demands. From the perspective of sociological ambivalence the role 
of the doctoral postgraduate can be seen to be ambivalent, being composed of 
conflicting and contradictory tensions. After all, doctoral candidates are not 
straightforwardly students, nor are they strictly members of staff. Rather, in the 
academic world, they appear to occupy an `in-between' status. 
Doctoral research is in many ways a liminal experience. The students stand on the threshold 
of their academic career. Many are poised between the collective experience of 
undergraduate education and full incorporation into the academic profession (Delamont, 
Atkinson and Parry, 2000, p. 176; emphasis in original). 
According to the research evidence, the role of the doctoral postgraduate is 
structured around a complicated mixture of both `student' and `staff demands. 
The contrary nature of the postgraduate role can be appreciated if we consider the 
various activities which doctoral students may potentially be involved in during 
their course of `study. ' When teaching undergraduates, attending and presenting at 
conferences, and publishing their work, for example, doctoral candidates may 
come across as established members of the academy, almost like lecturing 
academics or independent research scholars. However, when participating in 
thesis assessment activities, presenting their work at postgraduate seminars, and 
being supervised by established members of staff, they appear dependent students 
or inexperienced novices. Paradoxically, doctoral postgraduates are studying for 
advanced qualifications while at the same time making original contributions to 
knowledge. The role of the doctoral postgraduate appears decidedly ambivalent. 
As with established academics and undergraduate students, doctoral 
postgraduates are under various institutional pressures relating to their 
professional conduct. Delamont, Atkinson and Parry (2000) suggest that in higher 
education the `[p]ressure to complete work to meet externally imposed deadlines 
is ever present. This applies from the everday work of the undergraduate onwards, 
and it is especially acute for the research student' (p. 15). Tony Becher (1993) has, 
for example, written of the `ever-present sense of time pressure' for doctoral 
22 
students to complete their theses (p. 136). 5 As well as there being pressures to 
complete work, however, there are also pressures on doctoral postgraduates to 
publish, especially if they are wanting to pursue academic careers in the future 
(Brewer et al., 1999; Gaston, Lantz and Snyder, 1975; for a critique, see Fox. 
1983,1984). 
Those who were strongly motivated to pursue an academic career saw [publishing] as an 
important means of establishing their professional identities well in advance of the time 
when they had to apply for jobs (Becher, Henkel and Kogan, 1994, p. 119). 
In the act of publishing doctoral postgraduates may appear to be established 
academics or researchers rather than inexperienced students. But how does 
publishing actually work at doctoral level in the context of the supervisory 
relationship? Research has suggested that supervisors differ in the degree to which 
they encourage their students to publish (Becher, Henkel and Kogan, 1994, pp. 
118 - 120). There also appear to be disciplinary differences in the importance 
accorded to publishing during the PhD. 
There was more evidence in psychology departments than in education departments of 
students being encouraged to write papers for publication, often jointly with the supervisor. 
The majority of psychology supervisors indicated that they regarded such initiation into 
academic life as an integral part of their role as supervisors (Hill, Acker and Black, 1994, p. 
67). 
No in-depth studies have been carried out, however, of the dynamics of publishing 
at doctoral level, and the experiences which students have had of it. If in 
publishing students appear independent academics, what of collaborative 
publications between students and their supervisors? After all, in the social 
sciences, `taking personal responsibility for one's work readily implies an almost 
competitive relationship with one's supervisor and other more senior academics' 
(Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 2000, p. 155), and this might especially be the 
5 `The common expectation among supervisors and students alike was that a hardworking 
individual, not encountering any particular problems in the course of the research, ought to be able 
to submit his or her thesis in some three-and-a-half to four years' (Becher, Henkel and Kogan, 
1994, p. 127). 
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case in publishing from a doctoral thesis. Given the contrary expectations of 
doctoral postgraduates being both autonomous scholars and dependent students, 
the activity of publishing from a thesis is not likely to be straightforward. Indeed, 
the extent to which doctoral postgraduates are, or should be considered, 'junior 
members of the profession or subordinate novices' is a sensitive issue (ibid., p. 
176). In an early essay on the supervision of doctoral candidates, Wason (1974) 
suggested that `the postgraduate lives in an ill-defined limbo between the world of 
undergraduates, which he [sic] has outgrown, and the staff with whom he may 
begin to mix on more equal terms' (p. 25). The cautious way in which Wason 
suggests that postgraduates may `begin' to mix with staff on `more' equal terms 
implies that their relationship with senior faculty members is anything less than 
straightforward. It is to the departmental and social contexts of postgraduate 
culture that the present review now turns. 
It is often acknowledged that social science doctoral cultures are 
significantly more individualized - both socially and intellectually - compared to 
those in the natural sciences (Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 1997a). 
The social scientists reported both social isolation - being lonely - and intellectual isolation 
- working alone on their topic. Isolation of both types is a function of the mode of 
socialization. Students are socially isolated because there are relatively few of them and 
they are often uninvolved in the social circuit of conferences, colloquia and so on. They are 
intellectually isolated because they are treated as individual scholars in their own right, each 
responsible for his or her own project (Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 2000, p. 161). 
It is often claimed that the individualized nature of social science PhD culture, 
combined with the ambivalent role of the doctoral student, can result in 
postgraduates feeling marginalised, isolated, and alone during the course of their 
studies. It has even been suggested that marginality is an inherent feature of 
doctoral education, and that postgraduate research students constitute one of the 
most marginalised groups in British higher education (Becher, 1993; Becher, 
Henkel and Kogan, 1994, p. 141, p. 147). In several of the institutions investigated 
by Becher, Henkel and Kogan, for example, postgraduates were given no 
communal room, no desk, and nowhere to leave their belongings. Marginality and 
isolation appear to be common features of social science doctoral research 
(although for a critique of this trend, see Bartlett and Mercer, 1999,2000). The 
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individualization inherent in social science doctoral study becomes especially 
apparent when we come to consider the student-supervisor relationship. modelled 
as it is on the traditional idea of an `apprenticeship. ' 
In contrast to the natural science model, doctoral work in the social sciences depends on a 
more individualized relationship between a student and his or her supervisor (or panel of 
supervisors in some cases). In many social science departments the supervisory relationship 
may form the main, if not the only, source of support for the doctoral student (Delamont, 
Atkinson and Parry, 2000, p. 161). 
The traditional British pattern in doctoral education is of the lone research student being 
supervised by a single academic (Phillips and Pugh, 2000, p. 193). 
The student-supervisor relationship appears to be a central organising feature of 
the social science PhD. Tony Becher (1993) has remarked upon `the weight placed 
on the student-supervisor relationship' and the `heavy reliance on supervision' in 
British doctoral programmes (p. 145). Indeed Becher, Henkel and Kogan (1994) 
point out that it is not difficult to see `how the concept of the doctorate as an 
individual apprenticeship and the marginalisation of graduate studies may 
combine to produce conditions in which students are acutely dependent on their 
supervisors' (p. 148). 
Naturally, in the early days of doctoral study, students and their supervisors 
are expected to arrange regular meetings with one another. One of the first duties 
of the supervisor is to discuss with the student their initial PhD thesis proposal, 
often transforming a general and over-ambitious project outline into something 
more manageable and realistic (see Becher, Henkel and Kogan, 1994, pp. 96 - 
100). Intriguingly, however, research on doctoral education has indicated that 
there is variability in the accounts students and supervisors give concerning the 
frequency, duration and agenda of their meetings, as the following extracts 
illustrate. 
Interesting differences emerged in student and supervisor perceptions of frequency and 
duration [of supervisory meetings], regardless of discipline. Supervisors most often stated 
that meetings took place weekly or fortnightly for full-timers and monthly for part-timers, 
whereas students most often reported monthly and two-monthly intervals respectively. 
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Supervisors also recalled longer-lasting tutorials of one or two hours, compared to students' 
reports of thirty to sixty minutes (Hill, Acker and Black, 1994, p. 62). 
It is, incidentally, interesting to note that the supervisors' estimates of the time they 
allocated to their students were almost invariably more generous than those of the students 
themselves (Becher, Henkel and Kogan, 1994, p. 112). 
Students, almost without exception, saw the agenda being set by themselves, whereas 
supervisors most frequently reported that it was jointly negotiated. Some students 
experienced this responsibility as something of a shock after the structure which they had 
experienced as undergraduates (Hill, Acker and Black, 1994, p. 63). 
While researchers often identify such discrepancies in their interviews with 
students and supervisors, they rarely say anything more than that they are 
`interesting. ' Researchers do not, for example, ask why such variability takes 
place, or study in detail the patterning of the different versions. Why do students 
and supervisors tend to differ in their accounts of supervisory meetings? 
Researchers of doctoral education rarely tend to theorise or analyse the 
discrepancies between, and within, student and supervisor discourse. This neglect 
is closely allied to the more general absence of substantive discourse analyses in 
doctoral education research. Although researchers often present qualitative 
materials, they rarely analyse them in detail, preferring to take the discourse for 
granted, and as representing transparent versions of `the world' or `experience. ' 
Talk and text are central features of doctoral education, and so it is somewhat 
unusual that researchers tend not to investigate them in detail, merely presenting 
accounts and implying that little of interest can be said of them. (Of course there 
are exceptions, see the following chapter, and also Delamont, Parry and Atkinson, 
1998). In the next chapter we will consider the role that language use, or 
discourse, might play in the constitution of doctoral identities and experiences, 
together with the question of variability between students and supervisors in 
accounts of their relationships. We will find that discursive psychology stresses 
the importance of language use and dialogue in the constitution of doctoral student 
thinking, identity, and experience. 
As suggested above, initial supervisory meetings represent the beginnings 
of what are often complicated and nuanced relationships, involving the subtle 
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negotiation of doctoral students' autonomy and dependency with regards their 
supervisors. Noble (1994), writing on the theme of autonomy and dependency in 
the context of postgraduate research, suggests that the humanities represent the 
most autonomous field of research, whereas the sciences represent the most 
constrained (p. 101). Although he does not specify those disciplines `midway' on 
the autonomy-dependency spectrum, we can surmise that the social sciences are 
one of them. Successful social science postgraduates are expected neither to be 
totally reliant upon their supervisors, nor entirely self-reliant. Rather, in order for 
the relationship to work, a delicate `balancing act' must be performed, between 
the contrary requirements of autonomy and dependency (Delamont, Parry and 
Atkinson, 1998). 
In the following extract Delamont, Atkinson and Parry (2000) outline the 
rather elusive and diffuse pattern of control evidenced in the social sciences in 
contrast to the natural sciences. 
In all disciplines and departments control is exercised, as Bourdieu points out, by the 
established academics over their successors. In both science and social science senior 
academics exercise authority, but in the natural sciences, control is more clearly hierarchical 
and overtly structured. In the social sciences the system of control is more implicit, more 
negotiable, more based on an individual's personal qualities than on seniority or leadership 
of a research group (p. 153). 
While the supervisors in their study claimed to exercise a range of styles, the 
`hands-off style was reported to be the most common (p. 162). Supervisors often 
experienced dilemmas, however, in allowing their students `sufficient autonomy' 
while at the same time `maintaining surveillance and control over the research' (p. 
176). John Hockey (1994) has similarly proposed that PhD supervisors experience 
problems in their role management, relating to the level of `intellectual expertise' 
they offer their students. The supervisor is expected to be the intellectual `guide' 
and `critic' of the student, but because of official institutional demands that the 
student's work should be `autonomous and original, ' the supervisor experiences 
some difficulty in making decisions about `the volume, specificity, depth and 
quality of the knowledge which they impart to the student' (p. 296). While the 
supervisor may not wish to transgress formal canons which emphasize that the 
PhD thesis should be the student's own work' (p. 298), there is `always the 
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potential for the autonomous originality of the student's research to be 
compromised by too much intellectual and emotional involvement by the 
supervisor' (p. 302). Therefore the supervisor should erect `boundaries' between 
themselves and their students as a way of managing these dilemmas. What 
Hockey does not mention, however, is how these boundaries are to be erected in 
practice, and how the dilemmas themselves are to be managed. 
In relation to their supervisor, then, the individual doctoral postgraduate is 
positioned in contrary ways, from that of `underling' or `powerless dependent' to 
junior or professional `colleague' (Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 2000, pp. 153 - 
154). Merton and Barber's (1976) description of the `apprentice-ambivalence 
pattern' (p. 5), which conveys the student's `devotion to his [sic] teacher pushing 
him to extravagent praise, his need for autonomy pushing him to excessive 
criticism' (p. 4) certainly seems appropriate in the case of the doctoral 
postgraduate. 
Ambivalence toward authority has to do in part with one's very real dependence on them 
and their ideas. The nature of this dependence is continuous and subtle, and it is one that 
grows out of a well-developed wish to be approved of intellectually by superiors (Taylor, 
1976, p. 137). 
It is often acknowledged in studies of doctoral education that while the 
supervisory relationship may not initially be a relationship of equals, it should 
become progressively more egalitarian as the research continues. Indeed, by the 
end of their doctorate, the postgraduate should ideally be in the position of a fully- 
fledged colleague. 6 The main traditions of work in this area, however, rarely go 
any further than simply making such observations, as the following extracts on 
power and equality in the supervisory relationship demonstrate. 
6 In a paradoxical sense doctoral candidates are learning from their supervisors how to become 
independent researchers or scholars, who may themselves go on to be supervisors and examiners 
of doctoral theses in the future. `The reason for giving feedback effectively is that through it 
students can eventually learn how to evaluate their own work and so take over this part of the 
supervisor's job themselves. In the longer term, they have to be taught how to become independent 
researchers in their own right' (Phillips and Pugh, 2000, p. 177). 
The imbalance of power between supervisor and student was such as to make students 
highly vulnerable. It was not surprising that one student in the study who was being 
seriously exploited by the supervisor felt that there was no safe way to complain and get the 
problem addressed (Becher, Henkel and Kogan, 1994, p. 148). 
The concept of the university doctorate has always been clear. As the highest degree that 
can be awarded, it proclaims that the recipient is worthy of being listened to as an equal by 
the appropriate university faculty (Phillips and Pugh, 2000, p. 20; emphasis in original). 
Instead of a teacher the supervisor becomes a colleague and the relationship becomes less 
asymmetrical than it was. In fact, this is the central aim towards which your relationship 
with your supervisor should be working (Phillips and Pugh, 2000, p. 108). 
The most satisfying kind of teaching is the postgraduate teaching because at the end of the 
process the teacher-pupil relationship, in an ideal case, is destroyed. And what you end up 
with is much nearer to the colleague relationship - among equals. They might not be equal 
in all respects, but certainly within the area of the student's own PhD subject. The student 
should leave here feeling they're equal (PhD supervisor, quoted in Delamont, Atkinson and 
Parry, 2000, p. 45). 
What is lacking is any sustained critical study of equality and inequality in the 
relations between doctoral students and their supervisors. What are the patterns of 
power at play in doctoral education, and how are they perpetuated and sustained? 
Given that control in the social sciences is often implicit, negotiable and covert 
(Delamont, 2003, p. 113), such analysis is unlikely to be straightforward. It will 
require the acknowledgement of difficult to identify, irreconcilable values, such as 
democracy and authoritarianism, equality and expertise, and freedom and control. 
This is why the study of doctoral education must begin to look beyond the realm 
of the supervisory relationship per se and consider wider patterns of ideology and 
control which are not unique to the academy, as we will consider in the following 
chapter. 
In 1988, Cox observed that there were no in-depth studies of the `critical 
relationships on the borders between autonomy and dependency' in the context of 
doctoral education (p. 21). This absence has to some extent been remedied, as 
there are now several studies on the dilemmas of autonomy and dependency in 
doctoral research. There is a sense in which Cox's observation still rings true, 
however, as analyses of the dilemmas of supervision have tended to be written 
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largely from the supervisor's point of view. Studies of doctoral dilemmas 
generally emphasise supervisor, rather than student, dilemmas (Burgess. Pole and 
Hockey, 1994; Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 1997b, 2000,2004; Delamont. 
Parry and Atkinson, 1998; Hockey, 1991,1994). As a result, we do not know very 
much about how doctoral postgraduates themselves experience the dilemmas of 
autonomy and dependency inherent in the supervisory relationship. In guides on 
`how to do a doctorate' dilemmas are often considered from the `student 
perspective, ' however, and it is to this literature that we will now turn. 
How to do a PhD 
There are currently numerous guides on doctoral education, aimed at both current 
and potential doctoral candidates, as well as doctoral supervisors and examiners. 
They include general guides addressing postgraduate students from MA to PhD 
level (Burton, 2000; Grix, 2001; Potter, S. 2002; Wisker, 2001), more specific 
guides on how to do (Brown, McDowell and Race, 1995; Cryer, 2000; Graves and 
Varma, 1997; Phillips and Pugh, 2000; Salmon, 1997) and write (Dunleavy, 2003: 
Murray, 2002) PhD theses, as well as guides on how to supervise doctoral students 
(Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 1997b, 2004; Lewis and Habeshaw, 1997), how 
doctoral theses are examined (Tinkler and Jackson, 2004), and also how young 
and established academics can develop successful research careers (Delamont and 
Atkinson, 2004). In this section we will examine how the doctoral experience is 
conceptualised in doctoral self-help guides. The review does not aim to be all- 
encompassing but rather selects two specific texts which are considered 
representative of the range of approaches to doctoral study and supervision. 
What we will find is that the doctoral self-help guide can be studied as an 
interesting `hybrid' literary genre. Many guides on how to do a doctorate consist 
of original social research - similar to the kind of work we have already been 
discussing - and can therefore serve as useful repositories of research findings and 
qualitative data. At the same time, however, doctoral self-help guides - in contrast 
to the literature we have so far surveyed - tend to be explicitly supervisory in 
character. That is, they often attempt to work as a form of doctoral supervision in 
themselves, addressing student readers explicitly, and giving them advice about 
what they should and should not be doing with their time. In a way, doctoral self- 
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help guides are publicly accessible literary instantiations of supervisory practice. 
and can therefore be studied in lieu of actual investigations of face-to-face 
supervisory meetings (Delamont, Parry and Atkinson, 1998). After all, if students 
are to read anything about doing a doctorate during their course of study, it is 
likely that they will read self-help guides such as these. 
Of course, students might not follow the guides that they read, however, and 
it would therefore be misleading to treat doctoral self-help guides as actual 
instantiations of doctoral supervision. Indeed, guides on how to do a doctorate 
might more accurately be considered idealizations of supervisory practice, as they 
tend to be written by supervisors rather than students. In part due to the fact that 
they are written by supervisors, guides on how to do a doctorate often come across 
as rather patronising and condescending. The authors of a recent guide to 
supervising the PhD suggest that supervisors might want get together with their 
students and read a couple of chapters from two of the most popular self-help 
guides during their initial meetings, but that `[b]ecause they are student-centred 
books you [the supervisor] may find them offensive' (Delamont, Atkinson and 
Parry, 1997b, p. 16). Suffice to say that doctoral students may also find them 
offensive, despite (or maybe because of) the fact that such guides seek to offer 
them help and support. Clothed in the rhetoric of assistance and usefulness, they 
often lead the unsuspecting reader down the path of authoritarianism and 
economic instrumentalism, as we shall see. 
Student as traveller: the knowledge-based PhD 
Phillida Salmon's Achieving a PhD - ten students' experience (1992) is not 
strictly a self-help guide. Nor is it an academic study. Rather it is both of these at 
the same time, as well as being an articulation of the author's own supervisory 
philosophy. The book comprises the views and experiences of ten of Salmon's 
PhD students, represented via `personal pen portraits' written by the author, along 
with `illustrative extracts from the jotted notes and expositions which the students 
offered towards the book' (p. 5). Achieving a PhD represents a traditional 
knowledge-based view of the doctorate, and argues for the centrality of 
scholarship, thoughtfulness and creativity. Salmon views research as a `process, 
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rather than merely as a product' (pp. 4- 5) and throughout she and her students 
use the metaphor of the PhD as a `journey. ' 
It is the best theses which make the largest call upon personal resources of time, of thought, 
of imagination. Such theses, for their examiners, entail a prolonged, necessarily difficult 
journey, a sustained dwelling within an unfamiliar personal terrain. In the course of this 
journey, quite unknown ground may be covered, while more familiar scenes may be viewed 
from entirely new angles. The vistas offered can be alien, both to established views and to 
one's personal ways of seeing and experiencing. Yet as a reader, one is carried along by the 
confidence and conviction of the writer; the guide, the pioneer within this new landscape, 
moves about in it with a sense of authority (p. 9). 
Salmon challenges existing patterns of supervisory practice, arguing in favour of a 
more supportive style, involving group therapy-like supervisory meetings where 
students share themselves and their research in a `caring, supportive atmosphere' 
(p. 90). She also contests assumptions about the `typical' doctoral student. In 
contrast to the prevailing view that PhD students are young, full-time and funded, 
Salmon argues that, in reality, the average doctoral student is more likely to be 
mature, part-time and self-funded (cf. Delamont, 1989). They are students who 
may take `many years' to complete their projects (Salmon, 1992, p. 2). 
Furthermore, they might not want to take part in any research training. 
What do PhD students themselves think of the addition of a training element to their work? 
Such evidence as there is suggests that those who are actually engaged in doctoral work see 
taught courses on research literature or methodology as an irrelevance (p. 3). 
In relation to the modern day higher education policy context, then, Salmon seems 
decidedly out of step, preferring as she does an `authorship' rather than `training' 
model of the PhD. Nevertheless Salmon reveals that she has `achieved a `success' 
rate well above the usual one' as a result of her view of research as a process (pp. 
4- 5) - thereby implying that many of her students 
have completed their theses - 
even though her emphasis upon the `long and difficult inner struggle' of PhD 
research (p. 117) will no doubt have caused something of a stir in her own 
department. 
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If PhD work is viewed as a process rather than a product, then what matters most is the 
private thinking, the feeling and imagining, the mulling over the contradiction, possibilit\ 
and implication, which constitutes the real stuff of original research (p. 20). 
This author has no fear of being accused of instrumentalism, being so far from the 
training model of PhD supervision. `Thinking' is something that is rarely 
mentioned in higher education policy documentation, or even for that matter in 
self-help guides on how to do a doctorate (possibly because it implies squandering 
valuable amounts of time which might otherwise be spent more productively). 
Salmon should therefore be applauded for re-introducing the term into the doctoral 
education literature. This might be something of a dangerous step, though, given 
the present day university political climate. 
In spite of the permissive and liberal tone of the book, Achieving a PhD 
might not be as emancipatory for upcoming doctoral postgraduates as one might at 
first think. This is because Salmon tends to neglect the issue of power, especially 
her own supervisory power, despite her proposal that `the dimension of power is 
inevitably present in student-supervisor relationships' (p. 92). Unlike many other 
studies of doctoral education, Achieving a PhD does not include extended 
discussion of the autonomy and dependency inherent in the supervisory 
relationship. Salmon is concerned to present doctoral study as a `private situation' 
(p. 1), involving a personal `inner struggle' (p. 15, p. 117) which each doctoral 
student goes through independently. Supervision is spoken of as a mere `shared 
context' (p. 5) in which `personal support' (p. 20) is offered. In the following 
extract we can appreciate the difficulties inherent in describing the process of 
supervision, while at the same time presenting doctoral study as an individual 
student endeavour. 
Agreeing to supervise a project means undertaking to work in close collaboration with 
someone who is embarking on a journey within themselves -a journey which may at times 
be profoundly exciting but which will also certainly be difficult, risky and painful (p. 21; 
emphasis added). 
At one point in the book Salmon suggests that the supervisory relationship 
involves `open communication' and that it is the student who is in the position of 
`ultimate control' (p. 17). Later she is keen to stress that ` [p]rojects which I have 
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supervised are certainly not my work' (p. 120). As a reader one gets the 
impression that Salmon is defending herself against something which cannot be 
said directly. The key to the puzzle lies in the chapter `Methodology: a Crumbly 
Cake' and the descriptions which Salmon and her students give of their PhD 
methodologies, and how they came upon them. As Salmon explains: 
The adoption of broadly qualitative methods is in fact a common denominator within this 
student group. And for no one has this been an easy decision. In every case, their academic 
training has been in conventional quantitative methodology (p. 78). 
Although Salmon does not specify here why her students have all adopted 
`broadly qualitative methods' in their theses, it is suggested elsewhere that each 
student came by their decision independently, through engagement with their 
respective academic literatures. For example, Maggie, who is conducting a 
participant observation of children learning to read, describes her methodological 
choice in the following way. 
There are vast tomes in the library devoted to reading research, but most are derived from 
short sharp experimental manipulations. The credibility gap between this kind of work and 
the reading process is so great that it reduces the viability to almost nil, in my opinion. So I 
have decided that I need to use qualitative methodology (p. 78). 
The point is not that this student is lying or deceiving herself in any way, but just 
to highlight how the methodological choice to go for a qualitative approach is not 
described as a mutual decision arrived at between student and supervisor. The 
student cites academic or intellectual reasons for her individual choice. When we 
consider Salmon's own accounts of her students' methodological choices, 
however, we begin to suspect that something more than mere independent student 
choice is taking place. 
Susan's efforts to develop appropriate modes for her own research led her, inevitably, to opt 
for a qualitative rather than a quantitative methodology (p. 77; emphasis added). 
Lesley, too, experienced a major breakthrough when she finally turned her back on 
conventional ways of analysing the puzzling and intriguing material she had gathered (p. 
80; emphasis added). 
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Is it not something of a coincidence that all of Salmon's students independently 
adopted qualitative approaches as their research methods of choice, moving as 
they did from previously quantitative allegiances? Salmon evidently has some 
level of stake in the matter, being their supervisor. The closest that Salmon gets to 
suggesting she might have had something to do with her students' methodological 
decisions comes towards the end of the chapter, albeit in a rather oblique and 
indirect way. 
Methodological decisions entail coming to terms not only with one's own personal 
situation, values and beliefs, but also with the whole intellectual ethos which pervades 
research. Whatever choices are made, some inner accommodation must be reached with the 
intellectual establishment (p. 84; emphasis added). 
It might have been more accurate to say - in the words of the quotation - that the 
inner `accommodation' which students are required to make is with Salmon as the 
supervisory `intellectual establishment' in this context, though it is unlikely that 
she would describe events in such a way. 
The main problem with Achieving a PhD is that Salmon does not fully 
acknowledge her own role as a doctoral supervisor, and as a central figure in the 
construction of her students' accounts. She does not place a question mark over 
the activity of asking her own students about their supervisory experiences, and 
the constitutive role that their relationship might have played in the formulation of 
their accounts. The general absence of any negative evaluations of her supervisory 
practice attests to the unusual context in which her students were invited to tell of 
their experiences. And the fact that Salmon is the sole named author of the book, 
even though much of the text constitutes written contributions from her students, 
attests to the potentially divisive nature of power in liberal academic contexts. As 
Salmon herself remarks, 
Political considerations are seldom recognised in the discussion of academic life, where the 
discourse of scholarship and rationality tends to preclude the acknowledgement of power 
dynamics ... 
That academic power is seldom made explicit can create real problems for 
students (p. 93). 
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Student as professional: the training-based PhD 
The bestselling How to get a PhD by Phillips and Pugh (2000) is now in its third 
edition. It is a popular and well-known `handbook and survival manual. providing 
a practical, realistic understanding of the processes of doing research for a 
doctorate' (back cover). The book is mostly addressed to postgraduate students, 
although chapter 11 `How to supervise and examine' is addressed primarily to 
supervisors. The authors stress that `the PhD is primarily a research training 
exercise to get you from being a mere beginner in research to the level of a full 
professional' (p. 51; emphasis in original). Thus the book is packed full of 
practical information and advice concerning `the processes of effective doctoral 
education' (p. xv). 
The ideas in this book are all based on systematic study, over many years, of the PhD in 
operation. Taken as a whole they form the basis of a coherent reappraisal of the system and 
thus make a contribution to the developments currently being introduced. As well as 
improving the quality and completion rates of doctorates, these policies would greatly 
improve the experience that individual students have of actually doing a PhD (p. 218; 
emphasis in original). 
In writing How to get a PhD Phillips and Pugh have drawn upon their `experience 
in doctoral supervision' and `systematic research into PhD education' to present 
real life examples of students and their supervisors, in faculties such as Arts, 
Business Studies, Science, Social Science, and Technology (p. 5). Many important 
and challenging issues are raised throughout the book, including the psychological 
aspects of the PhD process (pp. 75 - 83), as well as the notion of originality in 
doctoral work (pp. 63 - 64), although this latter concept is used in a somewhat 
limited fashion. Early on in How to get a PhD the authors point out that `[t]he 
British PhD is awarded for an original contribution to knowledge ... examiners 
need to be satisfied that the work has a degree of originality and that it is the 
unaided work of the candidate' (p. 28). Later, however, they offer the sage-like 
advice that `[i]t is a wise student who decides to postpone the pleasures of 
attempting to be totally original until after the PhD has been obtained' (p. 53). 
Unlike the students in Achieving a PhD - who appear to have almost unlimited 
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time to come up with their uniquely original ideas - in How to get a PhD students 
are encouraged to work within a more restrictive notion of originality. 
Phillips and Pugh's stance on originality is understandable given that they 
conceive of the PhD as a research training exercise where the overall aim is to 
develop the professional competence of the doctoral candidate (p. 4). 
There are many reasons why people decide to work towards a PhD. One of the most 
common aims at the beginning is the wish to make a significant contribution to the chosen 
field 
... another important aim for many postgraduates is to enhance career opportunities and 
future earning capacity through possession of the PhD degree (pp. 23 - 24). 
Unlike Salmon, Phillips and Pugh consider the doctoral `product' more important 
than the `process' of acquiring it. They espouse an instrumental view of 
postgraduate research, where `PhD-getting' is prized as the central objective of 
doctoral study and supervision (p. xvi, p. 2). To get a PhD a research student must 
be `effective' and `make use of all the opportunities offered' (p. 14). They must 
also exhibit `initiative, ' considering that `[t]he necessity for personal academic 
initiative is the key cultural change that doctoral students will encounter compared 
with their undergraduate days' (p. 4). In a section entitled `Selecting your 
supervisor' the authors stress that although students do not commonly select their 
supervisors - they are often allocated to them by the department - `you should 
certainly attempt to do so' (p. 11). There is also `certain basic information' that 
one needs to know in order to be confident that a particular academic is going to 
be an `appropriate' supervisor. 
The key factor is whether the academic has an established research record and is continuing 
to contribute to the development of his or her discipline. The questions you need to ask 
include the following: Have they published research papers recently? Do they hold research 
grants or contracts? Are they invited to speak at conferences in Britain and abroad? Positive 
answers to at least some of these questions are desirable (ibid. ). 
According to this view a doctoral student resembles a highly-motivated and well- 
informed academic `shopper. ' They have done their consumer research, and are 
looking for the right supervisory `product' with all the appropriate research 
qualifications. The questions which students are instructed to ask potential 
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supervisors come across as somewhat peculiar, however, as they resemble the 
kinds of questions that academic candidates being interviewed for university 
lecturing positions are often asked. Publication record, grant holding status. 
international renown: it is as if students are being instructed to assess their 
potential supervisors against RAE-style productivity indicators. What better way 
to turn them off you as a potential student? It is, in any case, a moot point whether 
a person in possession of such qualities would make a good PhD supervisor, or 
someone who is available and interested in their students and their work. 
It appears How to get a PhD - in contrast to Achieving a PhD - implicitly 
adopts a commercial model of doing a doctorate. A student and their supervisor 
are, for example, expected to develop a `psychological contract' with one another 
-a statement of expectations based upon the `oral contract' which has already 
been agreed - before coming to a mutually beneficial compromise (pp. 182 - 184, 
see also Noble, 1994, Appendix G for an example of a PhD contract). This, 
Phillips and Pugh suggest, underlines the fact that both supervisor and student are 
in a `partnership' with one another. Here doctoral supervision is viewed as 
something like a small business enterprise, where two parties draw up a contract 
and negotiate terms of service, as if equals. Student and supervisor are essentially 
pictured as business partners, each having mutual rights and obligations. Indeed, 
elsewhere in the book, supervision is described in precisely these terms. The 
authors explain how, 
in the humanities and social sciences students often come with their own topics within the 
field in which the supervisor is expert, and academics give a service of research supervision 
(p. 3). 
As well as those who wish to get the work done as speedily and efficiently as possible, 
there are those supervisors who are genuinely interested in producing more and better 
researchers. They are prepared to offer a service of supervision to postgraduate students in 
the same way as they offer a service of teaching to undergraduate students (p. 27). 
This view of the doctorate implies a very different power relationship to that 
described in the sociology of education literature. There, it is assumed that 
supervisors have power over their students, rather than the other way around. If 
postgraduates are consumers, however, then they may come to expect good 
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service from their supervisors. Equally, if they resemble entrepreneurs or young 
business people, then they will expect their supervisors to abide by their 
contractual agreements. In this sense we can understand how Phillips and Pugh 
can include a chapter entitled `How to manage your supervisor' and that in this 
chapter they suggest individual doctoral students should `[t]ry to make the 
relationship with your supervisor as far as possible a shared, if inevitably 
asymmetrical, partnership' (p. 113). This kind of proposal only makes sense if 
postgraduate students possess the power and authority of the consumer, which 
potentially reverses the traditional authority of the university. We will consider 
this and related issues in more detail in the following chapter. 
In their chapter on how not to get a PhD, Phillips and Pugh claim that `none 
of us, ' research students or research supervisors, want to become `millionaires, ' 
and that although `[t]here are many ways of making a million pounds ... 
doing a 
PhD is not likely to be one of them' (p. 34). Nevertheless, as we have discovered, 
How to get a PhD is replete with the values of business, commerce, and 
instrumentality. It remains to be seen whether postgraduate students themselves 
evoke instrumental economic or traditional academic values in their accounts of 
their PhD experiences. 
Concluding remarks 
It is clear that the guides on how to do a doctorate - and indeed some of the wider 
research literature on doctoral education - comprise unexplicated and contestable 
assumptions about doctoral study and supervision, and that these are often implicit 
and buried within particular conversational or textual practices in complex ways. 
Problematic assumptions such as these may continue to pass by unnoticed if we do 
not acknowledge the practical activity of doing and writing doctoral research. It is 
unfortunate that the practical role of the researcher is routinely ignored in studies 
of postgraduate education. It is rarely acknowledged, for example, how many 
studies of doctoral research are carried out and written by supervisors and 
established academic researchers. The authors are invisible partly because the 
questions they ask of their postgraduate respondents are never presented and 
analysed along with the answers. 
39 
What is needed, then, is a study of doctoral education in which student talk 
is not prompted by supervisory questioning. This study will require a critically 
reflexive research approach, stressing the centrality of discourse in the constitution 
of doctoral student life, and which has the potential to reveal patterns of power 
and inequality at play in academic contexts. The marginalised or `in-between' 
status of doctoral postgraduates makes them a good case for the study of power 
and ideology in the academy, for sometimes they may see things which those in 
power do not, having yet to be socialised into the established academic traditions. 
Doing a doctorate on doctoral study has a similar potential to reveal what might 
otherwise remain hidden in doctoral research and education. And just as doctoral 
students are `in-between' in their academic status, so to study their experiences we 
need to draw upon a field of study which is `in-between' disciplines, and able to 
study things which other fields cannot. In the following chapter we will outline 
discursive studies of higher education and identity which place power and 
ideology at the center of their concerns. 
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Chapter 3- Mapping a Discursive Approach to Doctoral Education 
In this chapter we will prepare the theoretical ground for the forthcoming analytic 
chapters, mapping an approach to the study of doctoral education that is based in 
the perspective of discursive psychology. Over the past 15 years, discursive 
psychology has established a distinctive theoretical position, as well as a wide 
body of empirical research, that has developed methodologies from conversation 
analysis, discourse analysis, and rhetoric. The present chapter does not aim to 
provide a comprehensive overview of this work, but rather highlights theory and 
research relating to doctoral education and issues of identity, ideology, and power. 
The general focus is upon discursive studies which combine the situated study of 
language use with broader social analysis of social issues. The main argument of 
the chapter is that it is possible to do a critical analysis of doctoral education by 
paying attention to the detailed specifics of postgraduate talk. We will consider 
studies of doctoral education that invoke notions of discourse, rhetoric and power, 
as well as discourse analytic work on the dilemmas of education. Central concepts 
such as identity work, ideological dilemmas, and reflexivity will be introduced 
and discussed. The overall aim is to move towards a theoretical and analytical 
perspective on doctoral education which stresses the centrality of discursive 
interaction, power, and ideology in the constitution of doctoral postgraduate life. 
Thus the present thesis attempts to combine theoretical awareness with empirical 
sensitivity in a critical way. 
Discursive psychology and `inner' life 
Discursive psychology comprises an eclectic approach to the study and 
conceptualisation of social psychology, employing theories and methods from a 
variety of disparate fields, including ordinary language philosophy (Austin, 1975; 
Wittgenstein, 1958), ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (Garfinkel, 
1967; Sacks, 1992), literary theory (Bakhtin, 1981; Voloshinov, 1973), rhetoric 
(Billig, 1996), and discourse analysis as pioneered in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984/2003). One of the central arguments of 
discursive psychology is that psychologists and social researchers have often been 
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looking for the subject matter of psychology in the wrong place. Instead of 
assuming that psychological phenomena such as attitudes, memories, beliefs and 
so on are internal mental states, existing within the heads of individuals, they 
should instead look to the outward use of `psychological language' in social life, 
and study how people use such language to perform social actions (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Edwards, 1997). 
Discursive psychologists follow the later philosophy of Wittgenstein (1958) 
by proposing that words acquire their meaning in part through how they are used 
in a language. The later Wittgenstein, or Wittgenstein II (Edmonds and Eidinow, 
2001), was critical of the `picture' theory of language, whereby words gain their 
meaning through a correspondence relationship with the objects they stand for, 
and instead proposed the metaphor of language as a `toolkit. ' To find the meaning 
of a term we need to examine how it is used, rather than what it stands for: 
`philosophers should start with a consideration of meaning that comes from 
inspecting actual uses of language' (Potter, 2001, p. 40). Wittgenstein was 
especially critical of the assumption that `mental phrases' such as `I think' or `I 
feel' describe inner phenomena, such as thoughts and feelings, arguing instead 
that people use such words to perform deeds and social acts. 7 The meaning of the 
statement `I feel jealous' will for example depend upon the context in which it is 
uttered, and what the speaker is doing in saying such a thing. Whereas the 
`language games' that Wittgenstein studied were often made up, discursive 
psychologists have taken his broad stance and applied it to the empirical study of 
talk. This involves looking at outward interaction rather than the supposed inner 
processes of individual speakers. 8 
As well as emphasising the practical and active uses of language, discursive 
psychologists have also stressed the rhetorical and dialogical quality of human 
`Talking about our inner states is not a matter of accurate reporting. If someone asks "How do 
you feel about me?, " there is no looking inward to locate the answer' (Gergen, 1999, p. 101). 
8 Discursive psychologists have studied, and in turn respecified, a variety of traditional and non- 
traditional psychological topics, including attitudes (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Billig, 1991), 
memories (Middleton and Edwards, 1990a; Edwards and Potter, 1992), prejudice (Billig, 1985; 
Wetherell and Potter, 1992), emotions (Edwards, 1999; Billig, 1999a), and facts (Potter, 1995, 
1996). The present review gives a partial representation of this work, focusing on identity, power, 
and ideology. 
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thinking (Billig, 1996; Shotter, 1993a, 1993b; Shotter and Billig, 1998). Drawing, 
for example, on the literary theories of Bakhtin and Voloshinov, they have 
proposed that meaning is established reciprocally between people in their dialogic 
interchanges with one another. Each utterance is given meaning only in the flow 
of conversational interchange. As Voloshinov (1973) remarks in Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language: 
A word is a bridge thrown between myself and another. If one end of the bridge depends 
upon me, then the other depends upon my addressee (p. 86). 
[M]eaning is realized only in the process of active, responsive understanding (p. 103). 
Any utterance - the finished, written utterance not excepted - makes response to something 
and is calculated to be responded to in turn (p. 72). 
In Celebrating the Other, Sampson (1993) proposes that `[t]he heart of any 
dialogic argument is its emphasis on the idea that people's lives are characterized 
by the ongoing conversations and dialogues they carry out in the course of their 
everyday activities, and therefore that the most important thing about people is not 
what is contained within them, but what transpires between them' (p. 20; 
emphasis in original). 9 This dialogism has parallels with developments in 
conversation analysis, a subfield of sociology, which aims `to discover how 
participants understand and respond to one another in their turns at talk' (Hutchby 
and Wooffitt, 1998, p. 14). The central finding of conversation analysis is that 
`ordinary talk is a highly organized, ordered phenomenon' (p. 13), and therefore 
conversation analysts study the structural organization of talk-in-interaction. 
In conversation analysis, `the production of utterances, and more particularly 
the sense they obtain, is seen not in terms of the structure of language, but first 
and foremost as a practical social accomplishment' (ibid., p. 14). This active and 
social view of meaning is evidenced in how `speakers display in their sequentially 
`next' turns an understanding of what the `prior' turn was about' (ibid., p. 15). 
Thus, in a paradoxical sense, each turn in a conversation gains its meaning in part 
through how it is taken up by one's interlocutor. The meaning of a turn does not 
9 `There is no meaning that is not derived from relationship itself (Gergen, 1999, p. 131). 
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so much reside in the turn itself, or in the mind of the person who spoke it, but 
rather in how it is taken up and responded to by the other person in the 
conversation. Discursive psychologists have followed the recommendation of 
conversation analysts to attend to how people display their understandings of what 
they are doing in their conversational interactions, analysing the observable and 
hearable specifics of talk-in-interaction (on the influence of conversation analysis 
on discursive psychology, see Edwards, 1995,1996; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 
1995). 
Discursive psychology applies the methods and insights of discourse 
analysis to the study of psychological topics, drawing specifically on discursive 
traditions in social psychology (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) and the sociology of 
scientific knowledge (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984/2003). In early work in discourse 
analysis, discourse is established as a topic of study in its own right, rather than as 
a transparent medium through which we can gain access to other phenomena, such 
as the `mind' or the `world. ' An open definition of discourse is adopted, which 
includes all forms of speaking and writing. Potter and Wetherell (1987) refer to 
discourse as talk and text as social practices, thereby pointing to the pervasive 
`action orientation' of discourse. The principles of function, construction and 
variation are proposed, which capture how people use discourse to do things, 
construct versions of events, and often tend to display variability in their attitudes 
and accounts. `The principle tenet of discourse analysis is that function involves 
construction of versions, and is demonstrated by language variation' (p. 33). 
In order to better illustrate some of the themes of discursive psychology, a 
study from the doctoral education literature can be cited. In the previous chapter, 
we discussed some of the dilemmas of doctoral supervision, and how supervisors 
must create a `delicate balance' between the tight control of their students and 
non-interventionist supervision. In their paper on the balancing acts of 
supervision, Delamont, Parry and Atkinson (1998) illustrate how the supervisors 
in their study, when asked to reflect on their supervisory practices, often 
contrasted their past and present experiences of supervision. The supervisors 
suggested that, as students, they had been poorly supervised, and contrasted these 
experiences with their current supervisory practices, which they implied were 
better organised and more supportive. The authors stress that they do not treat 
these stories of negative past experiences as `true' in any absolute sense, nor do 
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they dismiss them as `fictional. ' Instead, they are best understood as `rhetorical 
devices' used to perform particular social activities, such as presenting the 
supervisor and their colleagues in a positive light (p. 166). 
This study relates to work in discursive psychology on how, in talking about 
the past, speakers are doing more than straightforwardly accessing `memories' 
stored in their heads, or representing `the truth' about past events. Rather, they can 
be doing deeds and managing dilemmas, relating to the specific interactional 
demands of the moment. Middleton and Edwards (1990b) consider `remembering 
and forgetting as inherently social activities' (p. 1) that are `embodied and 
constituted within the pragmatics of ordinary social and communicative practices' 
(p. 10). For example, speakers will often perform their recollections of the past in 
joint collaboration with others. Middleton and Edwards celebrate the value of 
studying remembering and forgetting as `kinds of social action, rather than as 
properties of individual mentality' (p. 19), and recommend the analyst to attend 
closely to the possible actions people might be performing in making their 
`memory claims' (see also Billig, 1999a). 
The `delicate balances' study also relates to work in rhetorical psychology 
on the argumentative nature of thinking (Billig, 1991,1996). Billig's conception 
of rhetoric is deeper and broader than the `contrastive rhetoric' described in the 
supervisory dilemmas paper, however, as thinking itself is considered to be 
rhetorical. Billig emphasises the `two-sidedness' of everyday thinking and how 
thoughts themselves are modelled upon public dialogues. Drawing upon insights 
from the ancient tradition of rhetoric, Billig criticises contemporary work in 
cognitive psychology on the nature of thinking. He criticises the image of the 
thinker as a rule-follower or organizer of information, and instead stresses the 
rhetorical, or argumentative, nature of thought. The thinker is pictured as an 
arguer or debater, for as we think we are arguing, both with ourselves and with 
others. The use of contrastive rhetoric in the `delicate balances' paper is an 
example of the contrary nature of common sense, as `past' and `present' comprise 
contradictory argumentative themes, which enable people to think and argue. The 
rhetorical nature of thinking is such that when people speak for a particular 
version of events, they can also often be heard arguing against some alternative 
version of events, whether potential or actual. 
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[T]he meaning of discourse used in an argumentative context must be examined in terms of 
the contest between criticism and justification ... one should not examine merely the words 
within that discourse or the images in the speaker's mind at the moment of utterance. One 
should also consider the positions which are being criticized, or against which a 
justification is being mounted. Without knowing these counter-positions, the argumentative 
meaning will be lost (Billig, 1996, p. 121). 
In rhetorical psychology everyday thinking is also considered ideological, in the 
sense that it has a wider history and relates to patterns of domination and power. 
`The subject of ideology is a rhetorical being who thinks and argues with 
ideology' (Billig, 1991, p. 2). Indeed, the academics in the `delicate balances' 
study were not merely talking about any kind of past and present, but times when 
they were supervised by senior academics, and when they themselves acted as 
supervisors to their own students. Thus the contrastive rhetoric was not used 
merely to present the self in a positive way, but to explain and justify patterns of 
privilege and inequality. There is also an added historical dimension, for as the 
supervisors argued, they were participating in wider debates and arguments which 
were not purely their own. Delamont, Parry and Atkinson (1998) point out that the 
accounts given in their study were not characterised by `myths of a lost golden 
age' because supervisors suggested that they had not been supervised very well in 
the past (p. 170). The actual pattern of accounting used by the supervisors - which 
comprised a progressive historical narrative implying `things are getting better' - 
might itself be ideological, as it works to justify the present day status quo of 
higher education policy and practice (cf. Billig, 1990; Wetherell and Potter, 1992; 
Edley and Wetherell, 2001). Thus `the rhetorical approach likens our 
conversations to scaled down versions of the great debates of history' (Billig, 
1996, p. 186). Rhetorical psychology stresses the importance of placing arguments 
in their social and historical context, acknowledging the argumentative and 
ideological aspects of everyday thinking and reasoning (see Billig, 1992). We will 
consider in more detail the particular meaning given to the term `ideology' in 
studies of discourse and rhetoric below. 
When people speak about their experiences, then, they can be performing 
social actions and negotiating dilemmas, rather than simply representing prior 
states of affairs in a straightforward way. We will now turn to the issue of 
variability in accounts of experience - one of the principle and unifying themes of 
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discursive psychology - and the related concepts of interpretative repertoires and 
ideological dilemmas. 
Variability, repertoires, and dilemmas 
The previous chapter highlighted how studies of doctoral education have found 
considerable variation between doctoral students and their supervisors in their 
accounts of supervisory meetings. There was found to be disagreement between 
students and supervisors concerning the frequency, duration, and responsibility for 
setting the agenda of meetings. Students often reported infrequent meetings of a 
short duration which they set the agenda for, which contrasted with supervisors' 
claims of longer and more regular meetings involving mutual responsibility for 
agenda setting. Researchers of doctoral education have tended not to dwell on 
evidence of intersubjective variability, and in a sense this is not surprising, given 
that their studies tend to run on an (often unarticulated) notion of discourse as a 
transparent medium which functions to reflect the `reality' of thoughts and events. 
Any thoroughgoing investigation of variability between and within participant 
accounts is likely to have crucial consequences for representational 
understandings of discourse, and indeed for what is to be considered the `real' and 
`true' versions of events (Pollner, 1974,1975,1987; Potter, 1996). 
Discursive psychologists treat variation in accounting as an analytic `lever' 
rather than as a problem to be solved or avoided. They propose that variability can 
give important clues about the contextual, functional, and argumentative features 
of the discourse being analysed (Edwards and Potter, 1992). The earliest study in 
discourse analysis to bring sustained attention to the phenomena of variability in 
accounts is Opening Pandora's Box by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984/2003). This is a 
study in the sociology of scientific knowledge, 10 which modestly aims to draw 
10 Steve Woolgar explains that 'SSK is a vigorous (some would say virulent) subdiscipline, as 
energetic in its research production as it is contentious in its epistemological predelictions, which 
has become increasingly influential both within the history and philosophy of science and in 
sociology and social science more generally. The central achievement of SSK has been the 
demonstration that even the most esoteric features of scientific and mathematical knowledge can 
be understood as social constructs; that scientific facts are not so much reflections of the world as 
persuasive texts, accomplished within and shaped by a complex of contingencies and 
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attention to some `methodological and analytical weaknesses in previous 
sociological work on science' (p. 1). The authors take biochemistry as their focus. 
and problematise the assumption that sociologists can construct definitive versions 
of scientists' actions and beliefs, arguing instead that scientists' discourse is 
characterised by marked variability and contradiction. 
The degree of variability in scientists' accounts of ostensibly the same actions and beliefs 
is, in fact, quite remarkable. Not only do different scientists' accounts differ; not only do 
each scientist's accounts vary between letters, lab notes, interviews, conference 
proceedings, research papers, etc.; but scientists furnish quite different versions of events 
within a single recorded interview transcript or a single session of a taped conference 
discussion (p. 11). 
Gilbert and Mulkay propose that this `interpretative variability' in accounts can 
become a fruitful object of sociological study. Indeed, discourse analysis is 
introduced principally as a method for investigating such variability. 
For traditional sociological analysis of social action ... participants' 
interpretative variability 
causes fundamental, and perhaps insoluble, difficulties. In this book we intend to begin to 
develop an alternative form of analysis which turns this intractable methodological liability 
into a productive analytical resource. We refer to this form of analysis as discourse analysis 
(p. 13). 
Much of Opening Pandora's Box comprises discourse analysis of the variability in 
scientists' accounts of their own work and of the work of their colleagues in a 
variety of formal and informal settings. The concept of the `interpretative 
repertoire' (or `linguistic repertoire') is introduced, which is a `lexicon or register 
of terms and metaphors drawn upon to characterize and evaluate actions and 
events' (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p. 138). Gilbert and Mulkay discovered that 
the scientists they interviewed employed two different repertoires in their 
discussions of scientific work: empiricist and contingent. The `empiricist 
repertoire' predominated in formal research papers, stressed the primacy of 
circumstances. This is a significant achievement because it shows that no kind of knowledge need 
be exempt from critical scrutiny: in particular, scientific knowledge need not 
be considered a 
special case' (Woolgar, 1989, p. xvii). 
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experimental data, and lacked any mention of the scientists' personal 
involvements, judgements, or commitments. In the empiricist repertoire, the 
facts' were implied to speak for themselves. The `contingent repertoire, ' by 
contrast, was prevalent in informal interviews, and stressed the role of speculation, 
personal characteristics, and social ties. `The basic principle of the contingent 
repertoire was that professional actions and beliefs are crucially influenced by 
factors outside the realm of empirical phenomena' (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p. 
149). 
Gilbert and Mulkay were interested in how the biochemists they interviewed 
accounted for the `truth' and `error' of experimental results, and found that they 
accounted for `correct' and `false' beliefs in contradictory ways. Simply, when 
accounting for the `truth' of their own scientific beliefs they used the empiricist 
repertoire, and when accounting for the `errors' of other scientists, they used the 
contingent repertoire. This asymmetrical accounting pattern solved an 
`interpretative dilemma' relating to the holding of contrary beliefs that, on the one 
hand, the facts arise `naturally' from experimental findings, and on the other, that 
fellow scientists regularly seem to get their findings `wrong' (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987, pp. 152 - 153). 
The essential message to take from Opening Pandora's Box is that accounts 
and beliefs are always given in particular social contexts, and that discourse 
analysts need to pay attention to the variability of participants' discourse, and the 
particular social functions which this variability might serve. 
Instead of assuming that there is only one truly accurate version of participants' action and 
belief which can, sooner or later, be pieced together, analysts need to become more sensitive 
to interpretative variability among participants and to seek to understand why so many 
different versions of events can be produced (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984/2003, p. 2). 
This focus on variability has continued in discourse and rhetoric work in social 
psychology, especially regarding the variability of people's attitudes towards 
social issues. `The argumentative nature of holding strong views' is a case study 
in rhetorical psychology (Billig, 1989,1991, chapter 8), as well as an attempt to 
see how its theoretical principles work in practice. It is part of the Talking of the 
Royal Family studies, where families were recorded discussing royalty, in the 
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comfort of their own homes and their discourse analysed from a rhetorical 
perspective (Billig, 1992). Billig criticises the assumptions and practices of 
traditional attitude theory within social psychology, which often suggests that 
people hold simple, unvaried attitudes, and that variability of views is confined to 
cases of people holding weak or unformed attitudes. Work in discourse and 
rhetoric, however, has shown that attitudes have a pronounced variability, and that 
individuals express a complicated mixture of positions when they interact. Potter 
and Wetherell (1987) for example suggest that attitudinal variability is to be 
expected from a speech act perspective, because people will be performing 
different conversational actions with their utterances, depending upon the contexts 
in which they are speaking (see Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969; Levinson, 1983). 
Billig suggests, however, that while people may strategically alter their views 
according to the particular argumentative context of the moment, at the same time, 
they will be drawing upon a common sense repository of contrary themes. 
Variability of views is therefore a consequence of both the strategic, rhetorical 
nature of argumentation, and also the `dilemmatic' quality of common sense and 
ideologies, provided through culture and history. Billig (1991) shows how this 
`culturally produced variability of views' (p. 188) is evidenced in the discourse of 
a man known for his `strong views' about royalty. 
The idea that common sense contains contrary themes, as propounded in the 
traditions of rhetorical psychology and discourse analysis so far reviewed, is a 
central principle of the `ideological dilemmas' approach (Billig et al., 1988). This 
approach aims to introduce the concept of `ideology' to the social psychological 
study of everyday thinking, and in the process critiques how theorists of ideology 
have conceptualised the term. While cognitive psychologists have tended to 
overlook the `social nature and content' of thought, theorists of ideology have 
often ignored `the thinking of individuals' (p. 2). As such, the authors set out to 
study the `thinking society' by exploring the ways in which `ideological 
dilemmas' appear in everyday thinking and mundane activities. 
Billig and his colleagues propose that `many of the conventional images of 
ideology assume that ideological thinking is non-dilemmatic' (p. 27). That is, 
ideological systems are viewed as integrated systems of thinking, and the 
individual who is subject to ideology is viewed as a blind 'dupe' who unthinkingly 
follows the dictates of the ideology. By contrast, according to the ideological 
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dilemmas perspective, `ideology is not reproduced as a closed system for talking 
about the world. Instead it is reproduced as an incomplete set of contrary themes, 
which continually give rise to discussion, argumentation and dilemmas' (p. 6). 
The ideology of liberalism, for example, contains argumentative -counter-themes' 
such as democratic egalitarianism and authoritative expertise, equality and 
inequality, individualism and collectivism, the opposition of which `enables 
endless debate and argument' (p. 3). Through their qualitative investigations, 
Billig and his colleagues found it possible to see the `reproduction of the great 
problems of philosophy, and in particular liberal philosophy, in everyday 
discourse' (p. 6). Ideological traditions came to be `structured semantically in the 
vocabulary used in everyday discourse' (p. 41) such that `the very vocabulary at 
our disposal expresses conflicting themes' (p. 16). From an ideological dilemmas 
perspective, then, `ideology ceases to be seen as an elegent coherent totality but as 
fragmented and contradictory, with the very stresses and variations within it being 
crucial to its operation' (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 61). 
[T]he ideological thrust of discourse (in maintaining oppressive power relations) depends 
precisely on contradiction, dilemma and complex multi-faceted positionings of self and 
other which can be mobilized in multiple rhetorical directions with varying consequences 
for social relations (Edley and Wetherell, 2001, p. 441). 
The ideological dilemmas approach has been informative for discursive social 
psychologists studying racist and sexist discourse. In Mapping the Language of 
Racism, for example, Wetherell and Potter (1992) develop an analysis of racist 
discourse which stresses the importance of studying `ideological practice and 
ideological effects' (p. 200). In classical Marxist accounts of ideology, ideological 
discourse `obscures or mystifies, conceals or covers over real states of affairs' (p. 
18). The classical concept of ideology refers to `the processes whereby interests of 
a certain kind become masked, rationalized, naturalized, universalized, legitimated 
in the name of certain forms of political power' (Eagleton, 1991, p. 202; see also 
Marx and Engels, 1974). Wetherell and Potter (1992) instead view ideology as 
`discursive practice. ' Racist discourse is criticised not so much for representing 
`inaccurate and misleading representations of reality' (p. 18) but rather for 
establishing, sustaining and reinforcing oppressive power relations' (p. 70). The 
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analyst is encouraged to situate the discourse they are studying in its cultural and 
historical context, and analyse the detailed specifics of that discourse, paying 
particular attention to possible `ideological outcomes. ' 
The main advantage of the concept of ideology, as we see it, is the basic premise that 
knowledge, talk and texts are bound up with social and material processes, and the emphasis 
on historical analysis. Ideology ... also 
has the strongly critical edge necessary for anti-racist 
practice. To describe someone's opinions as ideological is to mount a critique of those 
opinions. This conception of ideology draws attention to processes of legitimation, 
rationalization and justification, and in this sense discourse is seen as a form of social action 
(p. 33). 
Wetherell and Potter argue that analyses that focus on the `falsity' of ideology, 
and which point to the `truthfulness' of scientific accounts of reality, may even 
serve to hinder the investigation of ideological practice. They demonstrate how 
`social reformist, humanitarian and seemingly liberal' arguments can be used to 
legitimate racism in modern day society (p. 56), 11 and how biological essentialist 
arguments might be mobilized for the anti-racist cause. 
It does not seem particularly useful, in this context, as in other contexts, to describe 
particular types of arguments as inherently ideological, that is, as inherently orientated 
towards the maintenance of unequal power relations (p. 186). 
From the perspective of discursive psychology, then, any claims about ideology or 
dilemmas are to be instantiated in the detailed analysis of discourse. Not knowing 
the actual content of discourse prior to analysis, the researcher must be attuned to 
the possible ideological effects of discursive and rhetorical practices, as they are 
employed in particular social settings. Along with being attuned to what is said, 
though, the analyst of ideology must also be attuned to what is not said. 
[I]f people think about one set of issues or dilemmas, then their attention is removed from 
other matters, and the effects of ideology might be gauged by what is not a matter for 
interesting discussion. In analysing ideological discourse, therefore, one should be aware of 
" Edley and Wetherell (1999) have similarly illustrated how liberal feminist themes can be used to 
legitimate gender inequality. 
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the gaps in discourse, or those possible topics of conversation which fail to be mentioned 
(Billig, 1990, p. 78; emphasis in original; see also Billig, 1997,1999a). 
We will return to the question of ideology and variability later in the chapter. 
when we consider how the ideological dilemmas approach has been applied to the 
topic of education. Presently, we will consider the extent to which discursive 
psychology can be considered `critical, ' and what a critical discursive take on the 
issue of `identity' might look like. 
Dilemmas of critique and identity 
Discursive psychology has often been presented as part of the `critical' movement 
in social psychology (for recent accounts, see Fox and Prilleltensky, 1997; 
Hepburn, 2003; Ibanez and Iniguez, 1997). There have been debates, however, 
about the extent to which discursive psychology is, or should be, critical (see, for 
example, the collection in Parker, 2002). Gough and McFadden (2001), in their 
recent introduction to critical social psychology, draw on the perspectives of 
Marxism, feminism and social constructionism to shed critical light on the 
traditional topics of social psychology, including the self, social influence, sex 
differences, sexuality, aggression, and prejudice. The traditional psychological 
approaches of experimentalism and cognitivism are criticized for promoting 
individualistc understandings of people, and in their place, the authors argue in 
favour of qualitative studies of discourse, ideology, and power. They stress that, 
`[i]n terms of data analysis, the popular preference for critical social psychology is 
discourse analysis' and make a distinction between `top down' and `bottom up' 
approaches (p. 18). The top down approach to discourse analysis, which is 
influenced by the work of Michel Foucault, is concerned to expose, and challenge, 
the oppressive discourses of society (e. g. Parker, 1992). The bottom up version, by 
contrast, is concerned with how people employ rhetorical strategies and 
conversational devices to perform social actions, and to negotiate particular social 
and historical dilemmas (e. g. Edwards and Potter, 1992). 
Gough and McFadden imply that one cannot be critical if one is taking a 
`bottom up' approach to discourse analysis. They include no examples of rigorous 
discourse analyses which pay attention to the detailed specifics of language use. 
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Indeed, Gough and McFadden's analyses come close to what Charles Antaki and 
his colleagues (2002) have termed `non-analysis' because the authors fail to 
analyse the specifics of the data they present. When the authors give only a short 
paragraph of analytic comments after a lengthy quotation (Gough and McFadden, 
2001, pp. 55 - 58), they are not properly analysing the discourse they present. 
Rather, they are doing a cursory or superficial kind of analysis. The absence of an 
introduction to critical discourse analysis, for example, which allows the 
combination of a critical, political agenda with the detailed study of discourse, is a 
surprising `bottom up' omission (see Fairclough, 1995,2001). 
The argument of the present thesis is that it is possible to do a kind of 
discourse analysis which pays attention to the detailed subtleties of language use 
and which is also `critical. ' After all, `today the dilemmas of critique are very 
much the dilemmas of language' (Billig and Simons, 1994, p. 7). The thesis 
follows in the footsteps of those discourse analysts who have attempted to 
combine both critical and analytical agendas (e. g. Billig et al., 1988; Billig, 1992; 
Fairclough, 1995; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). For example, in a series of 
publications on masculinity, Edley and Wetherell have attempted to transcend the 
top-down versus bottom-up dichotomy in discursive social psychology (Edley and 
Wetherell, 1997,1999,2001; Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell and Edley, 1999). 
If the problem with post-structuralist analysts is that they rarely focus on actual social 
interaction, then the problem with conversation analysts is that they rarely raise their eyes 
from the next turn in the conversation, and, further, this is not an entire conversation or 
sizeable slice of social life but usually a tiny fragment (Wetherell, 1998, p. 402). 
Edley and Wetherell argue in favour of an `eclectic' approach to analysis - which 
they term `critical discursive psychology' or a `two-sided discursive psychology' 
- that embraces both the constructive and constructed nature of discourse. 
Following Barthes (1993) and Billig (1991) they suggest that `people are 
simultaneously the products and the producers of discourse' (Edley and Wetherell, 
1997, p. 206; emphasis in original). Furthermore they argue that discourse 
analysts need to work with the contradictions of this `dilemma of discourse, ' 
rather than coming down on either side of the dichotomy. 
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When people speak, their talk reflects not only the local pragmatics of that particular 
conversational context, but also much broader or more global patterns of collective sense- 
making and understanding (Wetherell and Edley, 1999, p. 338). 
Edley and Wetherell illustrate their approach through an analysis of contemporary 
masculine identities, focusing specifically on how men manage the `delicate and 
sometimes dilemmatic task of juggling between two quite contradictory gender 
identities or masculine positions' (Edley and Wetherell, 2001, p. 451), namely 
between a `traditional' form of masculine identity, and the more modem identity 
of the `new man' (Edley and Wetherell, 1997, p. 204). It can be appreciated from 
these few comments how the discursive position warns against treating identity as 
an internal state. Tajfel (1981) claimed that identities depend on the use of 
categories, for a social identity is a form of categorization. As Widdicombe (1998) 
has pointed out, `notions of category membership and social identity are crucially 
linked: a reference to a person's social identity is also a reference to their 
membership of a specific category' (pp. 52 - 53). Discursive psychologists take 
Tajfel's point further by emphasizing that if categories are part of language, then 
identities should be considered as discursive constructs. That means that the topic 
of identity should be studied by examining what people are doing when they make 
claims about their own and others' identities. 
Edley and Wetherell carry out this form of analysis through a combination of 
ethnographic methods, focus groups, and interviews with two samples of men, 
including 17 to 18 year old sixth-form students at an independent boys' school and 
a more diverse sample of older men aged 20 to 64. They bring analytic attention 
not only to the `ways in which men are positioned by a ready-made or historically 
given set of discourses or interpretative repertoires, but also [to] the ways in which 
these cultural resources are manipulated and exploited within particular rhetorical 
or micro-political contexts' (Edley and Wetherell, 1997, p. 206). In their studies of 
teenage boy common room culture, for example, Edley and Wetherell focus upon 
the `action orientation' of the particular kinds of `identity work' done by the 
young men, and how they `position themselves in relation to the available 
interpretative repertoires of masculinity' (Edley and Wetherell, 1999, p. 183). 
These positionings often involve the complicated negotiation of ideological 
dilemmas. 
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Aaron can be seen to be trying to find a `solution' to a powerful ideological dilemma: he 
wants to have children and he'd like to be there for them, but he also wants to pursue a 
career; he wants an egalitarian relationship with his partner, but at the same time he would 
prefer her to stay at home with the kids (Edley and Wetherell, 1999, p. 186). 
Edley and Wetherell (1999) view gender as an `ideological battlefield' (p. 183) in 
which conflict and contestation abound over the contrary themes of masculinity. 
Men are neither wholly positioned by discourses, nor free to construct themselves 
as they please. Rather, a complicated dialectic takes place between the two polar 
extremes, such that men are seen as both agentive in their actions, as well as 
determined by their discourses. The present thesis follows work in critical 
discursive psychology and related work in rhetorical psychology and ideological 
dilemmas by understanding people as both free and constrained, knowing and not 
knowing, competent and incompetent (Billig, 1999a). It is not assumed that 
speakers fashion themselves anew in every social interaction, as might seem to be 
implied from a conversation analytic perspective. Nor is it assumed that speaking 
subjects are the effects of the workings of discourse or power, as might be 
suggested from a post-structuralist stance. Instead, people are understood as 
actively constructing themselves and their identities against the backcloth of 
history, and within the context of culture and society. In each social situation there 
is likely to be both novelty and conventionality, creativity and normalcy, as people 
think and argue over their identities and their place in the world, drawing upon a 
shared stock of common sense knowledge (Bakhtin, 1981; Billig, 1991,1996; 
Gramsci, 1971). 
Unaware of our ideological and semantic heritage, we can still live within its tradition. In 
this way the currents of ideological history can quietly pass through our own thinking, in a 
way which ensures that our thinking is not purely our own (Billig et al., 1988, p. 42). 
While the present author is in broad agreement with the tenets of a `critical' or 
`two-sided' approach to discursive psychology, especially with regard to the 
recommended analytic `eclecticism, ' the present thesis diverges from this work in 
terms of the particular form of discourse analysis adopted. Wetherell and Edley 
(1999) point out that they are not concerned with the `fine detail' of the discursive 
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and rhetorical work evident in the extracts they cite. Rather, their analysis focuses 
on the `broad patterns' evident in the data file, which are representative of the 
discourse sample as a whole (p. 339). The present work, by contrast, adopts a 
more fine grained approach to analysis, and attempts to look in detail at the 
particular ways in which doctoral postgraduates talk about themselves and their 
lives. The thesis will not therefore analyse discourse at the level of the 
`interpretative repertoire' (Potter and Wetherell, 1987), but rather at the level of 
the `utterance' (Voloshinov, 1973). It will be argued, for example, that ideological 
balancing and negotiation can take place within singular utterances, as well as 
over broader stretches of talk. Thus the analyst needs to maintain a double focus: 
the wider processes of ideology have to be caught within the observable and 
hearable detail of talk. 
In addition, the forthcoming analytic chapters will show how the interactive 
or relational dimension of discourse is central to the construction and negotiation 
of identities. As suggested in the previous chapter, empirical studies of doctoral 
postgraduate education need to acknowledge the role of the researcher-participant 
relationship in the constitution of participant accounts. In the classic Texts of 
Identity, Shotter and Gergen (1989) emphasise the importance of addressing the 
ways in which personal identities are `formed, constrained and delimited within 
ongoing relationships' (p. ix; emphasis added). Indeed, from the perspective of 
social construction, `[w]e are born of our relationship and derive our sense of 
identity from relationship' (Gergen, 2001, p. 177). The present thesis aims to track 
the relational process of doctoral identity formation locally, as it occurs in the talk 
of postgraduates in interaction. As such, the kind of discourse analysis espoused in 
the present thesis is influenced more by conversation analysis than it is by post- 
structuralism (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998). From a conversation analytic 
perspective, `identity is something that is used in talk: something that is part and 
parcel of the routines of everyday life, brought off in the fine detail of everyday 
interaction' (Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998, p. 1; emphasis in original). 
Conversation analysts see social identity as a `resource deployed in conversational 
contexts' and recommend the close inspection of identity claims and their 
interactional relevance (Antaki, Condor and Levine, 1996, p. 473; see also Antaki, 
1994,1996; Antaki and Horowitz, 2000). 
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The work of Widdicombe and Wooffitt on youth subcultures is a strand of 
discursive psychology that combines conversation and discourse analysis of 
identities (Widdicombe, 1993,1995,1998; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1990). Of 
especial interest is The Language of Youth Subcultures which is a study of the 
`perceptions, opinions and attitudes' of the members of subcultural groups, 
including punks, skinheads, gothics, and rockers (Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 
1995, p. 25). The authors' aim is to address subcultural members' own accounts of 
their existence, rather than relying on the assumptions of New Subcultural Theory 
about what members and their activities are like. To achieve this, Widdicombe 
and Wooffitt interviewed members of subcultures about their affiliations, the way 
in which they considered themselves, and how they came to join their particular 
subcultures. The authors pay particular attention to `the practical business of 
identity work which is accomplished through verbal interaction' (p. 89) and the 
way in which `identity is woven into the fabric of social interaction' (p. 76). 
Adopting a fine grained conversation analytic approach, Widdicombe and 
Wooffitt look in detail at the openings of interviews, and in particular the ways in 
which the interviewer asks questions of the respondents, such as `do you consider 
yourself a punk? '. The authors argue that `the back-and-forth flow of interaction 
between interviewer and respondents constitutes the basis of joint activity through 
which identities are produced (and resisted)' (pp. 89 - 90). 
By examining the subtle procedures through which identities are occasioned, resisted, and 
negotiated in interaction we begin to appreciate social identities as utterly fluid, variable 
and context-specific. This is partly because the very meaning, content and form of identities 
are made contextually relevant to address contingent interpersonal concerns (p. 108). 
As well as being interested in the local interactional contingencies of identity 
work, Widdicombe and Wooffitt are also concerned with the `ideological 
dilemmas' of being a member of a youth subculture, although they do not actually 
use this term. The interview participants were found to negotiate various 
dilemmas associated with liberal ideology and the contrary themes of 
`individuality' and `collectivism. ' For example, Widdicombe and Wooffitt note 
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how the participants in their study often `resisted' 12 affiliating with a subcultural 
identity at the beginning of their interview - even though they looked as though 
they were punks, skinheads, or gothics - only later going on to construct their 
`authenticity' as a subcultural member. The authors explain this pattern of initial 
resistance by bringing attention to the paradoxical idea that members of youth 
subcultures are expected to be `non-conformist. ' While a person who is a `punk' is 
not supposed to conform, at the same time they are a member of the `punk' 
subcultural grouping, which implies (or demands) some level of conformity. 
`[C]ollective identity implies a loss of individuality and consequently implicates 
self-inauthenticity' (p. 205). The participants negotiated this dilemma by first 
resisting subcultural affiliation, and then subsequently constructing their 
authenticity, so that their individuality was not entirely compromised through 
affiliation with the collectivity. `[B]y constructing the enduring nature of their 
interests, speakers imply that their status as members of subcultures is a simple 
expression of an intrinsic self-identity, and thereby indicates their authenticity' 
(pp. 144 - 145). 
Wetherell implied above that while conversation analysts gain from looking 
in detail at the organisation of social interaction, they also lose out by not placing 
their data into a wider social and historical context. Conversation analysis can still 
be recruited for the purposes of social critique, however, for as Widdicombe 
(1995) has argued, `it is precisely in the mundane contexts of interaction that 
institutional power is exercised, social inequalities are experienced, and resistance 
accomplished' (p. 111). '[F]ar from being an obstacle to understanding the 
political significance of identities, a detailed analysis of talk shows the site where 
power and resistance are played out' (p. 123). The present discursive approach to 
doctoral education combines a focus on interviewing as a social practice with an 
interest in patterns of tension and conflict inherent in postgraduate identity work. 
The focus is upon the way in which doctoral students come to negotiate wider 
ideological themes in specific social encounters and how they employ a variety of 
rhetorical strategies and conversational devices in their constructions of identity. 
12 In a later publication `resistance' becomes `warranting non-membership' or 
`doing non- 
membership' (Widdicombe, 1998, p. 52). 
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Dilemmas of education and power 
In this final substantive section of the chapter we will briefly review work in 
discourse analysis on the ideological dilemmas of education, specifically relating 
to the workings of power in higher educational contexts. The aim is to sketch out 
some of the themes that discourse researchers have found in their studies of 
education, especially relating to the dilemmas of liberalism identified in the earlier 
section on ideological dilemmas. As might be predicted from a dilemmas 
perspective, researchers have found evidence of contrary themes in education, and 
that these themes are related to inequality and power. However, what is clear from 
a discursive perspective is that power relations cannot be assumed prior to 
analysis. The changing nature of power dynamics in contemporary social life 
means that we must be sensitive to the workings of power in our actual analyses, 
rather than presuming the straightforward existence of power beforehand. Thus 
the present section attunes us to the possible patternings of discursive power at 
work in educational settings, but does not rigidly prescribe the forms this power 
might take in modern day postgraduate education. 
In an early discourse study, Edwards and Mercer (1987) carried out 
`educational language research' within mainstream junior schools in England. 
They video-recorded and analysed classroom lessons involving 8 to 10 year old 
children and teachers working according to a `progressive' or `child-centred' 
model of teaching. One of the central tenets of the progressive model is that pupils 
are expected to `learn for themselves' by making independent educational 
discoveries. The model stresses the importance of learning by doing: `learning 
through activity and experience rather than from didactic instruction' (p. 7). The 
teacher is merely to act as a facilitator, assisting pupils on their `voyage of 
discovery. ' In this respect, the progressive classroom appears to be democratic or 
egalitarian in nature. However, Edwards and Mercer were `suprised at the extent 
to which the relatively `progressive' sorts of teaching that [they] examined were 
characterized by the overwhelming dominance of the teacher over all that was 
done, said and understood to be correct' (p. 2). In practice, they found that the 
progressive teachers who took part in their study did not act according to 
`democratic' principles alone. Rather, they attempted to negotiate a balance 
between the contrary themes of `democracy' and `authoritarianism. ' The teachers 
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were, for example, posed with the dilemma of `how, in an essentially discovery- 
oriented sort of classroom education, do pupils manage to discover what they are 
meant to? ' (p. 101). Edwards and Mercer found that teachers resorted to `less 
overt means of maintaining discursive control over the establishment of common 
understandings' (p. 126), using what the authors termed `cued elicitation' (p. 110). 
Essentially `the teacher asks questions whilst simultaneously providing heavy 
clues to the information required' (p. 142). While the teachers gave the impression 
that their pupils were `learning for themselves, ' at the same time they would 
subtly guide and control what their students were learning, such that their 
educational `discoveries' conformed to pre-determined educational curricula. 
`[T]he freedom of pupils to introduce their own ideas was largely illusory; the 
teacher retained strict control over what was said and done, what decisisions were 
reached, and what interpretations were put upon experience' (p. 156). Thus, the 
ideology of progressive teaching was found to be dilemmatic, being composed of 
contrary themes and demands. The progressive teachers negotiated these themes 
as they taught and as they attempted to describe their teaching in conversational 
interviews. Edwards and Mercer concluded that `education is necessarily 
ideological and predicated upon social relations in which power and control figure 
largely' (p. 161). 
The power dynamics of higher education appear less straightforward than 
those of junior school education, as Norman Fairclough (1993,1994,1995, 
Chapter 6,1996) has illustrated in his work within critical discourse analysis on 
the marketization of contemporary British universities. Fairclough highlights how 
`advertising and promotional discourse have colonized many new domains of life 
in contemporary societies' (Fairclough, 1993, p. 139), including the university 
sector. Through a text-based analysis of press advertisements for academic posts, 
programme materials for an academic conference, an academic curriculum vitae, 
and entries in undergraduate prospectuses (p. 145), Fairclough brings attention to 
a `widespread contemporary ambivalence: is this information, or is it promotion? ' 
(pp. 150 - 151). For example, `the written text [of the contemporary 
undergraduate prospectus] is designed to persuade while appearing to be merely 
informative' (Fairclough, 1996, p. 80). Thus, `in terms of professional identities. 
[undergraduate prospectuses] show academics trying to reconcile being academics 
and being salespeople' (p. 78). 
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Promotional material addresses readerships as consumers or clients, and when someone is 
selling to a client, the client is positioned as having authority. This is generally true in 
advertising. It is in contradiction with the traditional authority of the university over 
applicants/students, and it places the institution in something of a dilemma, for it will 
obviously still wish to impose requirements and conditions upon entry, course structure and 
assessment (Fairclough, 1993, p. 157). 
Fairclough analyses how this `dilemma of authority' is practically negotiated 
within written university prospectuses. In addition, he suggests that the 
colonization of discourse by promotion may have `major pathological effects' 
upon people, as well as `major ethical implications' (Fairclough, 1993, p. 142). 
Given that we are all constantly subjected to promotional discourse, and that 
information is so widely covert promotion (Fairclough, 1994, p. 257), a problem 
of trust is said to occur. `[H]ow can we be sure what's authentic? How for 
example, do we know when friendly conversational talk is not just simulated for 
instrumental effect? ' (Fairclough, 1993, p. 142). Indeed, Fairclough (1993) 
suggests that `self-promotion is becoming part-and-parcel of self-identity ... 
in 
contemporary societies' (p. 142) and that it is `perhaps becoming a routine, 
naturalized strand of various academic activities, and of academic identities' (p. 
153). He proposes that particular self-identity shifts have recently occurred within 
organizations, including the `reconstruction of professional identities of academics 
on a more entrepreneurial (self-promotional) basis, with the foregrounding of 
personal qualities' (p. 157). 
What Fairclough falls short of doing is substantiating his claims through an 
analysis of the everyday talk of academics and students. Benwell and Stokoe's 
(2002) work on undergraduate tutorials, however, seems to point to some of the 
changes of authority that Fairclough has identified. They have studied resistance 
towards academic and intellectual identities and the negotiation of power amongst 
students and tutors in university seminar sessions. They found that undergraduate 
students `displayed discursively their reluctance to engage in discussion activities 
and a resistance towards academic or intellectual identities' (p. 429). For example, 
some students treated their tutorial task as `rather pointless but having to be done, 
instrumentally rather than for any educational worth it may have as a collaborative 
activity' (p. 444). `[P]ositive evaluations of their tasks ... as well as other 
displays 
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of enthusiasm for their activities, were routinely ironized, ignored or challenged in 
the students' talk' (p. 444). Benwell and Stokoe conclude that `[i]n the current 
social climate ... 
it appears that doing `being a student' involves displaying 
ambivalence, a lack of enthusiasm and ironic distance from `doing education" (p. 
446). It will be interesting to see if such displays are evidenced in the talk of 
doctoral postgraduate students, in relation to their identities and activities. 
The Colloquium studies by Karen Tracy and her graduate student colleagues 
in the United States comprise some of the most relevant work to the present thesis 
(Tracy and Baratz, 1993; Tracy and Carjuzaä, 1993; Tracy and Muller, 1994; 
Tracy and Naughton, 1994; Tracy, 1997). They have applied the concept of 
ideological dilemmas to the study of intellectual discussion seminars, involving 
academic faculty members and graduate students in the field of communication 
studies. `Drawing upon tape-recorded colloquia, interviews with colloquium 
participants, and several other kinds of materials [they] describe the web of 
problems academic groups face, the discursive practices used, and the ideals 
academics have about how they should talk' (Tracy, 1997, p. 4). Their central 
argument is that `the academic colloquium is best conceived as a dilemmatic 
situation -a communicative occasion involving tensions and contradiction' (p. 4), 
and describe many of the dilemmas experienced by colloquium participants. In 
communication studies, they propose, `being suitably intellectual is constituted by 
managing tensions - between being committed to practice and being interested in 
theory, between being methodologically systematic and pursuing rich data, 
between linguistic articulateness and interactional naturalness' (p. 49). For 
example, `while people wanted to be seen as smart, they [also] wanted to avoid 
appearing as if they were concerned about displaying their intellectual prowess' 
(p. 28). In the words of discursive psychologists these discussion participants were 
caught in a dilemma of `stake and interest, ' attempting to `produce accounts which 
attend to interests without being undermined as interested' (Edwards and Potter, 
1992, p. 158). 
Tracy and her colleagues have analyzed how intellectual discussion 
participants balance the contrary themes of `equality' and `expertise' in their 
presentations (Tracy and Carjuzaä, 1993; Tracy and Muller, 1994; Tracy, 1997, 
Chapter 6). They point out that while discussants are expected to evaluate ideas 
according to their own merits, the institutional inequality of the university and the 
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differing status positions of `graduate student' and `faculty member' - which 
connote differences in expertise, experience, and accomplishments - mean that it 
is neither possible nor desirable to treat everyone's ideas equally. 
Participants thought they were expected to respond to ideas on their merit alone. At the 
same time, they thought they should take account of the experience level of the person to 
whom they were making a comment (Tracy, 1997, p. 84). 
This ideological patterning has been described elsewhere in discourse analysis as 
an `unequal egalitarianism' or a `non-authoritarian authoritarianism' whereby the 
democratic ideals of society come into conflict with the authority of expertise 
given to modern day experts (Wetherell, Stiven and Potter, 1987; Billig et al., 
1988, Chapter 5; see also Edley and Wetherell, 1999). As explained in Ideological 
Dilemmas, 
In a strictly stratified society, in which the charisma of authority can be recognized for its 
own sake, the dilemma does not arise: authorities can behave in an uninhibitedly 
authoritarian way. However, in a society imbued with democratic norms, the position of an 
authority is not so straightforward. The norms of democracy are fundamentally egalitarian. 
They suggest that each person is to be respected as having opinions valuable enough to have 
an equal say in the destiny of the country (Billig et al., 1988, p. 65). 
`While the concept of `expertise' seems to resolve the dilemma between equality 
and authority ... modern 
day relations between experts, and between experts and 
non-experts, are characterised by ambivalence rather than by ... egalitarianism' 
(ibid., pp. 66 - 67). In the Colloquium studies Tracy found interesting differences 
between doctoral students and established academics in their accounts of the 
importance and mutability of rank and power. These patterns seem to capture well 
the image of the liberal expert who, as a `hunched-shouldered authority, ' must 
disguise their power in the context of a seemingly democratic society. 
[T]hose of higher rank thought the advantages of rank could be minimized more easily than 
those of lower rank (Tracy, 1997, p. 81). 
Faculty members underestimate the role of their power; graduate students overestimate the 
contribution of power differences (Tracy, 1997, p. 146). 
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Tracy proposes that inequality is `not only necessary, but a desirable feature of 
academic settings' because those with more status and power - such as professors 
- often have more `knowledge, experience, and skill' than those with less status 
and power - such as students (pp. 82 - 83). Tracy appears to be speaking from her 
own position of power here, for her argument does not allow for the fact that 
inequality can potentially lead to abuse of power. Studies of postgraduate 
education therefore need to be cautious of propounding the necessity and 
desirability of inequality in academic settings, giving careful attention to any 
differences in accounts of power between university staff and their students. After 
all, 
[I]t is in the very nature of the phenomenology of power that those at the centre who have it 
experience its workings the least. In their world, opportunities open themselves up before 
them; to have power is to find no resistance to the realization of one's desires. The kind of 
power of interest to us is not power at the centre, but that at work between centre and 
margins. It is those without power who find at every turn resistances to the realization of 
their desires (Shotter, 1993b, p. 40; emphasis in original). 
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Epilogue 
In an effort to cheer myself up, I spent the morning reading about reflexivity (Fictitious 
PhD student, cited in Ashmore, Myers and Potter, 1995, p. 339) 
In the chapter `Discourse, Rhetoric, Reflexivity' of the Handbook of Science and 
Technology Studies, Ashmore, Myers and Potter (1995) write a reflexive new 
literary forms' account of doing a literature review at postgraduate level. The 
chapter presents the diary of a female PhD student, spending `seven days in the 
library' trying to find themselves `a new research topic' (p. 324). Over this period 
the student reviews various fields of study, all in the general area of science 
studies. 
I never want to see another gerbil sand bathing again. I think I may give up on my 
dissertation; what really interests me now is not the behavior of rodents but the behavior of 
the psychologists and zoologists studying them. Specifically, what does this dissertation 
contribute to knowledge? What does a study like this do for me or anyone else? Why does it 
have to be written in that strange style and form? (p. 323). 
The student justifies writing their review in the form of a diary by pointing to the 
problematic division in science writing between `form' and `content. ' `It is not 
just a matter of how it is put; the it is mixed up with the putting, ' and as such it is 
better to `show the mutual constitution of form and content' than it is to say it (p. 
322; emphasis in original). Essentially it is better to do reflexivity than it is to 
write about doing it. 
As part of her argument the doctoral student proposes that `reviewing' is an 
interesting object of study in itself, and can be taken apart and analysed as an 
academic activity, and as a form of literary presentation. 
[R]eviews 
... are a particularly 
interesting and underanalyzed genre. As far as I can see, the 
only way to write a review, while at the same time attempting an analytic treatment of "the 
review, " is to use a form that is "self-commenting" (p. 322). 
This particular suggestion has a direct implication for the present research study: a 
doctorate on doing a doctorate ought to include a running reflexive self- 
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commentary, bringing attention to its own status as a 'PhD thesis' and as a site for 
doctoral knowledge production. The present literature review should, for example, 
employ `experimental textual forms' in order to parody its status as a 'literature 
review, ' thereby allowing new questions to be asked and new avenues of inquiry 
to be pursued. 
All week, the most interesting things I have read are those that foreground their authors' 
own involvement in the text. And it seems that the closer one's topic is to one's method, the 
more important it becomes to devise some way of coming to terms with the implications of 
that similarity (p. 339; emphasis in original). 
This approach has been developed most fully by Malcolm Ashmore in The 
Reflexive Thesis (1989), which is a study in, and on, reflexivity within the 
sociology of scientific knowledge. It is an exercise in `celebratory practical 
reflexive inquiry' which aims to move beyond the idea that reflexivity is 
something problematic and to be avoided. `[B]y showing and displaying and 
talking around its own socially constituted nature, its own textuality and its own 
paradox, instead of always and only talking of these things, it can talk of other 
things' (p. 110; emphasis in original). Using a variety of literary forms, including 
the lecture, the encyclopedia, and the dialogue, Ashmore demonstrates the play 
between `thesis-as-argument and thesis-as-an-occasioned-academic-product' 
(Woolgar, 1989, p. xix). 
The functions of this chapter include displaying the author's scholarly erudition, displaying 
the width and depth of the author's reading, acting as a general introduction to the main 
topic of the thesis, acting as a series of specific introductions to the reflexive claims made 
by those SSK participants discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, acting as a 
series of substitute analyses of the reflexive claims of those SSK participants not discussed 
in greater detail in subsequent chapters (Ashmore, 1989, p. 47; emphasis in original). 
Reflexivity has the potential to open up new lines of enquiry in the study of 
doctoral research, and indeed to reveal things in postgraduate education that might 
otherwise remain hidden. The doctoral student in `Discourse, Rhetoric, 
Reflexivity, ' for example, was concerned to show how the task of reviewing is 
`riddled with accident, serendipity, and loss' and how the `appearance of 
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coherence and order that is the achievement of the text is built on extremely 
shifting sands. ' `One prominent strategy I use is to point up certain noticeable 
absences in normal review discourse by foregrounding their presence in my text' 
(p. 322). 
In the following chapter, we will adopt this reflexive strategy, exploring the 
dilemmas of doing and writing doctoral research methodology, in which the 
paradoxes of revealing and concealing `error' are practically managed. What we 
will find, however, is that not everything is made visible through a reflexive 
analysis. In going reflexive, one may still be leaving absences, and accomplishing 
avoidances. For example, while the student in the above chapter attempted to 
situate herself `in space and time, in networks of relationships' (p. 322), there is 
no mention of a supervisor. Given that the initial responsibility of a supervisor is 
to negotiate with the student the actual nature of their thesis topic, this absence is 
somewhat conspicuous. Of course, the student in `Discourse, Rhetoric, 
Reflexivity' is fictionalised, being the creation of the academic authors of the 
chapter itself, who themselves were and are doctoral supervisors. As such, she is 
not intended to be taken as a `real' PhD student, but rather as a mere `fiction. ' It 
might be more accurate to describe her as a `fantasy, ' however, for she seems to 
resemble an `idealised' student, the kind of student that Ashmore, Myers and 
Potter might like to supervise. 
Independence, perseverance, enthusiastic curiosity, and an energetic and systematic 
application to the work in hand were all frequently recurring components of supervisors' 
typifications of the good student (Hill, Acker and Black, 1994, p. 66). 
In a similar way to how the doctoral self-help guides often `idealise' the doctoral 
research process, Ashmore, Myers and Potter imagine the `ideal' doctoral student 
who, crucially, has no supervisor. It is in this sense that `fiction' cannot so easily 
be separated from `fact' in reflexive writing. It also appears that there is no 
approach or strategy in reflexive work - whether `traditional' or `experimental' - 
that can guarantee a particular outcome, such as revealing what is hidden, or 
bringing to the surface patterns of unacknowledged inequality and power. As such 
the present thesis will be presented mostly in `the time-honoured monologic 
format' (Ashmore, 1989, p. 73). 
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Chapter 4- Dilemmas of Method and Reflexivity 
Within qualitative, discursive and critical approaches to psychology it is generally 
acknowledged that methodological issues cannot be separated from theoretical 
assumptions. When one employs a particular method one is always drawing upon 
and consolidating ideas about how the world works, what people are like, and so 
on (see Richardson, 1996a; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Henriques et al., 1984). In 
contrast to this, the methods sections of traditional psychological reports are often 
presented as purely descriptive accounts of `what happened. ' They often involve 
little theoretical discussion of methodological issues, implying that the practice of 
psychology can be separated from theory, interpretation and argument. From a 
discursive perspective, the methods one employs are inherently bound up with 
theory. The choice of how to investigate a given topic is intimately connected with 
epistemological and ontological issues relating to the very nature of that topic as a 
`topic. ' As such, the present chapter constitutes both a presentation of `what 
happened' in this study, as well as a discussion of the particular issues 
surrounding method in discursive psychology and in studies of doctoral education. 
Each section will include descriptive details of how the study was developed and 
conducted, as well as a discussion of the associated theoretical issues. The aim is 
not to provide an exhaustive and complete account of the various methodological 
issues relating to the topics under discussion, but rather to highlight some of the 
central issues involved in adopting a discursive approach to the study of doctoral 
education, and to show how the presentation and practice of `method' is inherently 
bound up with theoretical assumptions. It is hoped that these discussions will 
contribute both to studies of higher education and debates on method within 
discursive and related constructionist approaches to psychology. 
It is not lost on the author that many reflexive issues arise when one is 
studying a topic which is `close to home. ' The way in which one studies a topic 
has the tendency to constitute that topic and this is especially the case when one is 
doing a doctorate on the dilemmas of doing a doctorate (Ashmore, 1989). Writing 
a PhD thesis can itself involve negotiating `doctoral dilemmas' and the present 
study is no exception. Rather than avoiding these issues and treating them as 
problematic, however, a better strategy seems to be to draw attention to the 
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paradoxes and make them a part of the study itself. As such this chapter will 
attempt to reflexively illustrate some of the most central issues arising from 
studying what one is studying. We will find that methods themselves can become 
objects for analysis and topics for creative discussion. Crucially the relationship 
between the researcher, the topic, and the participants becomes central. A 
reflexive approach is deemed to be entirely appropriate in this context because the 
present researcher's object of study is the same as his way into that topic. As such, 
even the doctoral theses as a written document can become a focus of 
investigation and experimentation. 13 
Participants and their selection 
Naturally the participants in this study were doctoral students and young lecturers 
registered as PhD candidates and in the process of either carrying out or 
completing their doctoral theses, or waiting for their viva voce examinations. 
Between March 2001 and January 2002 a total of 16 participants were 
interviewed, comprising 12 female and 4 male doctoral postgraduates in various 
psychology and social science departments at universities in the North West and 
East Midlands of the United Kingdom. Participants were selected from a variety 
of institutional locations, including `new' and `old' universities, as well as 
colleges associated with universities. The ages of the participants ranged from 24 
to 40 years. (Brief biographical details for individual participants can be found in 
Appendix A. ) Ethical issues relating to the discursive presentation and 
anonymisation of the respondents in the study are discussed in the section `Ethical 
Considerations' below. The present section will discuss the characteristics of the 
13 It is important at this point to raise the issue of authorial voice and how this chapter, this thesis, 
and indeed this footnote, are written. The standard choice as it is experienced in qualitative 
psychology is between adopting the impersonal and objective voice of the social scientist, or the 
personal voice of the researcher as an individual person. For the present chapter it was decided that 
the impersonal and the personal voice would both be used, depending upon what was being written 
at the time. The author flits between writing about what `I did' and what `was done' in the various 
different sections. This is mainly because I am both the researcher and a participant in this study. 
As we shall see, I was interviewed as if I were a participant, and in the interviews I am not solely 
70 
participants, their selection, and general issues relating to the presentation and 
engagement with `participants' in discursive psychology. 14 
The sampling method used in this study was opportunistic in the sense that 
the participants were found in a non-systematic and somewhat haphazard fashion. 
The aim was not to acquire a representative sample from a population of PhD 
students and therefore the term `sampling' is perhaps not entirely appropriate. In 
much discursive psychology `discourse' is the object of study rather than 
individual `people' per se (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). In the present study no 
attempt was made to standardise or control the selection of participants as in 
traditional questionnaire or experimental studies. Attempts to contact prospective 
participants were mainly made through friends and colleagues studying or 
working within the academy. As such the selection of participants has particular 
biases in it. The most obvious of these is that 75% of the participants were female. 
Of course this proportion of males and females is unlikely to reflect the overall 
gender split in psychology and social science doctoral students. For example, in 
2002 and 2003, the ESRC received applications for their Research Studentship 
Competition and 55% of the candidates were women and 45% men (ESRC, 2004). 
While this study does not seek to comment on gender differences between 
PhD students, it might nevertheless be the case that there are certain experiences 
which are specific to female as opposed to male members of the academy (the 
salary levels of academic staff is an example, see Ward, 2001 a, 2001 b). However, 
in accordance with conversation analytic and ethnomethodological approaches to 
gender, it is suggested that gender should only become an issue for analysis when 
it is demonstrably made relevant by the participants in their talk (e. g. Stokoe and 
Smithson, 2001). If gender `creeps into talk' then it will be taken up as an issue 
an `interviewer' but also a `doctoral student' as well. Hence the authorial voice of the thesis 
changes to reflect these contradictory and complementary identities. 
14 The reader may notice that in Appendix A the researcher himself is listed as participant number 
13. This is because he was interviewed by one of the other participants at the end of their 
interview. Few social research studies seem to include the researcher themselves as a participant in 
their studies. Indeed, the present researcher's own interview is not analysed in this thesis. It is 
worth thinking through the issues surrounding why this might be the case. In studies employing 
discourse analysis it would be important to consider whether there is a reluctance to subject ones' 
own talk to close linguistic analysis, and if so, why this might be the case. 
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for analytic discussion (see chapter 7). However, if no such `orientations' take 
place, then it is generally assumed that there are more similarities than differences 
between doctoral students of different genders. Of course this assumption of 
equality between genders is a contentious point, and therefore it is important to 
keep in mind the differences in gender of the doctoral students in this study. The 
reader is left to make their own judgements about matters arising from gender. 
based upon the discursive data that is presented. 
On a similar point there are also definite disciplinary biases in the sample in 
that 63% (10/16) of participants are in psychology departments. While there are 
no natural science doctoral students in the sample, there is one humanities student. 
Of course this reflects my own disciplinary training in psychology, which in turn 
determined who I contacted to find respondents. As Delamont, Atkinson and Parry 
(2000) have shown, there are important disciplinary differences in how doctoral 
students are socialised, and as such it is important to keep in mind the disciplinary 
affiliations of the doctoral students in this study. However, as I am not studying 
knowledge production per se, this is not assumed to constitute a major problem for 
the investigation. I am not so concerned with the ways in which doctoral students 
learn their topics of study and become socialised as particular kinds of 
knowledgeable subjects, but rather with more general issues relating to academic 
identity and the dynamics of the supervisory relationship. It is presumed that while 
there may be differences in doctoral experiences between social science 
disciplines, there are also likely to be important similarities. 
Furthermore it is problematic from a discursive perspective to assume that 
disciplinary identity is a background feature of what the respondents say about 
their experiences. As in the approach to gender adopted, disciplinary differences 
should only become an issue if they are demonstrated as such by the participants 
in their talk, or possibly if the researcher, through their scholarly or experiential 
knowledge of the subject matter, suspects that disciplinary differences might be 
playing a role at any given moment (Billig, 1988). Taking this discursive approach 
to disciplinarity and gender differences raises the broader issue of `context' within 
qualitative social research. To what degree do we need to look `beyond' the words 
of our participants to understand their activities? The present thesis does not aim 
to review or weigh in on the debates about context but rather to flag up points 
which are important to the discursive study of doctoral education (for more 
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general discussions of context in discourse and conversation analysis, see the 
special issue of Research on Language and Social Interaction, 1998, Volume 31, 
Issue 1). 
Overall it is somewhat difficult to talk about the selection of participants in a 
discursive study of this kind, partly because of the influence of conversation 
analysis, in which mention is rarely made of how one's data was acquired, or how 
one's participants were recruited. Even the term `participant' has different 
meanings in social psychological research as compared with conversation analytic 
work. In the former, a participant is someone who `participates' in the research. In 
the latter, a participant is `partaking' in a conversational interaction; they are a 
`member' of the social world (see Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998). In social 
psychological studies the methodology section should outline precisely how the 
respondents were recruited and what they were told about the research, partly to 
enable `replication' of the study to take place. In conversation analysis, however, 
the only `replication' likely to take place is of the analysis itself, hence the focus 
upon standardising transcription conventions (see below). Little or no mention is 
made of where the `data' has come from and how it acquired its status as `data. ' 
This is partly to give the sense that the materials under analysis are objects in 
themselves (cf. Ashmore, MacMillan and Brown, 2004). However, when the 
`data' consists of individual people and what they say, this raises subtle but 
important ethical issues about how we present and relate to our `participants, ' 
which we will briefly discuss below. 
In discursive studies influenced by both conversation analysis and social 
constructionism there appears to be a tension between showing your data to be 
constructed and as an artefact of the process of research on the one hand, and 
naturalising your data such that it becomes part of the social world rather than an 
academic creation on the other. The present study prefers to open up the research 
process for inspection, and to ask questions which are sometimes difficult for 
researchers, especially junior researchers, to address. Of course this process of 
revealing can also itself perform a hiding (Billig, 1999a), as we shall see as the 
chapter and the thesis progresses. 
The first way in which I selected my participants was to ask fellow doctoral 
students studying at the same university as myself to take part in practice or 'pilot' 
interviews. Two of these interviews were carried out. The fact that these 
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participants were known to me made it easier to contact them and arrange 
appropriate interview times. Furthermore the actual process of interviewing was 
made easier because of the relative informality of our relationships (although this 
was not always the case, see chapter 8). The particular questions asked of the 
respondents in both the pilot and proper interviews will be discussed in the section 
on interviewing below. 
Following these initial encounters, attempts were then made to contact 
cohorts of doctoral students through more senior academic members of staff who 
were known to me in other universities. In the first attempt to find respondents 
external to my own institution, emails were forwarded to PhD students in 
particular departments, requesting participation in my research study. Senior 
academic contacts were asked to introduce myself and my project, giving a sense 
of official permissability to my research, and then I sent the following email to the 
doctoral postgraduates in the department, personalising as appropriate. Names 
have been changed to protect the identities of those mentioned. 
Figure I: Email which was distributed to potential participants 
Dear Tony 
I hope that Malcolm Lawson has contacted you, regarding my PhD research 
into the experience of social science doctoral students. 
I am emailing to ask if we could do an informal interview? I am 
interested in your experiences as a doctoral student, what it's like for 
you to do your research, and so forth. 
I am based at Loughborough. If you would like to help me with my 
work, then we could arrange where you would prefer to meet. Maybe 
I could come to Placename, if this is the best for you? 
Warmest regards 
Steven. 
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This email represents a shift from the initial `internal' pilot interviews to 
`external' interviews of an informal nature. My own development as a doctoral 
student, from relatively cautious forays in my own department, to early attempts at 
contacting external respondents who were unknown to me, can be observed. In the 
email in Figure I, I set up the agenda of my study and make relevant particular 
ideas about my project and what I am expecting of my respondents. The request 
for an `informal' interview is important because it establishes the kind of study 
which is to be done. This is not going to be a `formal' interview for a job, but 
rather a more relaxed occasion. In this email we can not only detect subtle themes 
relating to what kind of research is being done, but also to the assumed 
relationship between the researcher and his participants. By mentioning `my PhD 
research' I explicitly display my identity as a postgraduate student doing a 
doctorate. This has the potential to perform particular interactional tasks in terms 
of my relationship with the participants. Firstly, it situates the research as a 
particular kind of research. It is personal or individual research ('my') and not 
research carried out by a team of researchers (such as the kind of study reviewed 
in chapter 2). Secondly, it locates myself as potentially `on a par' with my 
respondents. They are positioned in the same category of people as myself, `social 
science doctoral students. ' So emails such as this do not play a neutral role in the 
social research process. Rather they set the agenda of the study and display 
assumptions about what is required of the participants. As such they can be 
analysed as part of the research process itself, not as somehow prior to or separate 
from it. 
Emails like the one presented in Figure I were sent to doctoral postgraduates 
in institutions where senior academics known to myself were working. Then in 
December 2001 I sent a letter to PhD students registered in a Department of 
Psychology which was previously unknown to me. I contacted the administrator 
responsible for postgraduate research studies and asked whether they would be 
willing to distribute a letter to the students through their internal pigeon hole 
system. This request was accepted. In the letter I introduced myself and my 
research, and requested participants for my study (see Appendix B). This letter 
displays another shift in my own development as a researcher. Compared with the 
email presented in Figure I it is more professional and official in its character and 
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tone, possibly because it is `cold calling' doctoral students who are unaware of my 
research. There is much which could be said about this letter, and so I will limit 
myself to one observation about professionalism. The use of the Loughborough 
University logo in the top right hand corner works to credential myself as a figure 
with official authorisation, as does the mentioning of my PhD being sponsored by' 
the ESRC. The overall impression of the letter is that of a professional researcher 
who is capable of doing research in a competent manner. This being the last 
request for participants it appears as though I have become capable of carrying out 
research appropriately and professionally. 
We will now turn to consider the interviews which were carried out with 
doctoral students, as well as assumptions about interviewing as a social practice. 
When we consider the actual interview schedules which were used by the 
researcher in the field, we shall see that tensions between experience and 
inexperience, competence and incompetence, continue to be played out and 
negotiated. 
Interviewing as an academic activity15 
Interviewing is a standard research methodology in the social sciences, especially 
in qualitative work, where it is often assumed that a good way of gaining access to 
a person's experiences or beliefs is simply to go out and ask them (see Kvale, 
1996). Researchers rarely question the use of interviewing as a method of data 
collection, however, and as such certain important issues are often neglected. 
There are particular assumptions built into the theory and practice of interviewing 
which we might want to take issue with from the perspective of discursive 
psychology. In much qualitative work interviews are treated as `routes' through 
which one can gain access to other phenomena external to the interviews 
themselves, such as `attitudes, ' `experiences, ' or `reality. ' When participants are 
15 As well as carrying out interviews, 56 advertisements for social science PhD studentships were 
collected from the Guardian newspaper over the period of one year. These were to be studied to 
see how doctoral student life and identities are constructed in public university documentation, 
thereby making links between discursive psychology and work in critical discourse analysis on the 
marketisation of higher education (see Fairclough, 1992; Owen, 2004). However, these are not 
analysed in the present thesis. 
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asked to talk about their lives their talk is then treated as illustrating `what they 
do' or `what they think' in a universal and context-free fashion. Participants in 
interview studies are often expected to speak about their inner lives or the social 
world from a `God's eye point of view, ' outside of the particular contexts in which 
they ordinarily live their lives, speak and argue. As Potter (2002) has pointed out, 
interview talk tends to be flooded with psychological assumptions and 
terminology, which social researchers tend to treat as evidence of more general 
psychological processes existing within individual interviewees. 
In general, the theory and practice of interviewing often assumes that 
language works as a representational system for depicting the world or the mind, 
rather than working actively as a social practice for the performance of actions. 
However, the presumption that each person has straightforward access to their 
inner thoughts, beliefs and memories is problematic because it neglects the 
thoroughly social and discursive character of these phenomena (see chapter 3). 
Recent work in discourse and conversation analysis, however, has started to 
understand interviewing as a social activity and as a practice in its own right. 
Interviewers and interviewees are understood as `doing interviews' and their talk 
is analysed as such (see Van den Berg, Wetherell and Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2003). 
In this section I want to justify why interviewing has been chosen as an 
appropriate method of data collection in the present study, outline the interviewing 
procedure, and how we can understand the interviews from a discursive 
perspective. 
It is important to address why I have decided to interview doctoral 
postgraduates rather than say record everyday talk between doctoral students and 
members of staff in seminars, at social events, or in supervision meetings, for 
example. Doctoral supervision itself is a very private academic practice in the 
sense that it has only recently come under scrutiny by researchers and quality 
assurance agencies (see Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 1997b, 2004; Li, 2000). 
Delamont, Parry and Atkinson (1998) point out that the `social science research on 
doctoral candidates and supervision has never included prolonged and systematic 
observation of supervision actually happening ... 
Researchers have relied on 
students' and supervisors' accounts of the relationship and the processes' (p. 158). 
This study is no exception in the sense that it involves interviewing doctoral 
students, sometimes about their experiences of supervision, rather than actually 
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observing the supervisory relationship itself. Given the time limits involved in 
writing a doctoral thesis it was believed to be important to get access to data in as 
quick and straightforward a manner as possible. This is especially the case when 
one is learning the craft of discourse analysis, where it is important to begin 
writing as soon as possible (although guides on how to do discourse analysis 
rarely mention the subject). Negotiating access to supervision meetings is likely to 
have taken longer than requesting interview participation from doctoral students, 
and therefore might have delayed the thesis progress. 
Within the context of the present study it is important to stress that 
interviewing is a central part of contemporary academic research practice. Many 
academic researchers and doctoral postgraduates employ interviewing as their data 
collection method of choice. Therefore to study interviewing is to study an 
academic practice. It is to study a particular genre of `institutional talk' (McHoul 
and Rapley, 2001) or the negotiation of `elite identities' (van Dijk, 1993). In the 
present context, it involves studying the social activity of doing a social 
psychological doctorate, in a practical, empirical and reflexive manner. We will 
literally be getting a glimpse of what is involved in carrying out semi-structured 
doctoral interviews at PhD level. As such, this study follows critical work within 
psychology which studies interviewing as a form of social practice situated within 
particular social contexts (see, for example, Wetherell, 2003). The interviews are 
treated as collaborative interactional encounters in which wider personal and 
cultural themes are negotiated and managed. Although interviews are not 
supervisory situations, the interviewing practices in the present study are 
dependent upon prior and continuing supervisory situations, in which the 
participants and the present researcher participated, in their capacities as doctoral 
postgraduates. 
At the beginning of the first year of my PhD I carried out two pilot 
interviews with fellow PhD students, who were studying at the same university as 
myself. The first pilot interview was carried out in a restaurant on the 
Loughborough University campus and included questions on the doctoral 
student's thesis, as well as their views on publishing. (Part of this interview is 
analysed in chapter 8). After this first interview my agenda was then expanded 
and improved to encompass a wider variety of issues relating to doctoral student 
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life. The second pilot interview was carried out in my office 16 and began by 
mentioning ethical issues and the aims of my project. This was then followed by 
questions on the doctoral student's thesis progress and their experiences of 
writing. As the interview went on we talked about prior expectations of doing a 
PhD, experiences of publishing, and whether they considered themselves to be an 
academic. 
These initial pilot interviews served several different functions. Firstly, they 
allowed me to practice interviewing. Although I had used the method of 
interviewing for my first degree, I did not have much experience of carrying out 
in-depth interview discussions. In this sense the first few interviews served as 
useful practices, as I gradually changed my interviewing style. It should be noted, 
however, that this `improvement' in my capability as an interviewer did not 
necessary equate with `improved' data. When I carried out my first interview I 
was relatively inexperienced and tended to ask awkward questions of my 
participant. This generated some interesting data (see chapter 8). However, as I 
became more experienced, my subsequent interviews tended to be somewhat less 
interesting. Potter and Wetherell (1987) suggest that interviewers might want to 
challenge their interviewees, thereby allowing them to employ a variety of 
discursive devices in their talk. What they do not discuss however is that, by 
employing such an interviewing style, the interviewer themselves risks coming 
across as inexperienced or inept. They risk presenting themselves as something 
other than `dispassionate' social researchers in search of the objective `truth' of 
events. Doctoral students, as part of their academic development, are expected to 
be competent and professional in their encounters with their respondents. ' 7 If they 
16 Subsequent interviews were carried out in postgraduates' offices, vacant university seminar 
rooms, university cafeterias, a cafe, one university hall of residence, and also on the telephone. 
" For example, in their Code of Conduct for Psychologists, The British Psychological Society 
(2000) propose that `[p]sychologists shall endeavour to maintain and develop their professional 
competence, to recognise and work within its limits, and to identify and ameliorate factors which 
restrict it' (p. 2; cf. Foster, 2003). Similarly, the British Sociological Association (2002), in their 
Statement of Ethical Practice for the British Sociological Association, recommend that `[w]hile 
recognising that training and skill are necessary to the conduct of social research, members should 
themselves recognise the boundaries of their professional competence. They should not accept 
work of a kind they are not qualified to carry out' (p. 2). I imagine this latter stipulation could 
prove somewhat difficult for doctoral sociologists to abide by. 
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are to be seen as representatives of their home institution, or of academia more 
generally, then they may not wish to come across as incompetent or pushy. As 
such, Potter and Wetherell's suggestion might not be so helpful for fledgling 
qualitative researchers in the field. Unless, that is, they wish to generate 
interesting data. 
The second function of the initial pilot interviews was to find out whether I 
was going to get interesting and substantial data from my participants. Qualitative 
research can be a risky business in the sense that you literally do not know what 
you're going to get before going out into `the field. ' You are not sure whether 
your interests will be reflected in what your participants say. As it turned out the 
doctoral students I interviewed often spoke at length about the various issues, 
experiences and dilemmas they were negotiating in their lives. They generally 
seemed to appreciate the opportunity to speak openly about their dilemmas in the 
presence of a fellow student. 18 Indeed, this was mentioned in the letter of 
introduction sent out to potential doctoral student participants (Appendix B). 
Thirdly and finally the pilot interviews were helpful in developing interview 
schedules for the interviews subsequently carried out with doctoral postgraduates 
at institutions other than my own (see Appendices C, D and E). These schedules 
were used to guide the interview conversations. They acted as memory aids 
whenever I was `lost for words' and helped to give a general structure to each of 
the interviews. Several topics of discussion are commonly raised across the 
interview schedules, including ethics, requests for background information from 
the participants, their current doctoral research (including their sense of freedom 
and constraint), whether they considered themselves to be academics, and their 
experiences of publishing. 
Although the schedules include complete questions for the interviewees to 
answer, it was not the aim of the interviewing procedure to read these out 
verbatim. Throughout the interviews I adopted an in-depth semi-structured or 
`conversational' interviewing style. The general aim was to encourage the 
respondents to speak personally and at length about their lives as doctoral 
students, while at the same time covering the issues which I was interested in as a 
researcher. There was a constant balance to be struck therefore between what was 
18 Some participants appreciated this more than others, see chapter 7. 
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interesting to me and what was interesting to them, and as such the interviewer- 
interviewee relationship veered between impersonality and rapport. As Platt 
(1981) notes, `the recognized tension between the demands of impersonality and 
of rapport from the interviewer implies a preparedness to exploit divergent 
understandings, since the interviewer is meant to be objectively impersonal in her 
approach, while using rapport to elicit information which might not be provided 
under purely impersonal conditions' (p. 84). 
The reader will notice that the interview schedules were expanded and 
refined over the course of time. Several interesting observations could be made 
about these schedules, although they were not intended for public viewing. They 
give an interesting insight into the development of the present research, and 
indeed of the present researcher. One insight relates to the issue of professional 
competence, which was raised in the earlier discussion of participant selection. 
Changes in researcher competence can be observed across the three interview 
schedules. The first schedule (Appendix C) was typed on a typewriter using a 
piece of paper taken from a notepad. It was used for an interview with a doctoral 
postgraduate at an institution where I knew one of the senior faculty members. 
This was one of the earlier interviews and as such the schedule is not very well 
presented. It appears messy, incomplete and not very professional. In contrast, 
schedule number two (Appendix D) was printed using a computer, whereby 
mistakes could be removed at the word processing stage. In this schedule the 
interview was in the process of being split into various sections; questions are 
starting to be grouped together in certain ways. In the third schedule (Appendix 
E), this division is made more clear; the agenda is divided into `Beginning, ' 
`Middle and `End. ' 
The development of these interview schedules gives a potential insight into 
what could be considered the `professional socialisation' of myself as a doctoral 
student, moving from the position of inexperienced amateur to that of competent 
practioner. However, the acquisition of professional competence is unlikely to be 
as straightforward as this progression would imply. For the necessity of 
professional presentation places doctoral students in a potential dilemma. In 
learning how to present both themselves and their research in a capable and proper 
manner, student inexperience and incompetence must be repressed or at least 
avoided, both from presentation and from practice. A completed doctoral thesis 
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should, for example, be devoid of incompetence; mistakes and incompetencies 
ought to be discarded or concealed, and the final finished product should reflect a 
perfectly professional presentation of self (Phillips and Pugh, 2000). 19 With such 
rigid proscriptions regarding presentation and conduct, there is likely be a 
temptation to loosen the professional restraint, and present oneself in a non- 
professional manner (Billig, 1999a). What is repressed has the tendency to return, 
and therefore it is unlikely that even fully fledged academic professionals will be 
completely lacking in amateurish characteristics (see the top of Interview 
Schedule III, Appendix E). We will continue to consider ideas about the revealing 
and concealing of researcher incompetence in the following section on ethics. 
Ethical considerations 
Ethical issues are important to consider in any empirical social study which 
involves human or animal participants (BPS, 2000). Ethical guidelines provide 
codes of conduct with regards how researchers should relate with their 
participants. Although ethical guidelines are often written with the protection of 
participants in mind, ethical codes also work to protect researchers. Indeed, there 
is a sense in which it would be deemed `unethical' not to recognise and 
incorporate ethical considerations into the design and implementation of one's 
research. As such, it has become customary to acknowledge ethical issues in 
social research, and the reporting of ethics has therefore taken on something of a 
banal character. Ethics tend to be acknowledged in a routine manner, devoid of 
critical questioning or reflexive awareness. 
There is also something disingenuous about the reporting of ethics in 
psychological research, related to the tendency to routinely present oneself as 
being ethically `in the right. ' While superficially protecting participants, ethical 
discussions often work defensively to present researchers in a purely positive 
moral light. As such there is rarely a mention of those occasions where the 
researcher has been ethically `in the wrong. ' In doctoral research, however, things 
can and do `go wrong' (Delamont and Atkinson, 2001). Doctoral research 
19 Even the presentation of my own incompetence as a researcher is itself a display of 
professionalism, as I am demonstrating `transparency' in my research practice (see, for example, 
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therefore provides a potentially good case study in the contravention of ethical 
guidelines, and how this relates to the practice and reporting of ethics in social 
research more broadly. Briefly, in this section we will consider attempts to protect 
the participants in the present study, some accidental unethical practice during a 
telephone interview, and the dilemmas involved in interviewing one's peers. 
The main ethical consideration of relevance to the present study is 
`confidentiality. ' In research reports it is customary to anonymise one's 
participants by giving them pseudonyms and disguising their personal details so 
that they cannot be identified by readers or reviewers. In their `Ethical principles 
for conducting research with human participants' The British Psychological 
Society explains that `Participants in psychological research have a right to expect 
that information they provide will be treated confidentially and, if published, will 
not be identifiable as theirs' (BPS, 2000, p. 10). There are several reasons why 
confidentiality is important in the present study. Firstly, the respondents are in the 
same social sphere as those who are likely to read or assess the present piece of 
work. Secondly, there is a specific disciplinary focus on psychology and social 
science departments. And thirdly, PhD topics tend to be specific and idiosyncratic 
and therefore authors might easily be identified. Naturally the respondents in the 
present study talked about being doctoral students in their own particular 
university departments. They also often discussed their relationships with their 
supervisors. As such, there is a possibility that the real identities of the participants 
might be discovered, either through their institutional locations, or their doctoral 
thesis topics. How were the respondents to be identified (or, more accurately, not 
identified) in the present study? 
In their study of doctoral study, Delamont, Atkinson and Parry (2000) go to 
great lengths to anonymise their participants, giving senior academics and 
postgraduate research students a variety of elaborate pseudonyms and fictitious 
institutional locations, as well as systematically varying institutional and 
disciplinary affiliations (see Delamont, 2003). In the present study, efforts were 
made to ensure the partial anonymity of the respondents. While each participant 
was given a false first name and identified as such, their actual age, status and 
departmental location were preserved. Unlike Delamont, Atkinson and Parry the 
Appendix C). 
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present researcher is not so concerned with doctoral knowledge production and 
therefore little mention is made of the actual topics of respondents' theses. When 
mention is made, details of thesis topic or research orientation are disguised or 
altered so as not to identify the student or supervisor in question. Similarly the 
institutional locations of participants are not given. University names are either 
blanked out or replaced with the words `Institution' or `Placename. ' As such, all 
participants were guaranteed enough anonymity and confidentiality so that their 
real identities could not be ascertained. 
Not all of the participants in the study were concerned to be anonymised 
though. Participant number five (see Appendix A), for example, gave me 
permission not to anonymise him. When asked via email how much anonymity, if 
any, he would like, he replied `I can't actually remember what I said in the 
interview, but as long as I said nothing pro Bush or Blair you can mention me by 
nanme! [sic]. ' This participant is therefore identified by his real name and none of 
the details about his research or supervisor have been altered or concealed (see 
chapter 8). We will consider in more detail how ethical issues were practically 
negotiated in the research at the end of this section. 
The next important ethical issue to consider is the protection of the 
participants. `Investigators have a primary responsibility to protect participants 
from physical and mental harm during the investigation' (BPS, 2000, p. 10). In the 
present study attempts were made to ensure the mental and physical well-being of 
all the respondents. For example, interviewees were never asked to talk about their 
relationships with their supervisors, as it was felt that this was a sensitive issue 
which might have caused some discomfort to speak about, especially if the 
doctoral student in question was having a `rough time' of it. Also it was made 
clear to the respondents that I was not assessing the quality of their work or of the 
supervision they were receiving. Nor was I checking up on their thesis progress. In 
general it was assumed that the topics likely to be raised in the interviews were 
unlikely to cause participants any significant degree of mental harm. Indeed, the 
opposite seemed to be the case, as `[s]everal of my respondents ... appreciated 
being given the opportunity to speak in confidence about their lives as doctoral 
students' (Letter of Introduction, Appendix B). In particular this was borne out in 
the case of one participant who had had a particularly bad experience of doing her 
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doctorate. Anna explicitly said she appreciated the opportunity to talk about what 
had happened to her (see chapter 8 for her story). 
All of the participants were informed that they could withdraw from the 
study at any time. If, as the interview progressed, the participant was 
uncomfortable with what had been asked or the direction in which the interview 
was going, then they could just say so and I would turn off the recorder and stop 
the interview. ('At the onset of the investigation investigators should make plain 
to participants their right to withdraw from the research at any time, irrespective 
of whether or not payment or other inducement has been offered, ' BPS, 2000, p. 
10) 
Finally we need to consider the issue of `consent' and the instance of 
unethical practice in the study. `Whenever possible, the investigator should inform 
all participants of the objectives of the investigation' (BPS, 2000, p. 8). Naturally 
all of the participants knew that they were participating in a social research study 
on the topic of doctoral education (see `Participants and their selection' above). 
However, the researcher was not able give much more detail than this, because of 
the indeterminancy of the project at the time of data collection. As in much 
qualitative research, especially ethnographic and discursive work, the precise 
nature of the study could not be known from the outset. Rather it developed 
inductively over time as the researcher became acquainted with the materials and 
the topic. Participants were aware that they were partaking in a qualitative study in 
which their words would be presented verbatim, and consent was obtained from 
them to do this at the beginning of each interview. 
That is, in all but one case. During the one telephone interview in the study, 
the respondent was not informed of the relevant ethical issues relating to the 
conduct of the study at the beginning of the interview. Not only this, after around 
twenty minutes into their interview, the participant themselves raised particular 
ethical issues for clarification, which the researcher then went on to address. It is 
worth presenting transcribed versions of these ethical exchanges, if only to 
demonstrate how (un)ethical practice can become a `live' concern in social 
research. Ethics are not merely abstract methodological issues, driven by 
guidelines and codes of conduct. Rather they are practical concerns, handled and 
negotiated in various ways by researchers and participants as investigations 
proceed. By looking at occasions when ethics `become relevant' in research 
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studies we can begin to understand the practical role that ethics can play in the 
business of `doing research. ' Thus we can begin to treat ethical practice as a 
fruitful topic of study as well as a methodological issue. 
In the following exchange - after discussing a sensitive issue relating to the 
funding of her PhD - the participant `Louise' asks for clarification about an 
ethical issue (see Appendix F for the transcription notation used): 
Extract 1 
Louise can I just clarify this will be entirely anonymous won't it? 
Steven absolutely yeah I was gonna go on to do my statement when it was (. ) 
well (. ) when it was convenient but yeah I mean I'm guaranteeing you 
complete anonymity and confidentiality I won't specify- 
Louise I was assuming that yeah 
Steven I won't be identifying the institution or anything and I'll be making as 
much effort as I can to anonymise everyone 
In this instance it is the participant who raises an ethical issue rather than the 
researcher. 20 Ironically this in itself could be cited as evidence of unethical 
practice, as Steven appears to have neglected his ethical duty to inform the 
participant about the ethical procedures of his study, including provisions for 
anonymity and confidentiality. Louise should not need to `clarify' whether she 
will be `entirely anonymous' in the research or not, as Steven himself should have 
addressed the issue earlier in the conversation. An important feature of this 
exchange is the way in which Steven not only answers Louise's question, but also 
explains or justifies himself, saying that he was `gonna go on to do' his ethical 
statement when it was convenient. It is only then that he gives his statement, 
guaranteeing Louise `complete anonymity and confidentiality. ' Steven thereby 
defends what could be considered incompetence with regards his ethical practice 
20 It is important to stress that Louise did not just ask her question `out of the blue' without any 
prior occasioning. It was only after talking about a sensitive issue relating to the funding of her 
PhD that she raised the issue of anonymity. Thus, ethics are not merely abstract issues for 
theoretical consideration, but can become practically occasioned during research encounters 
themselves, and negotiated and managed by both researchers and participants. 
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by claiming that he was `going' to inform Louise about confidentiality, thereby- 
suggesting that he had not forgotten or intentionally disregarded the ethical 
considerations of his study. 
Thankfully as `Louise' is a pseudonym Steven appears to have stood by his 
promise of anonymity. However, the ethical dilemmas do not end here, for soon 
after this exchange Louise asks a second question, this time relating to the issue of 
consent. This question places Steven in an even more compromising position with 
regards ethics. 2' 
Extract 2 
Louise by the way are you taping this conversation? 
Steven yes I am I was going to also ask you if it was okay to do that 
Louise right 
Steven is that okay with you? 
Louise oh yeah yeah yeah I was kind of assuming that 
Steven right right I was gonna mention that whenever it became relevant 
Louise it's not a bad idea to let people know at the beginning 
Steven right okay sorry about that Louise 
The possibility that one might be `covertly recording' one's participants is 
potentially more ethically reprehensible than not promising them anonymity and 
confidentiality. It goes against ingrained assumptions in social research about 
`informed consent' and possibly evokes broader cultural fears around `phone 
tapping' or `being bugged. ' In general a researcher who records their participants 
without permission risks being considered morally suspect. Indeed it is possible 
that Steven himself is aware of this issue and its seriousness, because he justifies 
himself not once but twice in the present extract. Steven does not immediately 
21 It can be noted that both of the questions that Louise asks are prefaced (she says `can I just 
clarify ... 
' and `by the way ... 
') rather than asked directly, which gives the impression either that 
the questions themselves are enquiring into sensitive areas and therefore in need of softening. or 
possibly that the very act of questioning in this context is counter normative. After all, these are the 
only questions the interviewee asked of the interviewer during the conversation, which might 
account for their prefatory hedging. 
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apologise to Louise, saying that he `forgot, ' for example. Instead, he says that he 
was `going' to ask Louise if it was `okay to do that' and that he was `gonna 
mention that' whenever it became 'relevant. ' 22 Again it is taken for granted that 
Steven should have asked Louise for permission to record the interview, and that 
not doing so constitutes some kind of breach or infringement of good and proper 
research practice, such as that outlined in an ethical code of conduct. In a similar 
way to how, in Extract 1, Steven guaranteed Louise anonymity and confidentiality 
when it was raised by her as an issue, in Extract 2, after justifying his potentially 
unethical practice, Steven asks Louise whether it is `okay' to tape the 
conversation, which Louise then assents to, saying `oh yeah yeah yeah I was kind 
of assuming that. ' 
In their paper on participant orientations to recording devices, Speer and 
Hutchby (2003a; see also Hammersley, 2003; Speer and Hutchby, 2003b) suggest 
that `[b]y exploring how tape-affected speech becomes a participant's topic, we 
are able to delve further into the situated ways in which research ethics and the 
morality of recording are played out as participants' concerns' (p. 321). Indeed it 
would be worth following up analytically how ethics are practically managed in 
research materials and encounters. 23 Speer and Hutchby do not discuss in detail 
the issue of ethics in their paper, concentrating as they do more on methodological 
issues surrounding what counts as `natural' or `contrived' data (see also the debate 
in Discourse Studies, 2002, Volume 4, Number 4). Indeed they do not consider 
cases where the `recordee' asks the `recorder' whether their talk is being taped, 
thereby implicating the researcher in potentially dubious ethical practice. The fact 
22 It is interesting that Steven uses the conversation analytic notion of `relevance' as a 
methodological strategy for informing his participant that their talk is being recorded. Might he be 
suggesting that the fact that a participant is being recorded should only become relevant when it is 
raised as an issue by the participant themselves, rather than being imposed by the researcher before 
hand? 
23 Ethical issues are explicitly mentioned in each of the interview schedules presented in 
Appendices C, D and E. Reference to ethics becomes increasingly specific as the schedule is 
modified, from the adhoc handwritten `ethics' (Appendix C), to an imprecise reminder to `say a 
few words about ethics' (Appendix D), to the more specific identification of three ethical 
considerations, `[a]nonymity, confidentiality and withdrawal' (Appendix E). This development in 
the specificity of ethics in the schedules might partly be a result of the `bad' telephone interview 
experience. Not surprisingly, all of the remaining interviews were carried out 
face-to-face. 
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that this is a telephone interview means that Louise would not necessarily have 
known whether she was being recorded or not, had she not asked Steven about it, 
and had he not told her. Louise appears to be correcting an absence related to the 
mentioning of potentially relevant research activities, including the habitual 
recording of interviews, and the customary obtaining of `informed consent' from 
participants to do so. Louise informs Steven that `it's not a bad idea to let people 
know at the beginning' of the interview that they are being recorded, thereby 
instructing him in the proper practice of ethics, and indirectly `telling him off for 
getting it wrong. It is only then that Steven apologises to her. 
Why did Steven the interviewer justify himself in the way that he did in both 
of the extracts? Why did Louise the interviewee need clarification on information 
which she says she was already `assuming' would be the case? And indeed why 
did Steven the researcher find these extracts so difficult to listen to and transcribe? 
Such questions lead us beyond the scope of the present section, and indeed beyond 
the scope of the thesis as a whole. One observation can be made, however, about 
the double prohibitive nature of ethics. Not only is there an especially strong 
prohibition against unethical activity in the practice of research, but there also 
seems to be a prohibition against presenting oneself as unethical in the writing of 
one's report. I was personally very reluctant to use extracts from Louise's 
interview in my thesis, finding them difficult to transcribe and listen to. Indeed I 
was tempted to avoid her interview altogether and forget that it had ever 
happened. 24 When thinking back to the emotional pain that was involved in 
listening to and transcribing extracts one and two - possibly evoking feelings of 
shame and embarrassment (Scheff and Retzinger, 1991,2000) - it is easy to 
understand why researchers tend to routinely show themselves as being ethically 
`in the right' in their studies. Ironically one would expect `transparency' in 
research to be the `right thing to do' ethically (cf. Gill, 1995). However, in 
presenting their ethical failings, researchers risk presenting themselves as 
incompetent and unprofessional in their dealings with participants. It is much 
easier to avoid or `skip over' ethically dubious practices, either by not mentioning 
24 Louise as a participant was very nearly `repressed' from the thesis as a whole; it was only after 
starting this section on ethics that I was reminded of her existence and decided to add her to 
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them, or giving banal and sanitised versions of what might otherwise appear to be 
`good ethical practice. ' 
Transcription 
The audio of each interview was recorded using a Minidisc recorder and lapel 
microphone. The main benefit of using digital as opposed to analogue recordings 
of interviews is that audio from a Minidisc is of a much higher quality than that 
from an ordinary analogue cassette tape. Good sound quality is important for the 
present research as the interest is not only with what the participants say but also 
with how they say it. Also the process of transcription is speeded up using a 
Minidisc because of the instant and reliable access which digital recording 
equipment affords. The interviews could be listened to repeatedly without fear of 
wear and tear of the disc itself, and textual transcripts could be produced relatively 
quickly compared to transcribing from a cassette tape with moving parts. 
Initial transcripts were made of all the interviews with doctoral students, at 
first recording only the words which were said by the interviewer and the 
respondents. These early verbatim transcripts were organised around topics and 
themes going across the interviews, such as doctoral postgraduate identity work, 
descriptions of the supervisory relationship, and stories of publishing from 
doctoral theses. When, after repeated reading, particular extracts were chosen for 
detailed discursive analysis, they were then retranscribed using a simplified and 
modified version of the notation developed by Jefferson (1984a) for conversation 
analysis (see Appendix F). This system captured not only what doctoral students 
said about their identities and experiences, but also how they said it. The system 
includes notation to represent the paralinguistic features of spoken interaction, 
such as emphasis, repair, pauses, and so forth. The Jefferson system is appropriate 
for a discursive approach which treats talk as a thoroughly interactional 
phenomenon, bound up with the performance of social actions (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987; see also Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998; ten Have, 1998). 
Appendix A. She is missing as a participant in Stanley and Billig (2004), who claim to have 
carried out '15 in-depth discussions with 11 female and 4 male doctoral students' 
(p. 162). 
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Of course the present study is not merely interested in the interactional 
organisation of the interview encounters with doctoral students. The main interest 
is with the ways in which doctoral students describe themselves and their lives. As 
such, the interest is more with content rather than form (although we cannot 
assume that these are entirely distinct, see Ashmore, 1989; Ashmore, Myers and 
Potter, 1995). This focus is reflected in the transcription notation used, which 
attempts to strike a balance between presenting what was said along with how it 
was said. While preserving details of the interactional organisation and prosodic 
`delivery' of the talk, at the same time attempts are made to display the overall 
`narrative' or `discursive patterning' of particular turns at talk. This is closely 
allied with the concern to maintain the readability of the transcripts. Often the 
respondents spoke clearly and lucidly about their lives and it was hoped that the 
transcripts would reflect this. The approach to transcription should become clearer 
as the analysis progresses (see especially chapter 7; for a similar version to the one 
used in the present study, along with a brief discussion on the theory of 
transcription, see the appendix of Wetherell and Potter, 1992). 
It was pointed out in the previous section that there are important ethical 
issues relating to how one presents and relates with one's participants. For 
example, the participants in the present study have been partially anonymised and 
are identified using false first names. Indeed, there is an ethical dimension to the 
process of transcription in terms of the identification of the participants in the data 
extracts. By referring to the participants using first names particular assumptions 
are being made about the relationship between the researcher and the respondents, 
as well as the status of the respondents themselves. For example, by referring to 
the interviewer as `Steven' and the interviewee as `Louise' in the extracts in the 
previous section, equal status and speaking rights were assumed. It was taken for 
granted that the speakers were on friendly and equal terms and that there was no 
imbalance of power between them. Equally it was suggested that no social or role 
identities were of relevance in their particular encounter. Of course this is plainly 
not the case, because in this example, and indeed in all of the encounters in the 
present study, the speakers are playing out the roles of `interviewer/interviewee' 
and also of `doctoral postgraduates. ' Why then identify the researcher and 
participants using first names rather than `discourse roles' (such as 'Interviewer' 
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and `Interviewee A') or indeed `institutional roles' (for example `Doctoral Student 
A' and `Doctoral Student B')? 
The main reason for being on first name terms with the participants is so as 
not to give the impression that the respondents are interchangeable, and that the 
talk of one participant could simply be replaced with the talk of another. As we 
shall see in the following final section on analysis, attempts were made in the 
thesis to give a `populated' vision of doctoral student life, preserving the 
distinctiveness of individual participants and their lives. Referring to them as just 
plain `interviewees, ' `doctoral postgraduates' or indeed letters or numbers might 
have given the impression that there is nothing special about the participants as 
individual people, or that they can be characterised purely by the roles and 
statuses which they were adopting at the time. Furthermore, it is expected that first 
name codes of address would be followed when doctoral postgraduates meet with 
one another. For example, in the introductory email potential participants were 
addressed through their first names (see Figure I above). 
Of course there are also disadvantages to referring to the respondents by first 
names, including the idea that their status as `interviewees' is not at all relevant to 
the analysis. The section on interviewing above made it clear that the respondents 
are understood as partaking in interview encounters, and that this in turn has an 
important constitutive role in how their discourse should be understood. Indeed, as 
part of this orientation my own discourse as `interviewer' is to be analysed along 
with the responses of the respondents, and the participants' discourse is 
contextualised with reference to the interviewer's turns. Taking into account as 
well that I took on the role of an interviewee, there is ample evidence to suggest 
that I am both a researcher and participant in this study. More profoundly, I am the 
doctoral student writing this thesis and analysing the data. My identification as 
`Steven' therefore works to bring attention to such paradoxes rather than 
disguising them by presenting myself as `the interviewer' (for a more extended 
debate on these and related issues in discourse and conversation analysis, see 
Discourse and Society, Volume 10, Number 4). 
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Discourse analysis procedure 
In chapter 3 we outlined what a discursive view of doctoral education might look 
like, describing the central assumptions of discursive and rhetorical approaches to 
identity, ideology and power, and how these might be applied to the study of 
doctoral student life. In that chapter we set out the theoretical and analytical 
background to the kind of discourse analysis which is carried out in subsequent 
chapters. As such, the present section will only lightly prepare the ground for the 
forthcoming analyses, briefly considering the specific discourse analytic 
procedure adopted in the present study. We have already considered how the 
interviews are to be approached discursively, and therefore the present section will 
necessarily be short. 
There is currently a preponderance of guides on how to do, and not do, 
discourse analysis (see, for example, Wood and Kroger, 2000; Phillips and 
Jorgensen, 2002; Antaki et al., 2002). Often these guides stress that doing analysis 
is not like following a rigid procedure or set of rules, but is a more indeterminate 
and eclectic exercise. As Potter and Wetherell (1987) point out, `[a]nalysis of 
discourse is like riding a bicycle compared to conducting experiments or analysing 
survey data which resemble baking cakes from a recipe. There is no mechanical 
procedure for producing findings from a transcript' (p. 168). Indeed, doing 
discourse analysis appears to resemble traditional scholarship more than it does 
social scientific practice. In the chapter `Methodology and scholarship in 
understanding ideological explanation' Michael Billig (1988) recommends 
adopting the methods of traditional scholarship in social research. He suggests that 
the `approach of the traditional scholar can be considered anti-methodological, in 
that hunches and specialist knowledge are more important than formally defined 
procedures' (p. 199), especially when one is studying ideology. The present 
discursive study of doctoral education represents traditional scholarship in the 
sense that it involves drawing upon academic knowledge and experience in a 
reflexive, idiosyncratic and somewhat eclectic manner. 
The discourse analysis in the present thesis differs from much work in 
discursive psychology, however, because it focuses on a selection of individual 
doctoral students. Over the course of three empirical chapters a selection of `case 
studies' are to be reported, merging the lives of singular students with shared 
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discursive and cultural themes (see chapters 6,7 and 8). The thesis is concerned to 
give a `populated' view of doctoral study, along the lines of previous work in the 
sociology of education, where individual doctoral students and their experiences 
are presented and analysed in the text, rather than obscured through the use of 
survey or questionnaire methodologies. Billig (1994,1998; see also the 
commentaries by Spears, 1994; Ussher, 1994; Stringer, 1994) has argued that 
much written experimental social psychology relies upon a `depopulated' form of 
rhetoric. Stories of experiments are often told in such a way that they are 
abstracted from the events that actually took place in the laboratory. Participants 
are devoid of everydayness and thereby discursively `dehumanized. ' Indeed, a 
similar pattern of depopulation can be found in more fashionable theoretical and 
analytical work in which individual people and their lives tend not to appear 
(Stanley, 2001 a, 2001b). Even in discursive and conversation analytic work the 
distinctiveness of individual identities can often be obscured through an 
overriding emphasis on `discourse' or `talk. ' The present analysis adopts a kind of 
`discursive case study' approach, in which the accounts of individual participants 
are supplemented and contextualised through biographical details taken from their 
interviews as a whole. While there is often substantial overlap between 
participants in terms of the discursive strategies they employ, and the turns of 
phrase they use, there is also uniqueness in the sense that what each person says is 
novel, having never been said before (Bakhtin, 1981). The analysis reflects this 
tension between conventionality and novelty in the participants' accounts by 
balancing the `personal' with the `social' (Hepburn, 2003). 
Given the eclectic nature of discourse analytic practice, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to articulate the precise method which was used to carry out the 
forthcoming discourse analyses. This is because no systematic `method' was used 
at all. Rather, the researcher pursued analytic intuitions and hunches, taking up 
themes and patterns across the materials in an idiosyncratic way, therefore 
resembling a traditional `scholar' more than an up-to-date `methodologist. ' 
However this account of the research process gives the impression that the present 
researcher acted alone, and without the aid of collaborators. Indeed the guides on 
how to do discourse analysis tend to neglect the relational or collaborative nature 
of intellectual work. Authors of methods articles and textbooks tend not to 
mention the `distributed' character of academic practice. They often write as 
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though academics think and act alone and in isolation from their peers, thereby 
perpetuating the myth of the `independent scholar' (Lee and Williams, 1999: 
Johnson, Lee and Green, 2000; on the myriad consequences of this kind of 
orientation, see Shotter, 1997). 
This absence in the methodological literature is especially problematic when 
we come to consider the case of doctoral study, in which students often work with 
supervisors, who take on the role of intellectual guides or mentors. In a rare 
mentioning of this issue in a handbook of qualitative research methods, 
Richardson (1996b) stresses that `the significance of an effective and sensitive 
supervisor-student relationship cannot be emphasized too strongly in the conduct 
of qualitative research' (p. 10). For doctoral students learning to do discourse 
analysis, or indeed any qualitative approach, the role of the supervisor and a wider 
intellectual community is essential. They are developing a craft skill and as such 
are in need of help and assistance from more experienced teachers and colleagues. 
The conventions of academic writing, however, tend to hide the 
collaborative nature of analysis and scholarship. For example, while collaborative 
doctoral publications will often display the names of both student and supervisor 
(Stanley and Billig, 2004), the spines of bound doctoral theses tend to only display 
lone student names (Stanley, 2004). As such, the writing practices of academics 
and postgraduates themselves tend to reinforce the `lone scholar' myth. This myth 
is accompanied by a general neglect of the topic of `writing' in the social sciences, 
even in qualitative methods textbooks. For example, in the case of discourse 
analysis, an emphasis on `reading' is made, but not `writing. ' In his paper on 
methodology, Billig (1988) suggests that `the scholar knows that the task of 
scholarship cannot be reduced to getting through a list of set reading. It is not, for 
example, merely a matter of ploughing through the collected works of Enoch 
Powell, in the belief that all necessary reading then will have been completed. 
Wider reading is also required' (p. 214). Similarly, in their attempt to convey the 
discourse analytic process, Potter and Wetherell (1987) suggest that `there is a 
basic lesson that is inescapable: analysis involves a lot of careful reading and 
rereading' (p. 168). What both neglect to point out is that scholarship and analysis 
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necessarily require writing and rewriting. And crucially, in the case of doctoral 
study, in collaboration with a supervisor (or supervisors). 25 
If all goes well, learning to do discourse analysis at doctoral level can be 
rather like being an apprentice, studying under an experienced craftsperson. 
However, the issue of the training of young discourse analysts, and indeed of 
critical scholars in general, is rarely addressed in the literature. It is possible that 
such ideas threaten the `originality' of doctoral theses; the `independence' of 
doctoral students as autonomous academics; and indeed wider assumptions around 
`critical' intellectuals being separated off from mainstream academic economies 
and practices. If doctoral postgraduates can be `trained up' in discursive and 
critical approaches, set free to `disseminate' the work of their supervisors and 
tutors, and in turn `publicise' their mentors as intellectual figures, then surely this 
represents a challenge to cherished notions about the purity and preciousness of 
scholarship and intellectual endeavour? As we shall see as the analysis progresses, 
the traditional assumptions of academia can sometimes come into conflict with 
contemporary `marketised' realities, and the socialisation of doctoral students can 
become intertwined with broader power relations and institutional concerns, 
which are sometimes difficult for both academics and students to acknowledge. 
25 We will consider the role of writing and authorship in the doing of a doctorate in chapter 8. On 
the writing strategies of academics and social science research students more generally, see 
Lowenthal and Wason (1977), Hartley and Knapper (1984), Hartley and Branthwaite (1989) and 
Torrance, Thomas and Robinson (1992,1994). 
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Chapter Five - Content Analysis of Postgraduate Identity Work 
This chapter presents a content analysis of the corpus of interviews carried out 
with PhD students on their experiences of doing doctorates. It reports a content 
analysis of qualitative interview transcripts (Kracauer, 1952-1953; Schutz, 1958- 
1959). Traditionally, content analysis has been a methodology used in 
communication research. It is `a research technique for the objective, systematic, 
and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication' (Berelson, 
1952, p. 18). It has been used within social psychology to analyse participant 
responses to open-ended questionnaire items and semi-structured interview 
questions. Hayes (2000) explains that `content analysis consists of setting up a 
series of categories and counting up how many examples of each category can be 
identified in the data' (p. 275). In this chapter we will not be carrying out a 
traditional content analysis by testing hypotheses through statistics. This is 
because both the sample size and epistemological bases of the study precludes 
such analysis. Instead, we will attempt to illustrate some of the identity work done 
by doctoral students in response to a particular question concerning their academic 
identities. 
Content analysis has been criticised from the perspective of discursive 
psychology for decontextualising the categories it attempts to study (see Edwards 
and Potter, 1992, pp. 5-6; Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 93). Potter and 
Wetherell (1987) argue that it is a method `more suited to research where the 
discourse is understood primarily as an indicator of something lying beyond' (p. 
41). Furthermore, Wood and Kroger (2000) suggest that `discourse analysis and 
content analysis are two very different species' (pp. 32 - 33). However, it is 
proposed in the present chapter that discourse analysts might actually benefit from 
including content analytic style summaries in their work, as a prelude to more 
detailed and sensitive analyses. This can act as the first step in a discourse 
analysis, establishing patterns and themes running across the data corpus, and 
indicating frequencies of occurrence, commonalities and divergences. A 
`linguistically-oriented' content analysis can be performed, sensitive to the 
particular language used by interviewer and respondents, and therefore similar to 
that of a discourse analysis (Shamir, Ziskind and Blum-Kulka, 1999). 
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Asking the academic question 
It is not usual for social researchers to study the questions they ask of their 
participants, respondent answers generally comprising the exclusive focus of 
study. Thus the role of researchers in practically setting the agenda of their studies 
is often neglected. In this section we will look at how the interviewer in the 
present study `probes' his respondents by asking a particular question of them. It 
will be suggested that a `systematic examination of the language of survey [and 
interview] questions can provide a useful context for the analysis of the answers' 
(Shamir, Ziskind and Blum-Kulka, 1999, p. 354; see also Van den Berg, Wetherell 
and Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2003). 
Out of the 15 respondents who took part in this study, 12 were asked `the 
academic question. ' According to the interview schedule in Appendix E, this 
question is phrased `Do you consider yourself an academic? ' However, the normal 
semi-structured interview procedure was not to read questions from the schedule 
verbatim. As a result of this conversational interviewing style, there was a certain 
amount of variability in how the questions were asked. We will presently 
investigate how `the academic question' was asked across the interviews. Table I 
presents the various different ways in which the interviewer asked this question. 
The analysis will consider some of the common assumptions displayed in the 
asking of the following questions, before going on to consider participants' 
responses to them. 
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Table I: Variations on the academic question 
Type I Respondent 
1 Do you consider yourself an academic? Anna 
2 Do you consider yourself an academic would you say? Samantha 
3 Do you consider yourself an academic wd- would you say? Fiona 
4 Do you consider yourself an academic in in any way? Wendy 
5I wonder if you could just reflect on your identity as a Punya 
research student and I wonder if you consider yourself an 
academic in any way? 
6 So would you consider yourself an academic? Will 
7 Would you consider yourself an academic in any sense? Ben 
8I mn would you consider yourself an academic at all? Cathy 
9 Do you feel like an academic? Sandy 
Type II Respondent 
10 Do you feel yourself becoming an academic or you think Rachel 
you already are one or? 
11 Do you consider yourself an academic at the moment? Yoko 
12 Do you think you aspire to be an academic like? Hanako 
The analysis will consider some of the general features of the asking of the 
academic question and the two different types of phrasing involved, related to the 
presence or absence of time or temporality. The expression `the academic 
question' might be somewhat misleading, however. The use of the definite article 
gives the impression that there was one single, standard question which was asked 
of all the respondents. By saying `the' academic question, the implication is that 
the respondents were asked the same question, and that this question had the same 
meaning across all of the interviews. Indeed, the interview schedule in Appendix 
E would give this impression. However, we can appreciate from Table I that there 
was no one single version of this question. The question was not asked 
in a 
standard form across all of the interviews. Rather, all of the askings were 
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different. For example, while Will (6) was asked whether he would consider 
himself an academic, Hanako (12) was asked whether she aspires to be an 
academic. In a simple sense, therefore, it is difficult to single out any one specific 
meaning of `the academic question. ' 
Despite the lack of uniformity in the asking of these academic questions, 
however, there are nevertheless patterns of similarity across the askings. For 
instance, all of the questions involve the use of epistemic verbs, such as 
`consider, ' `feel' and `think. ' Indeed, 83% (10/12) of the respondents were asked 
whether they (would) `consider' themselves academics. A common sense 
understanding of such questions is that the interviewer is asking the respondents to 
look within themselves and report upon their thoughts or feelings about whether 
they consider themselves academics. To feel like an academic might be assumed 
to directly correspond to an inner `academic' type feeling, and the epistemic verbs 
correspond to this inner mental or physical life. However, Wittgenstein (1958), in 
his later philosophy, argued that words such as `feel' and `think' perform 
rhetorical functions in conversations. Such words, along with language more 
generally, are used to perform deeds or social acts. For example, by using 
epistemic verbs, Wittgenstein argued, people can express certainty or doubtfulness 
about what they are saying or asking. Thus, in terms of their function, `verbs are 
used not only to express assessments of the factual quality of the embedded 
clause, but more significantly to index the statement with the level of commitment 
the speaker is prepared to give it' (Mühlhäusler and Harre, 1990, p. 100). So, 
rather than being vehicles for expressing inner states, epistemic verbs can have 
social functions in conversations, relating to the factuality of what is being said, or 
how committed one is to what one is saying (for more on how Wittgenstein's 
philosophy has influenced discursive psychology, see Shotter, 1993a, 1993b; 
Potter, 2001). 
We therefore need to understand the asking of the academic question as a 
social activity. Particular assumptions are being made about the respondents when 
they are asked such questions. For example, by asking respondents whether they 
`consider, ' `feel' or `think' themselves to be academics, the interviewer is 
requesting that they express their beliefs about whether they are academics or not. 
The very expression of a belief on a matter is evidence of the potential 
contestability of that belief (Schiffrin, 1985; Billig, 1996, p. 251). The respondents 
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are not being asked whether they `are' academics or not and to `think' that you are 
an academic is different from saying that you `are' an academic. Furthermore both 
of these are different from being `seen' to be an academic in the eyes of others. By 
asking academic questions, and phrasing them as a matter of belief, the 
interviewer implies that there is an uncertainty about whether the respondents are 
indeed academics (see especially question 10). 
Specific examples of this displayed uncertainty can be cited. Wendy (4), 
Punya (5), Ben (7), and Cathy (8) were asked whether they considered themselves 
to be academics `in any way, ' `in any sense, ' or `at all. ' Here, it is assumed that 
the respondents are not wholly academics, but that they might partially consider 
themselves to be academics. It is suggested that there might be meagre (or 
contestable) evidence of them considering themselves academics. The interviewer 
is therefore subtly remarking upon the unlikelihood of these respondents being 
academics. Furthermore, these respondents are also being required to give 
evidence to support their beliefs about whether they consider themselves 
academics. They are expected to state the `senses' or `ways' in which they 
consider themselves academics, providing justificatory evidence for their claims 
accordingly. We will look at the justificatory warrants given by the participants 
below. 
Questions in Table I have been divided into Types I and II. Type II questions 
(25%; 3/12) involve a sense of time or temporality, whereas Type I questions 
(75%; 9/12) do not. Rachel, for example, was asked whether she feels herself 
`becoming' an academic; Yoko whether she considers herself an academic `at the 
moment'; and Hanako if she `aspires' to be an academic. In each of these askings 
it is assumed that the respondents' identities are contested or undecided, and a 
potential progression is also implied. If Pamela feels herself `becoming' an 
academic, then it is implied she is not one at the moment. Similarly while Yoko 
might consider herself an academic `at the moment' she might not do so at other 
times; it is assumed that her identity is not solid and definite. Finally, when 
Hanako is asked whether she `aspires' to be an academic, the implication is that 
she is not an academic at the present time. This observed difference between Type 
I and Type II questions suggests that the interviewer was displaying his 
understanding that his respondents might be in the process of `becoming' 
academics. 
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In sum, the very asking of these `academic questions' attests to the 
disputability of the respondents' identities. The interviewer is setting up the 
respondents to deliberate or consider their status as academics or non-academics. 
In this sense their identities are literally in question. Furthermore the respondents 
may think that the various questions asked of them require different sorts of 
justificatory identity work in response. Let us now go on to consider the ways in 
which the participants responded to the various forms of the academic question. 
Responding to academic questions 
The academic questions which were asked of the respondents were never couched 
with qualifiers, suggesting that they were unusual and in need of explanation or 
justification. The interviewer did not excuse the questions before asking them. As 
such, it was assumed that the questions themselves were reasonable, and that 
asking the respondents such questions was a reasonable and ordinary thing to do. 
Equally, none of the respondents refused to answer their respective academic 
questions, or questioned the validity of the questions when providing their 
answers. Each respondent entertained the question and thereby treated it as 
reasonable. As Billig (1996) points out, `the mere act of answering a question 
imparts legitimacy to the question' (p. 252). The respondents kept within the remit 
of questions which assumed that their identities were matters of doubt, uncertainty 
or dispute. 
There was of course variability in how the participants responded to being 
asked their respective academic questions. Table II categorises their initial replies. 
An initial reply follows straight after the question and does not include any 
substantial divergence from the question. For example if a respondent says `no' 
immediately after being asked their academic question, then this is considered 
their `initial' reply. In the language of conversation analysis, an initial answer is 
the one most adjacent to the question (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973). Only one 
respondent gave a non-initial answer to their academic question. It should also be 
noted that some respondents went on to change or modify their initial replies. 
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Table II: How the respondents initially replied to their academic questions 
Yes No 
Rachel 
Sandy 
Ben 
Fiona 
* Reply was not initial 
Both Neither 
Anna will* 
Wendy 
Yoko 
Punya 
Samantha 
Cathy 
Hanako 
We can appreciate from Table II that overall, the question of whether the 
respondents in this study considered, felt or thought themselves to be (becoming) 
academics was not straightforward. Just as the participants were asked different 
questions, so they gave different answers, performing agreement, disagreement, 
both or neither. It seems as though the question of whether doctoral postgraduates 
and young lecturers feel themselves to be, or be becoming, academics is by no 
means straightforward. 
From Table II we can see that 42% (5/12) of participants responded with 
`neither' yes or no in response to their respective academic questions. For 
example, when she was asked `do you consider yourself an academic at the 
moment? ' Yoko said `I don't know semi-academic. ' This was then followed by 
34% (4/12) of participants who responded with `Yes, ' such as Sandy, who said 
`yeah yeah I do' in response to the question `do you feel like an academic? ' 16% 
(2/12) of the respondents said `No' including Anna, who gave the most 
unequivocal answer out of all the respondents; she latched her 'no' response to the 
end of the question `do you consider yourself an academic? ' Finally, one 
participant (8%) responded with `both' yes and no. After displaying much 
difficulty with the question `so would you consider yourself an academic? ' Will 
gave the reply of `yes and no. '26 
26 It is no coincidence that Will's unique `yes and no' reply was non-initial, see chapter 
7. 
103 
The respondents in this study did not just give replies such as those listed 
above, followed by resolute silences. As well as giving their initial replies, all 
accompanied their answers with justificatory evidence, which was implied to 
support or refute the idea that they considered, felt or thought themselves to be 
academics. Table III expands upon Table II by illustrating the way in which 
participants gave evidence for and/or against themselves being academics. 
Table III: Respondents' initial replies tabulated with evidence for and against 
them being academics 
Reply 
Yes No Both Neither 
Evidence 
For Ben, Fiona Hanako 
Against Anna, Wendy Yoko, 
Catherine 
For and Rachel, Sandy Will Punya, 
Against Samantha 
None 
Table III suggests that, in doing academic identity work, the doctoral 
postgraduates in this study are drawing upon skills of argumentation and rhetoric 
(Billig, 1996). Not only are they saying whether they consider themselves to be 
academics, they are also drawing upon evidential warrants, and making arguments 
which work to either support or refute the idea that they are academics (on 
warranting, see Gergen, 1989). All of the respondents employed evidence either 
for or against the idea that they are academics. An argumentative context was 
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therefore evident in the majority of respondents' replies to their respective 
academic questions. 27 But what counts as for and against evidence in this context? 
Earlier it appeared as though the various academic questions the respondents 
were asked would occasion purely introspective answers. The use of epistemic 
verbs seemed to suggest that they would talk reflectively about their inner states of 
mind or feeling. Indeed, Mead (1934) has argued that introspection, or the 
capacity to objectify ourselves by talking reflectively, is central to the 
development of the self. However, from Table III we can appreciate that the 
respondents did not merely reflect upon their thoughts and feelings about whether 
they considered themselves academics. They used evidential warrants to support 
or justify their initial responses to the academic questions they were asked. 
Categories of the actual kinds of evidence given by the respondents are presented 
in Table IV. 
Table IV: Types of evidential warrants identified by the respondents as 
qualifying or disqualifying them as academics 
Type of Evidence Count Respondents 
Doing research 5 Anna, Ben, Sandy, Yoko and Will 
Knowledge, ideas and thinking 4 Ben, Catherine, Hanako and 
Samantha 
Publishing (including the RAE) 4 Ben, Punya, Rachel and Will 
Qualifications (e. g. PhD) 4 Catherine, Rachel, Samantha and 
Will 
Talking, socialising and lifestyle 4 Punya, Samantha, Sandy and Will 
Conference-going 3 Ben, Samantha and Sandy 
Teaching or lecturing 3 Ben, Sandy and Will 
27 The majority of respondents volunteered this information after giving their 
initial replies. Only 
one participant was asked by the interviewer why they had started to consider themselves an 
academic, thereby prompting them to provide justificatory evidence 
for their initial response. 
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Having confidence 2 Samantha and Yoko 
Detest of admin 1 Ben 
Reading the books you want to read 1 Sandy 
Having a lot of job experiences 1 Yoko 
Feeling different to members of staff 1 Wendy 
When responding to the question of whether they considered, thought or felt 
themselves to be academics, participants often made assumptions about what 
counts as an academic. Table IV presents evidence used to either support or refute 
the idea that the respondents considered themselves to be academics. Although 
none of the participants explicitly stated that `an academic is somebody who ... ' 
they nevertheless assumed that there was a taken for granted definition of what an 
academic is by the way they gave their evidential warrants. For example, Ben said 
that he comes up with new ideas, researches, presents and publishes them, thereby 
suggesting that these are things that academics do. Each respondent spoke as 
though they were drawing upon a commonly shared definition or criteria of what 
it takes to be an academic. However, when we look across the interviews, we can 
see that there is no straightforward consensus about what an academic does. In a 
sense, each participant was working to a different definition. We will now 
consider some of the qualities which the doctoral postgraduates and young 
lecturers in the present study suggest credential a person as an academic. 
In the book Academic Tribes and Territories, Tony Becher (1989) argues 
that in higher education, research and publishing are more highly regarded than 
teaching. He claims that `membership of the academic profession - at least in elite 
departments - is defined in terms of excellence of scholarship and originality 
in 
research, and not to any significant degree in terms of teaching capability' (p. 3). 
28 
From Table IV we can see that the most commonly cited evidential warrant for 
being an academic in this study was `doing research. ' Five respondents talked 
28 Becher (1989) later reaffirms that `for the most part, in leading academic circles, credit is earned 
through the publication of one's research findings; excellence in teaching counts for little towards 
recognition by established colleagues in the same field' (p. 53). 
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about research when responding to their respective academic questions. For 
example, Anna said `I love research and I'm hoping to go on and do some kind of 
research-based job' (see chapter 8). However, frequency of occurrence does not 
always indicate degree of importance. 29 Although respondents more commonly 
associated research and publishing with being an academic than they did teaching 
or lecturing, we need to look at the meaning ascribed to these respective warrants. 
Overall, research and publishing were implied to be straightforwardly 
positive indicators of academic status. In terms of publishing, for example, Will 
cited the fact that he has published things in peer reviewed journals as `objective' 
evidence in favour of him being an academic. Punya said that she would like to 
consider herself an academic, but doesn't know whether she can, because she 
hasn't even published any studies yet. In both of these cases it is assumed that 
publishing is something that an academic does. 30 Conversely, respondents implied 
that teaching and lecturing were ambivalent indicators of academic status. For 
example, Ben used his interest in teaching and mentoring students as evidence in 
favour of him being an academic, whereas after describing her experiences of 
teaching Sandy said that `I think feeling ... 
like an academic is more the research 
side of it. ' Will even suggested that both the quantity and quality of his teaching 
disqualified him as an academic (see chapter 7). So while research and publishing 
are implied to be straightforward indicators of academic status, in the sense that 
no respondent invoked these warrants as working against them being academics, 
teaching and lecturing were found to be ambivalent indicators. 
Along with publishing, the second most commonly cited sets of criteria 
relating to academic status were `Knowledge, Ideas and Thinking, ' 
`Qualifications, ' and `Talking, Socialising and Lifestyle. ' Evidential warrants 
falling within these categories were each mentioned by four participants 
respectively. Included in the first category is Ben's claim that he comes up with 
29 Indeed, when samples of material are small, `counting frequencies of occurrence as an indicator 
of dominance or importance of themes or contents become less appropriate' (Morant, 1998, p. 
245). 
30 As publishing is part of doing research, Punya and Rachel might have 
been added to the 'doing 
research' category. However, unless otherwise noted, the analysis stays with the categories 
explicitly mentioned by the respondents themselves. (In a content analysis 
it is sometimes difficult 
to keep the categories discrete. We will return to this issue at the end of the chapter. 
) 
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`new ideas' and Catherine's idea that being an academic is being able to `think (. ) 
quickly. ' Similarly Hanako said that she liked the process of `intellectual pursuit. ' 
In each of these cases it is suggested that, to be an academic, one must engage 
oneself mentally in a particular way. From the category `Qualifications' the 
example of Catherine can be cited. 31 She wondered whether `maybe doing a PhD 
is a way to sort of prove ... to everyone and yourself ... that you are in fact an 
academic sort of type. ' (We will consider the role of the PhD as an indicator of 
academic status in more detail in chapter 7. ) Finally, in the category `Talking, 
Socialising and Lifestyle' are participants such as Punya, who said `I would say 
that it's become more academic the lifestyle. ' In making this claim, Punya 
suggests that her lifestyle was already somewhat academic, but that it has become 
more academic recently. Also Will remarked that `I do talk to my colleagues and 
we bounce ideas around' and Sandy revealed that `I've got a great social life 
through parapsychology. ' 
The remaining evidential warrants are mostly self-explanatory, although it is 
worth pointing out a pattern which is common across the corpus. This is that each 
warrant points either to the `presence' or `absence' of a certain thing, which is in 
turn implied to either `qualify' or `disqualify' a person as an academic. So, for 
example, Samantha and Yoko both raised the issue of `confidence' in their 
answers. Samantha suggested that she had only recently gained the confidence to 
speak at conferences and used this as evidence to support her claim for an 
academic identity. Yoko, on the other hand, suggested that she doesn't have the 
confidence to claim a wholly `academic' identity. In both of these cases it is 
presumed that `confidence' is something which an academic ought to have. 
However, it is not always the case that the presence of a warrant equates with the 
presence of an academic identity. Yoko, for example, suggested that `having a lot 
of job experiences' disqualifies her from being an academic (she says that her 
previous work experiences `split' her identity). 
32 This suggests that the categories 
in a content analysis are not always equivalent to one another. That is, their actual 
31 Although Punya is not counted in the `Qualifications' category, by asking her to reflect on her 
identity as a `research student' the interviewer displays an assumption that an academic 
identity 
and a research student identity can coexist (see Table I, 
Question 5). 
32 Ben's detest of admin is used in a similarly counter-intuitive way to credential 
him as an 
academic (see chapter 6). 
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status as categories is fluid, contingent, and dependent upon the contexts in which 
they are used. This means that the quantification of categories may be less helpful 
than might have been previously thought. We will return to this issue at the end of 
the chapter. 
Invoking `events in the world' in response to `subjectivity' questions? 
Earlier it was noted that the academic questions asked of the respondents seemed 
designed to occasion purely introspective answers. At face value the questions 
appeared to be asking the participants to reflect upon their inner states of mind or 
body, requiring them to talk of subjectivity, rather than outward reality. However, 
Table IV suggested that the kinds of evidential warrants drawn upon by 
respondents to justify their identity claims were not of a purely `subjective' kind. 
Only 33% (4/12) of the warrants used in response to the academic question were 
implied to be subjective markers of academic status ('Knowledge, Ideas and 
Thinking, ' `Having confidence, ' `Detest of admin, ' and `Feeling different to 
members of staff are all implied to be inner properties of the mind or body. ) The 
majority of warrants index `events in the world' in some way (67%, 8/12), such as 
`Doing research, ' `Publishing, ' and `Qualifications. ' If we look at Table V, which 
shows the kinds of discursive strategies used by respondents when answering their 
respective academic questions, we can see that invoking `events in the world' was 
the most frequently used strategy. 
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Table V: Discursive strategies in answering the academic questions 
Strategy Count Respondents 
Invoked events in the world 9 Anna, Ben, Catherine, Punya, 
Rachel, Samantha, Sandy. Yoko 
and Will 
Invoked subjectivity 6 Ben, Catherine, Hanako. 
Samantha, Yoko and Wendy 
Invoked others 4 Anna, Fiona, Rachel and Samantha 
Told a story 2 Punya, Samantha 
Respondents tended to invoke external events more often than inner subjectivity 
when responding to their respective academic questions. 75% (9/12) of 
respondents employed this strategy. It is worth thinking about why this might be 
the case, given what was said earlier about the apparent design of the academic 
questions. Why did respondents invoke `events in the world' more often than 
`subjectivity' in their answers to questions which appeared as though they would 
require pure introspection? 
Deborah Schiffrin (1985), in her study of arguments, observes a pattern in 
the way people express their beliefs. A person will often state their belief and then 
accompany this expression with justifications. Schiffrin gives the example of 
Irene, who expresses a belief in fate. In arguing for her position, Irene does not 
merely state her belief, and then go silent. Rather, she describes experiences in her 
life which, she claims, give support for her position. Schiffrin poses the question 
of why evidence of this kind is given to support the expression of a belief? She 
suggests that Irene's position is potentially disputable because it is a 
representation of a belief. According to common sense reasoning beliefs reside 
within the mind. It is assumed that people cannot check the validity of these 
internal states. As such, expressions of belief are often accompanied 
by 
justifications, whereby evidence or explanation are given. This evidence might 
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involve descriptions of events in the world. Irene, for example, describes a fateful 
car accident. 
Descriptions of events in the world can be given in the form of stories. and 
both Punya and Samantha told stories when replying to their respective academic 
questions. Samantha described attending a conference and informing one of the 
speakers (a senior lecturer) about a particular author of which she was unaware. 
Punya described missing the taxi to her friends' 21St birthday party and wondering 
whether to go home and do some reading, or catch another taxi and go down. 
These stories were not told `for the sake of it' but were implied to have a `point' to 
them (Polanyi, 1979; Schiffrin, 1981). They were each designed to support the 
claiming of academic identities, and not in order to disclaim those identities. Thus 
Samantha suggested that she has found her `academic voice' and Punya claimed 
that her lifestyle had become `more academic. '33 Similarly, several respondents 
invoked `others' when responding to their academic questions, using their 
opinions to support the idea that they were academics. Rachel, for example, said 
that within the physio profession she is `definitely regarded' as one of the 
academics, and Fiona said that `people always say that I'm a natural academic' 
(see chapter 6). As with the stories told by Samantha and Punya, these `others' 
were always of the opinion that the respondents in question were indeed 
academics. 
If we look at Table VI we can appreciate the way in which participants 
rarely invoked purely `inner' subjective justifications when claiming or 
disclaiming academic identities. The majority of respondents used justifications 
which only invoked `outer' events in the world or justifications which invoked 
both `inner' subjectivity and `outer' events. 
33 For more on the analysis of stories from a 
discursive perspective, see chapter 8. 
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Table VI: Types of justification used by respondents in answering their 
academic questions 
Outer Only Inner Only 
Anna 
Punya 
Rachel 
Sandy 
Will 
Hanako 
Wendy 
Both Neither 
Ben 
Catherine 
Samantha 
Yoko 
Fiona 
Discursive psychologists have demonstrated that people often negotiate this sort 
of trade off between `mind' and `world' in their talk. Derek Edwards (1997) 
claims that `mind and world are at issue in discourse, rather than discourse being 
an expression of mind or a reflection of the world' (p. 20; emphasis in original). 
The aim of the analyst is therefore to consider precisely how `mind-world 
relations are discursively constituted and traded off against each other' (p. 19). 
However, to accomplish this successfully in the present study, we would need to 
do more than just categorise respondents like we have been doing so far. Should 
Anna's `love of research' be categorised as invoking `subjectivity' or `events in 
the world'? In the end, the categories used in a content analysis tend to break 
down, in part because categories are for talking (Edwards, 1991). We therefore 
need to move to a discursive method of analysis which can deal with the local, 
`fuzzy, ' and contingent way in which psychological and social categories are used 
in everyday life. 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has briefly demonstrated the benefits and limitations of using a 
linguistically sensitive content analysis to study doctoral postgraduate identity 
work within the context of semi-structured interviews. The main benefit has been 
that themes and patterns can be observed across a corpus of qualitative data. 
Frequencies of occurrence, commonalities and divergences can be tracked, and 
individual participants located within broader patterns and trends. 
As such, this 
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approach might be employed by discourse analysts as a way of handling large 
amounts of qualitative data, before moving on to more subtle and nuanced 
analyses. 34 
It has been shown that, within each interview, respondents appeared to draw 
upon implied definitions of what counts as an academic, and used these definitions 
to frame their own giving of evidential warrants. For example, a respondent might 
assume that, in order to be an academic, one must publish frequently, and in high 
quality journals. They would then attempt to measure themselves using this 
criteria. While in the context of individual interviews this strategy appears to 
involve drawing upon an `objective reality' of what it takes to be an academic, 
when we came to look across the interviews, we found that there was no 
agreement between the participants about what counts as an academic. No 
`objective reality' was to be found. This lack of concensus implies a lack of truth 
about what it takes to be an academic, based upon the intersubjective evidence 
(Rorty, 1996). What this means is that we need to study the actual particulars of 
individual cases, considering how respondents construct the `reality' of academic 
identities within the context of their interviews (Potter, 1995,1996; Potter and 
Mulkay, 1985). This is one of the main aims of the following two chapters of 
discourse analysis, and the present content analysis should be seen as preliminary 
to this forthcoming analysis. 
34 Although content analysis is essentially a quantitative methodology, the present analysis 
has 
consisted of both quantitative and qualitative observations. As such, it might not 
be categorised as 
a `content analysis' at all. Needless to say categories - even categories of analytic methods - are 
slippery by their very nature. 
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Chapter Six - Rhetoric and Qualification in Claiming an Academic Identity 
The present chapter is a discourse analysis of doctoral postgraduates claiming 
academic identities within the context of conversational interviews. Specifically, 
the analysis concerns how several of the interview respondents answered their 
`academic questions. ' We will be looking at how the doctoral candidates Ben, 
Fiona and Rachel answered their questions when they were asked them by Steven. 
the doctoral student interviewer. The three respondents selected in this chapter 
were classified in the previous chapter as claiming academic identities for 
themselves. That is, in the content analysis Ben, Fiona and Rachel all said 'yes' in 
response to their respective academic questions. In this sense, their replies 
appeared to be similar and related to one another. From a discourse and rhetoric 
perspective, however, these respondents used quite different strategies between 
one another to claim academic identities for themselves. This chapter presents 
some of the various different ways in which doctoral postgraduates can do 
academic identity work: issuing justificatory warrants; suggesting that the label 
`academic' is undesirable; and claiming a mitigated version of that identity. We 
will find that there are similarities, as well as important differences, in how each 
of the respondents claimed their academic identities. 
The case of Ben 
First, we will look at Ben's answer. `Ben' is a 33 year old lecturer in Psychology 
at a University College in the United Kingdom. Although Ben is British, and did 
his undergraduate degree at a UK polytechnic, he did all of his postgraduate work 
in Canada. He spent around 10 years doing a Masters degree, a PhD and then 
finally working as an Assistant Professor (which is the Canadian equivalent of a 
UK lectureship) in Canada, before returning to the UK to take up his present 
lectureship in Psychology. At the time of the interview, he was waiting to fly back 
to Canada to `defend' his thesis, which he was expecting to do in the next few 
months or so. In total, Ben will have taken around six years to do his doctorate. 
We join the interview as Steven is asking the academic question. 
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Extract 1 
1 Steven you were talkin' about erm career you know that career 
2 development and that wd- would you consider yourself an 
3 academic in any sense 
4 (1.0) 
5 Ben mmm ((swallows drink)) aahhhh (2.4) yeah itad- I think so 
6 because er (0.7) errrmm (1.7) it's a funny thing innit I wonder 
7 how many (. ) young people say yes to that (right) as compared 
8 to er established people (yeah) but (yeah) if I- if I reflect on 
9 the things that I do (0.9) try and come up with well come up 
10 with new ideas research them (yeah) eeerrrr present them 
11 publish them (mmmm) erm I mn- (. ) I'm equally as interested 
12 in in teaching and in mentoring students in err (yeah) in smaller 
13 groups (yeah) so I like all aspects of that of academia the 
14 thing I don't like (right) is admin (. ) and I (right) I really 
15 deteHHSSt it (yeah yeah) so yeah I'd say that (mm) given 
16 my interest the research and teaching and my (yeah) erhh 
17 (. ) ((slaps leg)) erhh (. ) hmph detESST in admin then I 
18 [probably am HU HU HUH HUH 
19 Steven [yeah YEAH HAH HAH HAH YEAH 
20 Ben yeah 
21 Steven yeah 
Before he asks his academic question, Steven brings attention to how Ben was 
talking about `career development' (lines 1 to 2). This mentioning of career 
development is important in two senses. Firstly, Steven implies that career 
development is somehow related to academic identity. Secondly, Steven presents 
Ben with a particular sense in which he is expected to answer the question. Ben 
might be occasioned to speak about his identity in terms of career development, 
for example. 
The particular phrasing of this academic question is also important because 
it relates to the character of Ben's answer. Steven asks Ben whether 
he would 
`consider' himself an academic. To consider oneself an academic is different from 
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actually being an academic. Steven therefore implies that there might be some 
doubt about Ben's status as an academic. While Ben might consider himself to be 
an academic, this does not automatically mean that he is an academic. The exact 
wording of the academic question in this example is whether Ben `would 
consider' himself an academic `in any sense' (lines 2 to 3). Steven's use of the 
word `would' makes this question a polite request; the word softens the request 
and makes it indirect (Brown and Levinson, 1987). This asking is not as direct as 
the possible alternative of `do you consider yourself an academic' for example. By 
phrasing the question in the particular way that he does, Steven implies that this 
might be a slightly delicate matter for Ben. The phrasing implies a thoughtfulness 
or conditionality with regards the answer. 
In her study of discourse markers, Deborah Schiffrin (1987) observes that 
`virtually none of the questions which I asked during my interviews were 
answered with only the information required: very few yes-no questions, for 
example, received only ayes or no response' (p. 159; emphasis in original). She 
goes on to say that her respondents often elaborated upon their answers, and 
expanded upon their initial responses. This observation is relevant to the answers 
to the academic questions; all of the respondents elaborated, explained or justified 
their initial responses. In the present sequence, Ben does not only say `yeah I think 
so' (line 5) but goes on to explain his answer and justify himself. 
The initial reply of `yeah I think so' is an affirmation of a personal opinion. 
Ben `thinks' that he would consider himself an academic. This is in line with how 
he was asked whether he would `consider' himself an academic, which implies a 
process of thinking or deliberation. The word `think' can be used to endow an 
expressed sentiment with a doubtfulness (Wittgenstein, 1958). As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, Schiffrin (1985) has shown that when people make 
arguments about their beliefs, they often give supporting justifications for those 
beliefs. Schiffrin identifies the pattern in rhetorical arguments of speakers making 
a claim to a `position' and then giving `support' for that position. This aspect of 
argumentative discourse is broadly reflected in the present interviews; the 
interview being a social context in which accounting work is normative 
(Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995). The academic question works as a `position' in 
the sense that it offers a proposal about identity which the respondents are 
expected to agree or disagree with. 
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Ben argues in favour of the idea that he is an academic by agreeing with the 
position expressed in the question, and by issuing justificatory warrants which 
work in favour of him being an academic. By warranting himself in this way, he 
gives the impression that his answer to the academic question, and therefore his 
claim to an academic identity, is rhetorical or argumentative in nature. Schiffrin 
(1985) has written that `[r]hetorical argument is a discourse genre in which the 
speaker establishes not just any position, but a position that is potentially 
disputable; in other words, speakers orient their presentations to a potential 
opposition' (p. 40). The academic question sequence has an argumentative 
character in the sense that the question gives the impression that there is doubt or 
uncertainty about whether the respondent is indeed an academic. The very asking 
of a question such as this is suggestive of the disputability of the respondents' 
identity. 
Before going on to give justifications for his answer, and thereby warranting 
himself as an academic, Ben wonders how many young people say yes to the 
academic question, as compared to established people (lines 6 to 8). Ben's 
wondering can be understood as a `meta move' (Schiffrin, 1980; Simons, 1989, 
1994) in the sense that he is reflexively bringing attention to the question he has 
just been asked. He is showing his awareness that this is a question within the 
context of a social science interview, wherein the frequency of responses between 
different social groups might be of interest. By wondering in this particular way, 
Ben is displaying his identity as a researcher. He is making a kind of research 
hypothesis; suggesting that there might be a difference between how these two 
groups respond to the academic question. By offering the category `young people' 
first Ben implies that this is the group which might have trouble saying `yes' to 
the academic question, as compared with `established' people. He makes an 
implied equivalency between `established' people and `academics' and implies 
that `established' people are old, rather than young. 
Ben's wondering can also be understood as an `insertion sequence' 
(Schegloff, 1972; Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998) in the sense that it works to delay 
the provisioning of the `answer' part of the `question and answer' pair. However, 
Steven does not come in and clarify matters at this moment (see line 8), which he 
might have done, given his status as the interviewing researcher. 
This might have 
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further delayed the provisioning of Ben's answer to the question. Instead, Ben 
returns to the business of answering the question. 
When he says `if I reflect on the things that I do' (lines 8 to 9) Ben gives the 
impression that his status as an academic is conditional upon the things that he 
does, which he is about to reflect upon. In this sense he implies that the things he 
is about to reflect upon were in existence before reflecting upon them (Pollner. 
1987). Also, he suggests that he is about to be impartial or objective about the 
things that he does. The use of the word `reflect' gives this impression. In this 
sense the declaration of `reflecting' works to build up the factuality of Ben's 
identity claims (Potter, 1996). The utterance seems to be `constructed to avoid it 
seeming like an artful construction designed to further the speaker's interests' 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992, p. 105). 
Ben goes on to justify or account for his `yeah I think so' answer by using 
`warrants' to credential himself as an academic (Gergen, 1989). The first thing he 
says is `try and come up with- well come up with new ideas' (lines 12 to 13). At 
this point Ben almost says that he `tries' to come up with new ideas, but cuts 
himself off and repairs himself by saying `well come up with new ideas' (on 
conversational repairs, see Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks, 1977). To try and come 
up with new ideas is not the same as actually coming up with them. Someone 
might `try' to come up with new ideas and only come up with old ones, for 
example. Alternatively, they might fail to come up with any ideas at all. If the 
word `try' had not been repaired, Ben might have presented himself as a person 
who `tries' to be a research academic, rather than someone who `is' a research 
academic. The self repair corrects the offending word and avoids this risky 
presentation of self (Billig, 1997; Goffman, 1959). 
By attempting to claim an academic identity for himself, there is a risk that 
Ben might present himself as a non-academic. By being asked to speak about his 
own identity, Ben becomes caught in a specific `dilemma of stake' (Edwards and 
Potter, 1992). Namely, credentialing himself as an academic, whilst at the same 
time avoiding the implication that he is a non-academic. Ben presents himself as a 
successful research academic when he says `research them ... eeerrrr present them 
publish them' (lines 10 to 11). This three part list of researching, presenting and 
publishing ideas gives the impression of a smooth research progression, 
in which 
each activity easily and straightforwardly 
leads onto the next (on listing, see 
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Jefferson, 1990; Schiffrin, 1994). This listing also gives the impression of the kind 
of `career development' which Steven brought attention to in his question; each 
academic activity moves onto the next without any problems. 
Ben says that he is `equally' as interested in teaching and in mentoring 
students in smaller groups (lines 11 to 13). By constructing his interests in this 
way, he implies that he is not biased in favour of research. He implies that he is 
not only a `research' academic but rather that he is also a `teaching' academic. At 
this moment, Ben is speaking as though he is drawing upon taken for granted, 
commonly held criteria for what counts as an academic. 
Ben goes on to say `so I like all aspects of that of academia' (line 13) and 
thereby constitutes himself as an academic. By using the word `so' Ben implies 
that he is drawing the upshot of what he has just been saying (on discourse 
markers such as `so' see Schiffrin, 1987). He suggests that his liking of all those 
aspects of academia works in favour of him being an academic. The claim to 
liking `all' those aspects of academia is a total case formulation which Ben uses to 
legitimise his argument that he is an academic (on extreme case formulations, see 
Pomerantz, 1986). However, extreme formulations are not always said literally 
(Edwards, 2000). When Ben goes on to say that `the thing I don't like ... 
is admin 
(. ) and I ... 
I really deteHHSSt it' (lines 14 to 15) he contradicts his claim about 
liking all aspects of academia, by saying that he doesn't like admin. 
There is a subtle feature of this utterance which is deserving of attention. 
This is the within speech laughter which occurs when Ben says `deteHHSSt. ' In 
her analysis of laughter in conversation, Gail Jefferson (1985) argues that it is 
important to take notice of the precise placement of laughter which occurs within 
utterances. She analyses a specific case of within speech laughter and notices that 
`the laughter is present in and only in a discrete segment of that utterance; in the 
saying of an obscenity. The rest of the utterance is free of laughter' (p. 30). In the 
present sequence, the interpolated laughter comes in the middle of the word 
`deteHHSSt' and this is the only point in the utterance when laughter occurs. 
By 
laughing as he says this word, Ben implies that his detest of admin 
is not 
something to be taken too seriously. He gives the impression that the 
detest of 
admin is a humorous matter. While the word `really' works to 
intensify the detest 
of admin, Ben's laughter seems to mitigate some of that 
intensity. It is almost as if 
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the within speech laughter works to repair the extremity expressed in the claim of 
detesting admin. 
By saying that he really detests admin, Ben gives the impression that he has 
had experience with admin, and therefore that he has experience of working 
within academia. That is, he has done academic admin enough to know that he 
detests it. In a subtle way, then, Ben's claim about detesting admin works to 
credential himself as an academic, or at least someone who has had experience 
with academic activities. However, Ben might also be presenting an argument 
against himself being an academic, because he is saying that he dislikes, or 
detests, something that is a feature of contemporary academia. His detest of admin 
might therefore work as evidence against him being an academic. However. Ben 
is quick to come in with a conclusion which contradicts this implication: 
Extract 1 (continued) 
15 deteHHSSt it (yeah yeah) so yeah I'd say that (mm) given 
16 my interest the research and teaching and my (yeah) erhh 
17 (. ) ((slaps leg)) erhh (. ) hmph detESST in admin then I 
18 [probably am HU HU HUH HUH 
19 Steven [yeah YEAH HAH HAH HAH YEAH 
Ben uses a particular rhetorical strategy to credential himself as an academic 
during this sequence. He says `given' his interest, the research and teaching, and 
his detest in admin, `then' he probably is an academic. The `given this ... then 
that' structure works rhetorically in a similar way to how Ben said he would 
`reflect' on the things that he does. He gives the impression that the evidence is 
already there, prior to his formulation of it, and therefore that he is being impartial 
or objective about his identity. He implies that he can accept what is `given' as 
being beyond doubt. This strategy therefore works as a persuasive argument to 
credential Ben as an academic. 
A subtle feature of this conclusion can be noted. By saying 'my' 
interest and 
`my' detest in admin (line 16), Ben suggests that he personally owns these 
qualities. The subtle shift from what were earlier 
described as activities or likes 
and dislikes (lines 9 to 15) to what are now personally owned qualities 
improves 
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Ben's grounds for claiming to be an academic. This is because the qualities which 
make him an academic have implicitly become stable parts of his character (cf. 
Wetherell and Potter, 1989). 
Another important shift takes place at this moment. When Ben makes his 
conclusion, he makes an identity claim which is an upgraded version of what 
Steven asked for in his question. Ben says `I probably am' (lines 17 to 18) and 
thereby makes a cautious claim to being, rather than saying that he would 
`consider' himself (an academic). While the word `probably' mitigates the 
strength of the claim, the `I am' intensifies it. Also, the word `probably' gives the 
impression that this conclusion is inevitable. It is as if the evidence suggests that 
he `probably' is an academic. He implies that this particular conclusion follows 
from the premise; that, given the facts of the situation, this is the conclusion. 
While Ben initially responded to the academic question by invoking his thoughts 
or feelings with `yeah I think so' (line 5) he finishes his answer by invoking the 
outward facts of the situation, and then concluding with `I probably am. ' It is 
paradoxical that the more this final conclusion is hedged with words like 
`probably, ' the stronger or more persuasive the argument appears to be. Ben is 
giving the impression that he is making his conclusion based upon the facts of his 
situation, and not his inner thoughts or feelings. 
However, it is important to point out that Ben does not actually say what he 
`is' at this moment. After saying `I probably am' he begins to laugh (line 18). 
Steven then echoes this laughter (line 19) before Ben then laughs again (line 18). 
By laughing in this way, Ben avoids explicitly naming what he is, and leaves it as 
something which is assumed. In this sense the laughter works as a kind of `not 
naming device' (Wooffitt, 1992). Ben does not say the word `academic' at the 
point where he might have been likely to, and nor does he mention it anywhere 
else in his answer. In the place of where the identity category might have come, 
Ben begins to laugh. 
Why does Ben laugh at this moment? Specifically, the laughter seems to be 
associated with his `detest in admin. ' Ben laughs for the first time when 
he says 
that he really detests admin (line 15) and he also slaps his leg in a comical 
fashion 
just before offering his `detest in admin' as evidence that he is an academic (line 
17). Also, Ben laughs again after making the final identity claim (line 18). It might 
be that the laughter is associated with the irony of how detesting admin can work 
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in favour of Ben being an academic, rather than working against him. It was 
mentioned before that to dislike or detest something which is a part of academia 
might work against a person claiming to be an academic. But by using his detest 
of admin as justification for him being an academic, Ben implies that admin is like 
a non-academic aspect of academia. Admin is a non-academic intrusion within 
academia, and something which `proper' academics ought not to like. Ben implies 
that it is something of a commonplace that academics dislike admin. To like 
admin might make a person a secretary or a bureaucrat, for example, instead of an 
academic. The humour at the end of the sequence seems therefore to be associated 
with how Ben claims his academic identity in this seemingly counter-intuitive 
way. 
In a more general sense, to claim to be an academic is to make a claim for a 
social position which can be imbued with an implicit status. However, the social 
demands of politeness mean that Ben is careful not to present himself as being too 
presumptuous or boastful about his status as an academic (Brown and Levinson, 
1987). Ben uses `situational, spontaneous or informal humour' (Mulkay, 1988, p. 
57) after claiming that he probably is an academic. This humour might work to 
lessen the potentially boastful implications of Ben claiming the identity of 
academic for himself in too strong or serious a manner. By laughing at the end of 
this sequence, instead of remaining serious, Ben avoids giving the impression that 
he is being conceited or boastful about his academic identity. 
In summary, Ben makes a conclusion in which he uses all of the things he 
has `reflected' upon previously as evidence in favour of him being an academic. 
He even uses his `detest in admin' as evidence which works in his favour. So, 
although he said that he was about to `reflect' on the things that he does, Ben only 
gives evidence which works in favour of him being an academic. He never 
provides any evidence to the contrary, which would imply that he was a non- 
academic. 
122 
Who wants to be an academic? 
In this section, we will continue to consider the status aspects of claiming an 
academic identity, by looking at Fiona's answer to the academic question. 'Fiona' 
had recently submitted her thesis in psychology at a new university. At the time of 
the interview, she was is in the process of preparing for her PhD viva voce 
examination. Before starting her doctorate, Fiona did an undergraduate degree in 
the same subject at the same university. We join the interview just before Steven 
asks Fiona the academic question. We will be paying particular interest in how 
Fiona replies to the question, and how her identity work is similar and different to 
that of Ben. 
Extract 2 
1 Steven so what's that job that you're goin- (. ) that you've 
2 actually got 
3 (. ) 
4 Fiona eerm [it's in ((institution)) 
5 Steven [it's in ((institution)) an yeah 
6 Fiona erm it's at ((college)) 
7 (0.6) 
8 Steven yeah 
9 (. ) 
10 Fiona just basically a straightforward lectureship in psychology (yeah) 
11 but errm it's quite exciting HUH (yeah yeah) basic- cos it's 
12 living in ((city)) which is a fantastic place for an academic to be 
13 (yeah) (. ) so (yeah) (0.8) just (. ) quite (. ) up'n (. ) hyper about 
14 that at the [moment 
15 Steven [yeah yeah do you consider yourself an academic wd- 
16 would you say? 
17 (0.9) 
18 Fiona yeah I do most people kind of squirm when you give them 
19 that kiHHnd of label 
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20 Steven YHHHHUH [HUH 
21 Fiona [HHH HUH HUH 
22 Steven yeah 
23 Fiona people always say that I'm a natural academic and I'm not 
24 really too sure wHHat tHHat [means 
25 Steven [HHHHH HUHUH huh 
26 (0.8) 
27 Fiona NO I'm not sure whether they're being nice or whether tHHat's 
28 offensive but (yeah) yeah I consider myself an academic it's 
29 the only thing I can do reaHHHlly= 
30 Steven =YEAH what do you think it means (. ) you know what- 
31 what does that involve d'you think? 
32 (0.7) 
33 Fiona I think people just have preconceptions that (. ) academics are 
34 very out of touch with reality an (yeah) they live in their little 
35 ivory tower and do their researching an (yeah) don't have any 
36 contact with other people (. ) erm (0.8) and they've got quite a 
37 scatty kind of imagHHe uhuh (yeah) a professory kind of image 
38 (yeah) erm (0.9) I think a lot of people think of academics as 
39 quite pretentious as well (yeah) (0.6) but erm (0.9) n'ats what 
40 I do I'm (. ) I'm okay with that label [HHHHH 
41 [yeah yeah (0.7) yeah 
We can see that Fiona takes quite a different approach to answering the academic 
question, as compared with Ben. She does not refer to her own activities as 
c 
warrants' in the same way as Ben did when he credentialled himself as an 
academic. For example, Fiona does not mention anything about her teaching, 
publishing or detesting admin. It is only when she says that 'people always say 
that I'm a natural academic' (line 23) that she could be understood as warranting 
herself as an academic. If people are `always' saying this about her, then, 
it is 
implied, there must be some truth in what they are saying. This particular claim 
could work as an `external' warrant in favour of Fiona 
being an academic. 
In the answer that Ben gave to the academic question, the 
desirability of 
being an academic was not identified explicitly as an 
issue. By credentialin`g 
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himself as an academic, Ben gave the impression that being an academic was 
something desirable to him. Whereas Ben attempted to warrant himself as an 
academic, Fiona is more concerned to talk about the significance or meaning of 
being labelled an academic. Specifically, she implies that the social identity of 
`academic' has negative connotations surrounding it, that the identity is derided by 
people, and therefore that it is an unwanted or undesirable identity. In the words of 
Goffman (1968), it is a `stigmatised' identity. However, at the same time, Fiona 
actually claims that identity for herself, and as such implies that there must be 
something about an academic identity which she herself finds desirable or 
favourable. We will see this tension between the desirability and undesirability of 
the academic identity is an important feature of Fiona's answer. 
Let us first look at the sequence before the academic question is asked, 
which is important in terms of how it relates to Fiona's subsequent answer to the 
question. At the start of the extract, Steven asks Fiona about the job she is about to 
take up (lines 1 to 2). Fiona says that she is going for `just basically a 
straightforward lectureship in psychology ... 
but errm it's quite exciting HUH' 
(lines 10 to 11) then later says that she is `just (. ) quite (. ) up'n (. ) hyper about that 
at the moment' (lines 13 to 14). Fiona uses the words `just, ' `basically' and 
`straightforward' to depreciate the significance or importance of the job she has 
got (on uses of the word just, see Lee, 1987). She gives the impression that there is 
nothing special about the job itself. Then she uses the word `but' and goes on to 
express her excitement about the job, saying that it's `quite exciting HUH' 
because the city she will be living in is a fantastic place for an academic to be. The 
word `quite' works here as a mitigator and places a limit on the excitement that 
Fiona is expressing. She does not boast about her upcoming lecturing post but 
rather gives a measured and modest rendition of her excitement. The laughter at 
this moment ('but errm it's quite exciting HUH') also works to mitigate some of 
the boastful implications of her being excited about her job. This pattern of 
depreciation and mitigation during this early part of the extract (lines 10 to 14) 
might be evidence of the potential status implications involved 
in getting an 
academic lectureship. Fiona's modesty points to the possibility that this academic 
job, and the associated identity of being an academic, 
is in some way desirable 
partly because of its status. However, while she mitigates 
her excitement, Fiona 
does not mitigate how `fantastic' the city she will 
be living in is. 
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By saying that the city she is going to be living in is a `fantastic place for an 
academic to be' (line 12) Fiona implies that she is an academic, or that she will be 
an academic when she is working as a lecturer in this city. Whatever the 
implication, she is taking an implicitly favourable stance towards the academic 
identity. By saying that she is quite up and hyper about it at the moment (lines 13 
to 14), Fiona gives the impression that she wants to be an academic in this place. 
Steven interrupts Fiona at this point and asks her the academic question (line 15). 
The actual rendition of the question `do you consider yourself an academic wd- 
would you say? ' begins in a more direct manner than how, in extract one, Steven 
asked Ben `would you consider yourself an academic in any sense? ' In the present 
sequence, Steven uses the form `do you' instead of `would you. ' Although. this 
directness is then mitigated by the addition of `would you say' (line 16) which 
softens the asking and makes it less direct. 
When she replies to the academic question, Fiona answers the initial form of 
the question. She does not reply with the possible `yeah I would' but rather says 
`yeah I do' (line 18). Fiona's initial reply of `yeah I do' is suggestive of an 
implicit tension which is drawn out more explicitly in the remainder of the 
sequence. This is the tension between the general discrediting of the academic 
label and Fiona's claiming of the identity of academic for herself. While she 
emphasises her `yeah I do' this is not the emphasis associated with eagerly 
adopting the identity of academic. Rather, it is Fiona displaying her awareness that 
what she is doing might be somewhat unusual or questionable. This initial avowal 
seems to be a subtle example of the reflexivity of the self that Anthony Giddens 
(1991) has described. Giddens argues that modern day selves are created out of a 
process of reflexivity in which people contemplate themselves and what they are 
doing at regular intervals. The central paradox is that it is through reflecting upon 
the self that the self actually comes into being. Giddens writes that `self-identity 
today is a reflexive achievement' (p. 215). Fiona's `yeah I do' has a reflexive 
quality in the sense that she is claiming an academic identity, while at the same 
time implicitly remarking upon that claim, and marking it out as conspicuous, or 
in need of some explanation. 
The first explicit indication that Fiona is presenting the `academic' label as 
being unwanted or undesired by people is when she says that 
`most people kind of 
squirm when you give them that kiHHnd of 
label' (lines 18 to 19). To `squirm' is 
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to display your distaste for what is happening to you; you are showing that you do 
not like what is happening. Fiona implies that `academic' is in a class of labels 
which people squirm at by saying `that kiHHnd' of label. Furthermore, by 
identifying the general class of `most people' Fiona implies that there is a popular 
and generalised disliking of being given the academic label, which suggests that 
the label itself is problematic. By saying `yeah I do' and thereby claiming the 
academic identity for herself, Fiona suggests that she is not the same as `most 
people. ' She is not squirming, but rather is claiming the academic identity, whilst 
at the same time subtly bringing attention to its status as a generally derided label. 
It was mentioned earlier that when Fiona says people always say she's a 
natural academic (line 23) she could be credentialing herself as an academic. 
However, she goes on to say that she is not sure whether people are being `nice' or 
`offensive' when they call her a natural academic (lines 27 to 28). Fiona thereby 
shows an awareness that calling someone a `natural academic' could work as 
either a compliment or an insult. In relation to this, Sue Widdicombe (1998) has 
written that `it is likely that on occasions the ascription of category membership 
may be used to make available unfavourable inferences about a person' (p. 53). 
However, Fiona shows that she is not taking the potentially offensive nature of 
this name calling seriously. She does this by laughing when she says `or whether 
tHHat's offensive' (lines 27 to 28). By laughing at the point just before she says 
the word `offensive' Fiona shows that she is not taking seriously the possibility 
that people are being offensive when they say that she is a natural academic. 
However, Michael Mulkay (1988) has pointed out that the `adoption of the 
humorous mode does not necessarily imply that one's speech is completely devoid 
of serious meaning or serious intent' (p. 67). Indeed, we will see later on that 
Fiona claims people have some rather critical ideas about what academics are like. 
Although Fiona entertains the idea that people might be being `nice' or 
`offensive' when they say that she's a natural academic, she does not question the 
legitimacy of the actual identity category they are identifying her with. Fiona does 
not express doubt about whether they are correct or not in calling her a `natural 
academic. ' It is in this sense that their name calling does seem to work as a 
credentialing device for her considering herself an academic. 
After wondering about the honourable intentions of the name callers, Fiona 
says `but' (line 28) and thereby gives a subtle 
indication that she is moving from 
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the humorous realm to the serious realm (Mulkay, 1988). She is making a shift 
from a jokey reply to the question, which does not directly answer the question, to 
a more serious reply, which directly addresses the issue of how she considers 
herself. When Fiona says `yeah I consider myself an academic' (line 28) she does 
not laugh, as she has been doing previously. Furthermore, she does not reflexively 
bring attention to her answer, as she did when she initially responded with `yeah I 
do' (line 18). Instead, she echoes the wording of the academic question, and by 
repeating these words, presents this as an answer to the question (on this kind of 
echoing, see Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995). By saying that she `considers' 
herself an academic, Fiona stays with the wording of the academic question. She 
talks about how she considers herself, rather than making any claims about her 
`being' an academic, as Ben did. For example, she does not say that she `is' an 
academic. At this moment Fiona gives the impression that she is making a serious 
identity claim. The interchange thereby loses some of its prior jokey or humorous 
quality. 
After making this claim about considering herself an academic, Fiona makes 
a self-depreciatory comment, saying `it's the only thing I can do reaHHHlly' 
(lines 28 to 29). The claim about `only' being able to do academia is in line with 
the idea that Fiona is a `natural academic. ' She uses the word `only' to single out 
being an academic as the one thing that she can do. Like a natural academic, who 
is born to do one single thing, Fiona excludes any alternative things that she might 
be able to do (on the uses of the word `only' see Billig, 1999a, p. 127). 
35 However, 
the within speech laughter during the word `reaHHHlly' (line 29) works to 
undermine the seriousness or literal nature of the claim that being an academic is 
all that she can do. Fiona marks the claim as being partly humorous, and therefore 
not to be taken too literally or definitely. By making this depreciatory comment 
immediately after the identity claim, Fiona counters the potentially boastful 
implications of adopting the academic identity. She undermines the significance of 
her considering herself an academic and gives a modest account of 
her academic 
3s Considering that Fiona was 24 years old at the time of the interview, and went directly 
from an undergraduate degree to a doctorate, we might suppose that she 
has not actually 
tried anything else, other than studying or working within a university setting. 
However, 
Steven did not ask Fiona about this. 
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self, which suggests that there is something more than to an academic identity 
than it being stigmatised. 
Appearance versus reality of academic identities 
Fiona describes the word academic as a `label' (lines 19 and 40). Labelling might 
be an activity which is done to oneself by others, rather than something than one 
does to oneself (Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995). For example, someone can be 
`given' the academic label (lines 18 to 19), and Fiona says that people always say 
that she's a natural academic (line 23). They are thereby labelling her with the 
label `academic. ' 
When Steven asks her what she thinks it means, `what does that involve 
d'you think' (lines 30 to 31), Fiona specifies those qualities which she believes are 
commonly associated with the academic label (lines 33 to 39). In this final part of 
the extract, Fiona changes her footing (Goffman, 1983). She shifts from talking 
about herself to talking about what other `people' think of academics. By using 
the general category `people' Fiona implies that these people are not academics. 
She does not imply that academics hold such beliefs about one another, but rather 
that non-academics do. Furthermore, she implies that she herself does not hold 
these beliefs. They are the opinions of other people, and not of herself. Fiona 
therefore constructs the appearance of academic identity whilst simultaneously 
distancing herself from those appearances. 
To begin with, Fiona thinks that people just have `preconceptions' about 
academics (line 33). By identifying the thoughts people have about academics as 
`preconceptions' Fiona places a doubt over the validity of their thoughts. A 
preconception might be a `conception' that has been formed `prior' to the proper 
knowledge has being gained about academia. In this sense a preconception 
resembles a stereotype (Pickering, 2001). Fiona is implicitly suggesting 
that these 
people have had no contact with academics, or experience of academia, and 
that 
they have formed their opinions without having the appropriate 
knowledge. If they 
still hold their preconceptions upon gaining this experiential 
knowledge. then it is 
implied that they could be classed as prejudiced, because their conceptions 
have 
not altered accordingly (Allport, 
1954). The very invoking of what 'people think' 
(line 38) is enough to suggest that a difference 
is being constructed between these 
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people's thoughts and the actual reality, or truth, of academia. While these people 
might `think' that academics are this and that, this does not mean that they 
actually are. 
The first preconception that Fiona identifies is that `academics are very out 
of touch with reality' (lines 33 to 34). As Fiona introduces this criticism of 
academics as a `preconception' it is therefore implied to be an unfounded 
criticism. Fiona implies that, in actuality, academics either are in touch with 
reality, or are more in touch with reality than people might think. 36 However. 
whilst people might be wrong in thinking that academics are 'very' out of touch 
with reality, it is implicitly conceded that they might be right in thinking that they 
are `somewhat' out of touch with reality. 
When Fiona describes people's preconceived thoughts about academics, she 
distances herself from these thoughts, and mounts implicit criticisms against them. 
Fiona performs a kind of `double-declaiming' (Billig, 1992). That is, she identifies 
people's preconceived thoughts, and at the same time implicitly suggests that 
there are more real or accurate understandings of academics and academia. The 
apparent appearance of academics - as evinced in the `label' or the `image' - is 
implied to lie in contrast with the actual reality of academics. This reality is 
implied to exist underneath or behind the label or the image. Fiona seems to be 
drawing upon the common sense distinction between appearance and reality in her 
answer to the academic question (see Pollner, 1975,1987; Eglin, 1979; Potter, 
1987,1988; Edwards, 1991; Edwards, 1997, p. 248). She implies that if you peal 
the label away, you will find the truth about academics. 
The particular description of `image' (line 37) is important for how it relates 
to the appearance versus reality distinction. The `image' of a person can be 
superficial and misleading. It can distract a person from the `real' substance which 
lies behind the image. While academics might have a scatty or professory kind of 
image (lines 36 to 37), this does not mean that they are actually scatty or 
professory. They might appear different upon closer inspection, or upon actual 
meaningful contact with them. 
36 A similar pattern is evident in the thought of academics 
`living' in their 'little' ivory tower, 
doing their researching (lines 34 to 35). This description 
has a fairytale-like quality to it and is 
therefore implied to be an inaccurate description of what academics 
do. 
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Thus, Fiona implies that there are different and more accurate 
understandings of academics, which stand apart from the preconceived ideas 
people have about them. She suggests that there are people who do not hold such 
preconceived ideas, and instead hold the `correct' or `true' versions of what 
academics and academia are like. For example, when she says `I think a lot of 
people think of academics as quite pretentious as well' (lines 38 to 39) she 
implicitly suggests that academics are in fact not pretentious, or at least that they 
are only slightly pretentious. The use of the word `quite' means that people could 
be wrong even if academics were only pretentious to a small degree. 
Fiona talks about the preconceptions people have of `academics' and how 
'they' live in their little ivory tower and `they' have quite a scatty kind of image. 
By using this kind of footing to describe the conceptions people have of 
academics, Fiona ends up distancing herself from `academics' and implies that she 
is not one of `them. ' This is especially the case when she says `and they've got 
quite a scatty kind of imagHHe' (lines 36 to 37). Here Fiona is suggesting that this 
is a claim she is making about academics; she is not identifying herself as an 
academic who has quite a scatty kind of image. However, Fiona then goes on to 
say `but erm (0.9) n'ats what I do I'm (. ) I'm okay with that label HHHHH' (lines 
39 to 40) and thereby makes a claim for the academic label. 
What are we to make of these final identity claims? At this particular 
moment, Fiona could have gone on to contradict the preconceptions that people 
have of academics or academia, and given an account of what academics are 
`really' like. After saying `but erm' she could have proceeded to specify why 
those people are wrong. However, she instead comes in with the seemingly 
straightforward defence of Vats what I do' and then makes an evaluation with 
`I'm (. ) I'm okay with that label. ' With the word `but' Fiona returns back to the 
question of her own identity, which was the focus of the previously asked 
academic question, and finishes her answer. By claiming that this is what she 
`does' Fiona implicitly appeals to the facts of her situation. She implies that the 
issue of what she does is straightforward and unproblematic. This 
is what she does 
therefore this is what she is (Sacks, 1992). This claim echoes what she said earlier 
about academia being the only thing she can 
do (lines 28 to 29). She subtly 
appeals to the facts of her situation, rather than to 
her thoughts on the matter. 
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Fiona says that she is `okay' with the label, and not that she is -delighted' or 
`excited' with it. However, she is equally not `squirming' with discomfort at being 
given the label. By saying she is `okay' with it Fiona gives the impression that she 
is reluctantly or matter-of-factly accepting the academic label, a label which she 
has previously identified as being derided by people. Basically, this is an 
unwanted label. It is an identity which, she implies, people do not want. Fiona is 
being reasonable and accepting the label, whilst not necessarily agreeing with 
people's preconceptions about what academics are like. After all, Fiona strongly 
implies that the things people associate with the label of academic are in fact 
incorrect. So, when she claims an academic identity for herself, Fiona implies that 
she is not claiming those apparent aspects of academics which other people make 
claims about. 
Fiona implies that the `label' of academic is different from the actual or real 
identity of the academic, in terms of lived experience for example. She implies 
that the actual life of an academic is not the same as the preconceptions associated 
with the `label. ' She can be labelled as an academic, but because the attributes 
associated with the label are incorrect or invalid, they are not implied to map onto 
her actual or real identity as an academic. By mounting implicit criticisms of the 
preconceived thoughts that people have about what academics are like, Fiona does 
some subtle and indirect identity work for herself. She suggests that she does not 
share the same thoughts about academics, and that academics and those who have 
the appropriate knowledge do not either. 
When she says that she considers herself an academic (lines 18 and 28), 
Fiona is surely not adopting those preconceived ideas that people have of 
academics? Being okay with that `label' is different from conceding either that the 
people with the preconceptions are correct, or that she is adopting all of the 
previously identified negative characteristics of academics (being out of touch 
with reality, scattyness, and so on) for herself. Throughout the sequence 
Fiona has 
suggested that there are other, more favourable (and therefore more 
desirable) 
ways of understanding academics, although she never actually explains what 
these 
are. We might suggest that Fiona drawing upon another set of attributes or 
characteristics about academics and academia which are strongly 
implied, but left 
largely unexplicated. What is interesting about this pattern of 
double-declaiming is 
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that Fiona never actually articulates what academics are `really' like. These ideas 
remain largely unsaid during this sequence (Billig, 1999a). 
By giving the impression that the academic identity is considered by people 
to be undesirable, Fiona is able to claim that identity without warranting herself as 
an academic. She avoids doing the kind of credentialing work that Ben did by 
giving the impression that the academic identity is not a sought after identity. If 
Fiona had specified why those people are wrong about academics, and gone on to 
elaborate upon the `reality' of academia, then she might have presented the 
academic identity as having positive, and therefore desirable, aspects. Instead, she 
lets the high status of her forthcoming academic appointment speak for itself. 
Fiona's dilemma seems to be how to create the impression that an identity 
category is generally discredited, whilst at the same time claiming that identity for 
herself. If she identifies certain desirable aspects of being an academic, then the 
category itself becomes desirable, and she would need to make claims to warrant 
herself, as Ben did. However, by deriding the category too much, she runs the risk 
of making it entirely undesirable. Fiona gives the impression that identity of the 
academic has been derided by people, while at the same time hinting that this is 
not the whole story about academics or academia. 
Career and the qualified academic 
Finally, we will look briefly at the case of Rachel. Rachel's answer to the 
academic question was similar to Ben and Fiona's in the sense that she replied 
with a `yes. ' However, her reply was different because she qualified her claim to 
an academic identity by saying that she would regard herself as a `junior 
academic. ' We will look at this qualified version of academic identity work and 
also the issue of career rhetoric. 
`Rachel' was a 36 year old doctoral student of sociology. At the time of the 
interview, she was in the third year of her PhD, and expecting to submit 
her thesis 
within the next six months. Prior to taking up 
her doctorate, Rachel worked in a 
research unit at a city hospital on a health services related project. 
At this time she 
also did a Masters degree in order to get 
further research training. Prior to this, 
Rachel worked for eight years in clinical practice as a physiotherapist. 
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We join the interview a few moments before `the academic question' is 
asked. Steven is asking Rachel about whether her PhD fits into some kind of 
career. We will find that this previous sequence is related to the asking of the 
academic question itself, and Rachel's answer to that question. 
Extract 3 
1 Steven you mentioned earlier the word career (. ) and erm I was 
2 thinkin' can you think of it yknw in that kind of career (. ) 
3 sense of havin' a (. ) of your PhD fitting into some kind of 
4 (yes) a career [at all yeah] yeah 
5 Rachel [oh yeah yeah] yes I mean my my intention 
6 ((cough)) well (1) my ideal will be t- to (0.8) to continue to do 
7 (0.6) research rather than for instance moving into teaching 
8 or lecturing (right) and I'd love to get another (. ) fellowship 
9 of some sort (yeah) but you know (. ) those aren't that 
10 eaHHsy to come by (yeah yeah) but but certainly you know 
11 my (. ) my PhD has been (0.6) yknw (0.7) as I said it was 
12 sort've VAGUELY- it was desired perhaps rather than 
13 absolutely planned but (. ) yknw as part of a progression 
14 towards (yeah) an academic career (yeah) and it has 
15 developed me (0.9) erh (. ) the- yknow uh aspects of me 
16 towards meeting that career as well I think (yeah) or is doing so 
17 (yeah) yeah 
18 Steven do you feel yourself (. ) becoming an academic or you think 
19 you already are one or 
20 (2.9) 
21 Rachel eehhrrmm (2.3) YEAH I would regard myself as as a sort've 
22 wha- as a probably as a junior academic in that (mmmmm) 
23 I'm not highly published I published from the trial but I 
24 haven't published from this yet (right) erm but I ((coughs)) 
25 er and certainly within- within the physio profession 
26 1 def- I'm definitely regarded as a- one of the academics 
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27 
28 
(yeah) and YEAH I w- I desire to be and I guess in some 
ways I'd say I am (yeah) yeah (yeah) yeah 
In a similar sense to how, in extract one, Steven said that Ben was `talkin' about 
career' (lines 1 to 2), in the present extract, Steven brings attention to Rachel's 
mentioning of the word `career, ' and then asks her whether she can think of her 
PhD as fitting into `some kind of ... a career at all' (lines 1 to 4). Rachel replies 
positively to this question, and goes on to say `my intention ((cough)) well (1) my 
ideal will be t- to (0.8) to continue to do (0.6) research rather than for instance 
moving into teaching or lecturing' (lines 5 to 8). There are two aspects of this 
utterance which are of relevance. The first point is that Rachel corrects `my 
intention' to `my ideal' when she talks about what she will do after her PhD. 
Having an `intention' to continue to do research might be too presumptuous a 
claim to make. By repairing `intention' to `ideal' Rachel implicitly acknowledges 
the possibility that she might not be able to continue to do research. By using the 
description `ideal' Rachel makes continuing to do research a desired, but not 
inevitable, future career activity. 
The second point is that Rachel uses the idea of `moving into' teaching or 
lecturing. This particular form of expression is part of the rhetoric of `career. ' This 
is because an impression of movement, transition or progression is given; career 
may consist of a progressive movement on the job front, for example (on the 
ambivalence of academic career and self promotion, see Fairclough, 1995, chapter 
six; see also Coupland, 2004). Rachel says that her ideal will be to `continue to 
do 
(0.6) research' rather than for instance `moving into teaching or lecturing' (lines 
6 
to 8) and thereby gives the impression that she is preserving the continuity of 
her 
career. While moving into teaching or lecturing is not her ideal, Rachel 
implicitly 
concedes that she might still make this move, if she cannot attain 
her ideal. The 
rhetoric of career is again constituted when Rachel says that 
her PhD has been part 
of a `progression towards ... an academic career' 
(lines 11 to 14). Her use of the 
word `progression' gives the sense of movement or 
development. Earlier in the 
interview, Rachel said `I did know that I wanted to carry on in a research 
(. ) 
academic career and that to do that I would need a 
PhD. ' In this earlier utterance. 
the PhD is implied to be a kind of passport to a research academic career. 
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Similar `career' identity work can be appreciated in the utterance `and it has 
developed me (0.9) erh (. ) the- yknow uh aspects of me towards meeting that 
career as well I think (yeah) or is doing so' (lines 15 to 16). Here, Rachel talks 
about her self development during the period of her doctorate. There is some 
delicate work going on during this utterance. Firstly, there is the repair from the 
PhD having developed Rachel (`and it has developed me') to it having developed 
aspects of her ('uh aspects of me') towards meeting an academic career. By 
correcting the claim that the PhD has developed her, and claiming that it has 
developed `aspects' of her, Rachel draws away from being too presumptuous 
about her progression along the academic career path. Secondly, there is the 
addition of `or is doing so' at the end of the utterance. This might be related to the 
fact that Rachel had not yet completed her thesis, and therefore is having difficulty 
speaking of it in the past tense, as though she has completed it already ('it has 
developed me'). The addition of `or is doing so' situates the self-development in 
the present; the PhD is in the process of developing her towards meeting the 
academic career. 
It can briefly be noted that Rachel says `that career' rather than `a career' 
(line 16). At this moment, she is speaking about `meeting' a specific career, an 
academic career, rather than a career per se. Rachel gives the impression that she 
is in the process of meeting a new career, and making a transition from her earlier 
career as a practising physiotherapist, and not meeting her first career. After all, 
earlier in the interview, Rachel said that the fellowship which funded her PhD was 
designed for clinicians who wanted to `go into' research. 
Steven goes on to ask Rachel `do you feel yourself (. ) becoming an academic 
or you think you already are one or' (lines 18 to 19). This particular wording of 
the academic question differs markedly from the questions which were asked of 
Ben and Fiona. Steven does not ask Rachel whether she would `consider' herself 
an academic, for example. Instead, he asks if Rachel `feels' herself `becoming' an 
academic, or if she `thinks' she already `is' one. A distinction between `becoming' 
an academic and `being' an academic is constructed. Steven implies that Rachel 
might not be an academic yet. The inclusion of the word `already' 
is significant in 
the sense that it might be premature for Rachel to think of herself as an academic 
yet, at this moment in her `career. ' By phrasing the questions 
in the particular way 
that he does, Steven strongly implies that Rachel is not an academic, 
but that 
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nevertheless she might well feel, or think herself to be one, or at least becoming 
one. 
The question of whether Rachel feels herself becoming an academic seems 
to come straight out of what she said previously about her career self- 
development. Rachel said that her PhD has developed her, or aspects of her, 
towards meeting an academic career, or that it is doing so (lines 14 to 16). This 
kind of self development is implicitly picked up by Steven when he asks her 
whether she feels herself `becoming' an academic. The implication is similar to 
the rhetoric of substance which Kenneth Burke (1969) has written about. Burke 
argues that it is more accurate to say that something is not the case, rather than to 
say that something is substantially the case. He writes that one may say it is 
substantially true" precisely at a time when on the basis of the evidence, it would 
be much more accurate to say, "it is not true"' (p. 52; emphasis in original). From 
this perspective, to be `becoming an academic' is not to be an academic at all. 
Although Rachel is not asked whether she `would consider' herself as an 
academic, as some of the other respondents were asked, she nevertheless goes on 
to give an answer which seems to suggest that she is answering such a question. 
Rachel says `YEAH I would regard myself and uses the word `would' and 
`regard' as though they were the words of the question. Rachel does not only say 
that she `regards' herself as an academic, but gives a conditional rendition of 
saying that she `would. ' As mentioned earlier, however, regarding oneself as an 
academic is different from making a claim to actually being an academic. 
Rachel says that she would regard herself as a `junior academic' and thereby 
gives a qualified version of the identity category `academic. ' This provisioning of 
the category `junior academic' works to solve the problem of claiming too much 
or too little of an academic identity. The addition of the word `junior' works in a 
mitigatory sense to limit the extent to which Rachel regards herself as an 
`academic. ' Rachel is not considering herself as an `academic' but rather is 
claiming the somewhat lower status position of `junior academic. 
' She thereby 
gives the impression of being `on the way' to being an academic; she 
is becoming 
an academic. However, even her claiming of this 
lower status position is hedged 
and qualified. Rachel says that she would regard 
herself as a `sort've wha- as a 
probably as a junior academic' (lines 
21 - 22). She does not straightforwardly 
claim the identity of junior academic 
for herself without expressing some caution. 
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The words `sort've' and `probably, ' as well as the false starts, give the impression 
of hedging, mitigation and possibly unease. 
Why does Rachel hedge her answer in this way? There are several 
possibilities. Firstly, Rachel could be displaying a reluctance to make her identity 
claim in too strong or certain a manner. If she had been more direct, she might 
have given the impression that she was conceited or boastful. Secondly, the 
identity `junior academic' is a not a standard category. By hedging, Rachel could 
be showing that. this category is unconventional, such that she cannot just give it 
straightforwardly. Thirdly, the hedging and mitigation could be associated with 
the status associated with the category `junior academic. ' As she makes her 
identity claim, Rachel is also claiming a particular status. The words `sort've' and 
`probably' may work to curtail some of the status implications of her claiming to 
be a junior academic. 
Rachel explains her use of the `junior academic' identity by saying that she 
is `not highly published' (line 23). Rachel's use of publishing as a criteria for 
being an academic fits in with what she said earlier about her `research' career. 
Her ideal was to continue to do research, rather than moving into teaching or 
lecturing. By saying that she is not `highly' published Rachel suggests that she is 
published, but that she has not published enough for her to be a proper academic. 
Indeed, she goes on to say that she has `published from the trial' but that she 
hasn't `published from this yet' ('the trial' being her previous research, and `this' 
being her doctoral thesis; lines 23 to 24). Rachel's argument seems to be that she 
has not published enough in terms of quantity. 
Rachel uses an absence to justify her claim of being a `junior' academic, for 
not being highly published is a negative criterion. She implies that if this lack was 
corrected, and if she were highly published, then she might consider herself to be 
an `academic' rather than a `junior' academic. By saying that she hasn't published 
from her thesis `yet' (line 24) Rachel suggests that she expects to publish from her 
thesis at some point in the future. Furthermore, she implies that when she 
has 
published from her thesis, then she will be in a better position to consider 
herself 
an academic. By going into a research career, it is likely that 
Rachel will be highly 
published, given the passage of time. We will consider the 
dilemmas of doctoral 
publishing in more detail in chapter 
8. 
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Rachel says that `certainly within- within the physio profession I def- I'm 
definitely regarded as a- one of the academics' (lines 25 to 26). In a similar way to 
how Fiona said that `people always say that I'm a natural academic' (extract 2, 
line 23), Rachel brings the opinions of others onboard to credential herself as an 
academic. She uses the words `certainly' and `definitely' to make a strong case for 
her being regarded as `one of the academics' within the physio profession. 
After giving her justificatory warrants, Rachel returns to the business of 
answering the academic question. At the end of this sequence, Rachel says `I 
desire to be and I guess in some ways I'd say that I am' (lines 27 to 28). This 
answer shows that the topic of her academic identity is not clear-cut or 
straightforward. For example, her reply contains hedging ('I guess') and 
qualification ('in some ways'). In a similar way to how Ben said `I probably am' 
at the end of his answer to the academic question, Rachel finishes with `I am' and 
thereby upgrades her initial claim of regarding herself as a junior academic. It can 
be noted that, at this point, Rachel does not specify whether she is an `academic' 
proper or a `junior academic. ' 
By attempting to claim academic identities for themselves, all of the 
respondents in this chapter suggested that they wanted to be academics. Although 
it was only Rachel who professed a desire to be an academic, Ben and Fiona, 
through their conversational actions, both gave the impression that they wanted to 
be academics. However, sometimes the language of desire is not so 
straightforward. On occasion doctoral students have difficulty speaking about who 
they are, and who they want to be. There are dilemmatic aspects of claiming an 
academic identity, involving feelings of ambivalence, which will consider 
in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter Seven - Ideological Dilemmas of Claiming an Academic Identity 
In the previous chapter we analysed the ways in which doctoral students 
warranted themselves as academics. The particular focus was with those 
respondents who were categorised in the content analysis as replying `yes' to the 
academic question. In the present chapter, we will be concerned with the 
ambivalent or dilemmatic aspects of claiming academic identities. The chapter 
concerns the case of `Will' who was categorised in the content analysis as saying 
`Yes and No' in response to his academic question. Whereas the previous chapter 
concerned relatively straightforward cases of those respondents who `would' 
consider themselves academics, this chapter concerns more complicated issues, 
surrounding ambivalence of desire, and dilemmas of an ideological nature, which 
can surround the claiming of an academic identity for doctoral postgraduates and 
young lecturers. 
`I don't want to be all career-ey': The case of Will 
`Will' is a 34 year old Senior Lecturer in Psychology at a University College in 
the United Kingdom. He started his lectureship in January 1998, which was 
around three and half years prior to the interview. He was initially employed as a 
Lecturer, and then in 1999, after 18 months, a Senior Lecturer position came up, 
which he applied for and got. Will pointed out that this was his first `proper job, ' 
his `first full-time job in higher education. ' Will was not registered as a doctoral 
postgraduate at his current institution. He started his PhD at another 
institution, 
around two years prior to taking up his lectureship. Before taking up 
his doctorate, 
he did an undergraduate degree, and taught in Further Education 
for around six 
years. At this time he also studied part-time for a Masters 
degree. The interview 
was carried out in the Summer of 2001, and Will was 
hoping to submit his thesis 
in the Autumn, and to have his viva before Christmas. The PhD will 
have taken 
him around six years to complete. 
Like Ben and Rachel, Will used the word `career' in his interview, without 
being asked about it by Steven. However, whereas 
both Ben and Rachel used the 
term `career' and implicitly endorsed career rhetoric 
in their talk, Will displayed 
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his reluctance about using such language. Early on in the interview, in the context 
of answering a question about the backgrounds of the postgraduates in his 
department, Will said `I mean my career (. ) has been a bit odd (. ) really in lots of 
ways' (emphasis his own). He did his first degree, then trained to be a teacher, 
then did a part-time Masters whilst teaching in Further Education, before starting 
his PhD. When he made this comment, Will distanced himself from the word 
`career' by signing quotation marks with his hands as he said the word. By putting 
the word in quotes, Will gave a subtle indication that he was reluctant to fully 
endorse the term, and to use it without qualification. 
Later on in the interview, Will said `I'm not really into my career erm it's 
not a term I ever really use' (emphasis his own) although, ironically, this was the 
second time that he used the term. Will said that he preferred to talk of having a 
`job of work' rather than a `career. ' He said that his approach might be considered 
`eclectic' and that he was a `jack of all trades. ' When I asked him why he was 
cautious about using the word `career' Will said that he is not really very 
ambitious. He went on to say that `career always implies a next step' (emphasis 
his own) and that he doesn't have any desires to advance himself. He also said that 
he had fallen into a lot of things he's fallen into, and that `I don't want to be all 
kind of career-ey. ' Although he did not talk about career in the same way as Ben 
and Rachel did, Will nevertheless used the language of career when he talked. The 
difference is that Will attempted to distance himself from this language. These 
early indications of the dilemmas of work and career within academia are 
expanded upon in Will's reply to the academic question, which we will turn to 
presently. 
Extract 
1 Steven so would you consider yourself an academic? 
2 Will ((sucks through teeth and sighs for 5 seconds)) 
3 ((7.7 seconds of silence and tutting)) 
4 wl be a big pause there Hn- in-in your transcript isn't there gHn 
5 Steven [uhHUHUHAHAAH huh huh ] 
6 Will [he said HUUGE HUUGE SIGH TEN SECONDS] OFF 
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7 Steven 
8 Will 
9 Steven 
10 Will 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 Steven 
26 Will 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
UHUHUHhuh 
gaah eerrmm 
huhuh 
I spose yes and- iwthe here we go YES and no yayy`yes 
and no- (yeah) p- p- GENERALLYNO I'm putting more no 
than yes I don't- (0.9) I wouldn't tend to position myself as a 
as an academic and I I'm not sure tht- tht- much of what we do- 
(1.2) there there is'v- I- within my job now there is a lot of 
teaching (mmmm) d'you know what I mean and it (yeah) 
really a lot of it isn't that different from (. ) what I t- went from 
teaching A-Level (yeah) eeerrrmm (yeah) yes the level is 
higher th- it's theoretically more complex (. ) but I spose I had 
this idea of academia (. ) or academe and (. ) it was (. ) me sitting 
in my office sucking on a pipe even though I don't smoke 
(hmhmhm) eerrmm with er a little group of three or four 
students that had read lots of articles and having this kind of 
(yeah) desperately pretentious and precious 
[theoretical discussion about something ERM AND you know] (. ) 
[ccchhhhhhhuuhhhuhhhh yeah huhuhuh 
I don't do anything like that at all I- I lecture and then- II do a 
lot of- actually II do- most of my teaching is se- third year or 
second year BUT (mm) I (. ) do my lectures and then I do 
seminars and II and in a seminar group I have twenty students 
who might have read one paper if I'm lucky (yeah) eerrmm 
um and I do a (. ) wls a seminar isn't really that different to a 
lesson (yeah) in in school terms (I see yeah) eerrm so I have 
difficulty from that point of view (mmm) seeing myself as an 
academic (. ) having said that you know II do (0.8) talk to my 
colleagues and we bounce ideas around and (. ) you know I 
have continued to do research and I have published things in 
(. ) yknw peer rate- peer reviewed journals (yeah) so from an 
I 
objective point of view I spose it would be f- (0.6) silly to sorta 
say well of- you know of co- you know anything but of course 
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41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 Steven 
67 Will 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 Steven 
I'm an a- of course I'm an academic (yeah) but it's probably 
not a g- it's not a position I feel wholly comfortable with 
an a there is a huuuuge huuuuge snob value in the PhD 
non-PhD thing (yeah) d'you know what I mean and I'm 
acuutely aware I mean there is some pressure (. ) it's fairly 
subtle here to be fair but there is some pressure that `for 
God's sake (. ) when are you going to get this kind've PHHD 
that we thought you were gonna have (yeah) pretty muHHch 
as soon as you kind of arrived in ni- January nineteen ninety 
eight' which is (. )fair enough (yeah) d-d-d'you know what 
I mean t-to a certain extent but Itha- there is this huge schism 
I think between the PhD (yeah) and and and the lecturer 
who doesn 't have a PhD (mmmm) for all that you might have 
a lot of teaching experience or you might have published 
quite a few things or you might be in the RAE (. ) it's it's still 
not seen as as quite good enough as as if you haven't got 
the- if you haven't kinda got the thesis (yeah) errrrm (. ) 
SO ai I spose a- I feel wary ofofof styling myself as an academic 
before that actual time (yeah) eerrrmm but my hunch is that 
even- I mn hopefully- once I've got the PhD I probably still 
won't feel (. ) that academic is is the right (. ) i- is it's not the 
way I would label myself (yeah) if that makes sense (yeah) 
eerrrrmm (. ) yeah iiiii I think it's unlikely to be- ISA I'm sure 
I'll be ones who will not use my (. ) (mmm) you know I'm not 
gonna have all my kinda credit cards changed to 
[Doctor d- d'you know what I mean eerrmm (. ) ] 
[yeah HHHHMMHHMMHHHHH huhuhuhuh] 
and that kind've id if people want to that's fine but iith- the- 
that's not the way (yeah) you know w- (. ) I'll use it in a work 
sense but that-that-that's the only place (yeah) that I kind've- 
that I would kind've- that I will kind've use it (yeah) so you 
know I'm not that into the status of- (. ) 
[yeah ] 
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73 Will [eerrm] (I see) of- of that and that's partly cos I know the 
74 process is so hit and miss (mmmm) (. ) you know the- the 
75 people that do deserve doctorates don't- sometimes don't 
76 get them the people that don't deserve them sometimes do 
77 (yeah) and the (1.6) teHHrrible lack of reliability (mmmm) 
78 within the whole process (yeah) eerrmm (. ) I mean is 
79 absolutely sh- it's aHHb[solutely shocking [so you know I 
80 Steven [hhhh [uhu 
81 Will mean III- I might get my doctorate but really if I'd got a different 
82 (0.7) panel (yeah) they might have said `this is just terrible' 
83 (yeah) equally I might fail and somebody else might say 
84 `wy- you know this is great' (yeah) d' you know what I mean 
85 (yeah) so errrm 111111 I'm cautious about the whole- I'm 
86 cautious about the whole thing (yeah) really (yeah) 
Out of all the respondents, Will displayed the most difficulty with the academic 
question, both in terms of his initial response (lines 2 to 13), and his subsequent 
discussion throughout the remainder of his answer (lines 14 to 86). Listening to 
the interview as a whole, it is noticeable how much the flow of the interaction is 
disrupted, as soon as Will is asked the academic question. The relative ease with 
which Will answered the other interview questions was not evidenced in his reply 
to this particular question. The interview seemed to come to an abrupt halt when 
the question is asked. 
This kind of change is difficult to capture in a written transcript. Initially, I 
transcribed this sequence phonetically, according to the Jefferson (1984a) system. 
This was partly to give the reader an idea of how Will initially responded to the 
question `would you consider yourself an academic? ' (see especially lines 2 and 
3). However, I found this transcript to be too difficult to read, and it seemed to 
obscure the overall pattern of argument during the sequence. The sequence was 
therefore retranscribed in such a way as to strike a balance between the content of 
what is said and how this was said. 
As well as his initial difficulty, Will's explanation of 
his reply to the 
question is both contemplative and dilemmatic. 
We will find that, when it comes 
to the issue of his academic identity, nothing seems to 
be straightforward. As the 
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transcript suggests, Will took longer than any of the other participants to answer 
the academic question. However, it is important to note at the outset that the 
analysis will not be concerned with Will's entire answer. Rather we will focus on 
some of the rhetorical and ideological features of his answer, and how these 
features relate to, and expand upon, some of the themes of the previous chapter. 
The big pause in my transcript 
When he is asked the academic question, Will displays an initial difficulty (lines 2 
to 3). First he sucks in through his teeth. Then he lets out a sigh. This is followed 
by silence, which is interspersed with tutting sounds. Will seems to be displaying 
a reluctancy or discomfort about answering the question (Pomerantz, 1984, p. 72. 
p. 95; Jefferson, 1989). After showing this difficulty, he says `wl be a big pause 
there Hn- in-in your transcript isn't there gHn' (line 4) and thereby makes a 
reflexive meta move. Herbert Simons (1994) has written that a `communication is 
reflexive when it makes prior communications the subject of communication' (p. 
470). Will's meta move is reflexive in the sense that he brings attention to how his 
response to the academic question is likely to be represented in Steven's 
transcript. He is humorously reflecting upon his `big pause' and making fun of 
how this will impact upon the transcription process. Will reflexively makes this 
prior communicational act of `responding to the question' a subject of his 
communication. 
Will goes meta on his answer and simultaneously brings attention to his 
difficulty in answering. In this sense his meta movement can be understood as an 
escape strategy (Simons, 1994). Will might be attempting to escape from the 
difficulty he was experiencing in answering the question straightforwardly, and in 
the terms of the question. However, going meta has the potential to impede the 
flow of an interaction (Simons, 1989). A meta mover can give the impression that 
they are being impolite, disruptive or evasive. For example, by going meta, a 
person can put off answering the question they have been asked. Will 
is initiating 
an `insertion sequence' at this moment, as Ben did in chapter six, which 
is 'a spate 
of interaction which is nested in or embedded in an overarching sequential 
framework' (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p. 180). By initiating this insertion 
sequence, Will risks disrupting the question-answer sequence, and 
thereby 
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avoiding the question. However, in the present extract, Will does not put off 
answering the academic question so much as bring attention to his answer in the 
process of answering. The meta movement is part of the answer to the academic 
question, and deals with the issue of answering the question itself. Will is bringing 
attention, in an indirect manner, to how his answer was said. 
By saying that there will be a `big pause' in Steven's transcript, Will 
implies that he is responsible for that pause. This is despite the fact that no 'big 
pause' actually took place. Rather, a sigh, and silence interspersed with tutting 
actually took place (lines 2 to 3). Ironically, it might be the case that Will went 
meta in order to avoid leaving a `big pause. ' After all, by saying that there will be 
a `big pause' Will does not leave a big pause. It can sometimes be difficult to 
leave long silences in ordinary conversation (Jefferson, 1989) and Will's meta 
movement might work to stop him from experiencing serious difficulty with the 
academic question. 
By laughing twice as he makes the comment about the big pause, Will 
signals that this is a humorous meta move. The particles `Hn' and `gHn' represent 
interpolated laughter within the utterance, and work to give the impression that 
Will is entering the realm of humour (Mulkay, 1988; Jefferson, 1985). This is the 
first time that laughter appears in the sequence. By laughing as he makes his meta 
move, Will gives the impression that what he is saying should not be taken 
entirely seriously. The laughter works to soften the meta movement and gives the 
impression that the comment is meant humorously. Humour can work to repair a 
potentially embarrassing situation (Billig, 2001), such as being unable to answer 
an interview question in an appropriately straightforward way. The laughed `gHn' 
at the end of the utterance, after the tag question `isn't there, ' works as an 
invitation for Steven to laugh (Jefferson, 1979). Steven picks up on the humorous 
nature of what Will has said by laughing loudly and emphatically (line 5). 
By talking about the big pause in Steven's `transcript' Will does some 
implicit identity work. Like Ben in the previous chapter, Will displays his 
academic identity. He gives the impression that he is knowledgeable about 
qualitative and/or discursive research, that his interview is being recorded, and 
also that it will be transcribed at a later date (cf. Speer and Hutchby, 2003a). 
By 
saying `your transcript' Will positions Steven as the researcher, and as the one 
for 
whom the transcript has significance. He 
implies that Steven does not want a `big 
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pause' in his transcript. In fact, it might be something annoying and problematic 
for him as the researcher, like a potential `gap' in the data. After all, how much 
can one say about a big pause? 
As Steven laughs (line 5), Will says `he said HUUGE HUUGE SIGH TEN 
SECONDS OFF' (line 6). This is a sequence of direct reported speech, in which 
Will jokingly imagines how Steven will transcribe Will's initial response to the 
question (on reported speech, see Antaki and Leudar, 2001; Buttny, 1998; 
Voloshinov, 1978). The previous utterance about the `big pause in your transcript* 
sets up this subsequent utterance about the `huge, huge sigh' to be heard as though 
it is Steven doing his transcribing. By saying `he said' Will gives the impression 
that Steven is speaking or writing. The pronoun `he' in this context indexically 
refers to Will himself as the interviewee, the subject whose words are being 
transcribed. 
Paradoxically, the words which Steven is supposedly saying (HUUGE 
HUUGE SIGH TEN SECONDS OFF') are designed in such a way as to capture 
what Will himself has just said. It is almost as if Will is doing his own jokey 
transcription of his words, but using the imaginary voice of Steven as a 
mouthpiece. The expression `HUUGE HUUGE SIGH' is a characterisation of 
how Will responded to the question. In itself a `sigh' is suggestive of trouble 
because a person may `sigh' to give the impression that they are experiencing 
emotional difficulty with something. They can be displaying exasperation, for 
example. By loudly stressing `HUUGE HUUGE SIGH' Will emphasises the 
enormity of the sigh and implies that it is somewhat troublesome. The hugeness or 
extremity of the sigh is suggestive of its problematic nature (Pomerantz, 1986). 
Will reflexively brings attention to the difficulty he was having with the question 
and characterises it as an extreme form of difficulty, albeit in a humorous, 
mocking kind of way. The impression of humorous mockery comes about 
because 
Will is imaginatively voicing Steven doing the transcription of Will's interview, 
but while he is doing the interview itself However, it is a moot point whether 
Will 
is mocking himself or Steven at this moment. 
The description `TEN SECONDS OFF' is Will's jokey attempt to measure 
how much time he spent mulling over the question. 
Compared to the `big pause' 
in the transcript, `ten seconds' gives the impression of a specific, timed 
measurement. Indeed, it is the 
kind of measurement which might appear in a 
147 
transcript. By saying `ten seconds, ' rather than say one second, ' Will implies that 
this is more than a reasonable amount of time to hesitate over an interview 
question. The value of `ten' seconds is ten times the standard maximum of one 
second, which is the approximate value Jefferson (1989) has proposed regulates 
ordinary conversation, although Will might not have been aware of this at the 
time. 
Michael Mulkay (1988) has shown that people can move between humorous 
and serious realms in conversation in both subtle and ambiguous ways. When he 
says `gaah eerrmm' (line 8), Will is signalling a return to seriousness. He is 
implying that his humorous meta move is over, and that he is returning to the 
serious business of answering a question, which he is having serious difficulty 
with. Steven's laughter comes to an end at this point (line 9) and he does not laugh 
again until some time later (line 25). 
Yes and no 
When it comes to Will's initial reply to the academic question, the transcript tells 
a more complicated story than did the content analysis. In the content analysis, 
Will was categorised as responding with `Yes and No. ' The impression was given 
that he gave this as a straightforward, self-contained answer to the question. 
However, when we look at lines 10 to 13 of the extract, we find that matters are 
not so straightforward. Before looking closely at the specific character of Will's 
reply, and its subsequent revisioning, we will consider the conversational structure 
of the first part of the sequence, and how this relates to the academic question 
itself. 
The initial difficulty which Will displays when he is asked the academic 
question (lines 2 to 3), along with his meta movement (lines 4 and 6) constitute 
what conversation analysts have called a `dispreferred turn format' (Hutchby and 
Wooffitt, 1998, p. 45). The sighing, tutting and pausing can be understood as 
`hesitating prefaces' or `dispreference markers' (Pomerantz, 1984). It has been 
noted that `preferred actions are characteristically performed straightforwardly 
and without delay, while dispreferred actions are 
delayed, qualified and accounted 
for' (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998, p. 45). So, at this early point in the sequence. 
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Will might be giving indications of his dispreference (for more on preference and 
dispreference, see Sacks, 1987). 
But what is Will showing his dispreference for? One possibility is that he is 
preparing to signal his disagreement with the academic question. The hesitation 
`may signal potential disagreement' (Pomerantz, 1984, p. 77) with the idea that he 
would consider himself an academic. `Incorporating delay devices constitutes a 
typical turn shape for disagreements when agreements are invited' (p. 70). 
Relatedly, Davidson (1984) has shown that, by staying silent in response to a 
proposal, a person can be suggesting that they are about to reject that proposal. To 
understand the dispreference in this particular sequence, we need to look at the 
academic question, and then at the reply which Will gives in response to that 
question. 
The asking of a question normatively demands that an answer is given in 
reply (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973), and the way in which a question is phrased can 
give important clues about what is expected or not expected as an appropriate kind 
of answer (Sacks, 1987; Schegloff, 1988). Potter and Wetherell (1987) point out 
that `the preferred response to questions is an expected answer while the 
dispreferred response is a non-answer or unexpected answer' (p. 83). But what, in 
this context, counts as an unexpected answer to the academic question? Potter and 
Wetherell go on to describe an expected answer as `an answer related closely to 
the possibilities raised in the question' (p. 84). By asking the question `would you 
consider yourself an academic? ' Steven makes an assumption that Will will either 
consider himself an academic or that they he will not. The question seems to 
be 
designed in order to prefer yes or no type responses. Respondents are not 
being 
asked to specify `how much' or to what degree' they consider themselves to 
be 
academics, for example, which would have allowed them to 
both agree and 
disagree with the question. Rather, as it stands, this particular academic question 
seems to invite agreement or disagreement. 
Will's initial reply, which was categorised as `Yes and No' in the content 
analysis, actually reads as `I spose yes and- 
iwthe here we go YES and no 
yayyyyes and no-' (lines 10 to 11; emphasis 
his own). Will's reply is both long 
and subtly accentuated. He actually repeats 
his `yes and no' answer three times. 
although each rendition is subtly 
different. The first reply is qualified but 
unfinished (`I spose yes and-'); 
by saying `I spose' Will shows caution about 
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giving his answer. Indeed, when he begins to give his answer, he stops and cuts 
himself short, saying `yes and- iwthe here we go. ' Will does not complete his 
initial rendition of the `yes and no' answer, but instead comes in with `iwthe here 
we go. ' The utterance `here we go' is not Will signalling that he is about to 
confidently `go ahead' with his answer. Rather, the utterance is a reflexive action, 
in the sense that Will is casting an evaluative judgement over the answer he is in 
the process of giving. He implies that his `yes and no' answer is typical, 
conventional or predictable. By saying `here we go, ' and by putting emphasis on 
the word `go, ' Will suggests that he is giving an expected answer, and one that is 
`on the fence. ' So, at this moment, Will is reflecting upon his identity claim, and 
this reflection is also itself part of his identity claim. The utterance is therefore 
another subtle example of a reflexivity of the self, similar to that of Fiona's reply, 
in the previous chapter. 
Will's second reply to the academic question is complete, and includes a 
loud and emphatic `yes' ('YES and no'). By emphasising the word `yes' in this 
way, Will might be heard as suggesting that he is replying with `more yes' than 
no. His subsequent repetition, and then revisioning of his answer ('I'm putting 
more no than yes, ' lines 11 to 12), might be doing repair work, which functions to 
counter this interpretation. 
Will's third repetition is said awkwardly and is abruptly cut off at the end 
('yayyyyes and no-'). It is as if, with this third and final repetition of the `yes and 
no' answer, that Will is again displaying the dispreferred nature of his reply. 
Indeed, the abrupt cutting off at the end of `no-' is subsequently followed by Will 
revising or repairing his `yes and no' answer. He comes in with `GENERALLYNO 
I'm putting more no than yes' (lines 11 to 12). By saying 'GENERALLY 
NO' Will 
changes his answer, and signals his general disagreement with the proposition of 
the question. Whereas by saying `yes and no' Will was expressing 
both agreement 
and disagreement with the question, by saying `GENERALLYNO' 
he shows that 
he is coming down more on the `no' than the `yes' side. 
However, by saying 
`generally' no, Will is still implicitly conceding that 
he is saying `partially yes. ' 
Whilst he has not come down from the fence completely, 
he has nevertheless slid 
down into the `no' garden, whilst keeping one of his hands 
in the `yes' garden. It 
can be noted that the answer 
`generally no' has a rhetorical advantage, which is 
similar to the `rhetoric of substance' which 
Kenneth Burke (1969) has described: 
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What handier linguistic resource could a rhetorician want than an ambiguity whereby he 
can say "The state of affairs is substantially such-and-such, " instead of having to say "The 
state of affairs is and/or is not such-and-such"? (p. 52; emphasis in original). 
When he gives the revised version of his answer ('I'm putting more no than yes'), 
Will subtly indicates that he is participating in a social science research interview. 
By saying that he is `putting' more no than yes, Will gives the impression that he 
is filling out a survey questionnaire for Steven. The claim of `putting more no than 
yes' is an observational way of talking, as though Will is observing himself giving 
his answer to the question. However, the claim is itself part of the answer to the 
academic question, and therefore constitutive of Will's construction of self. It is 
an act of self-monitoring which is part of Will's identity construction, and is 
therefore another example of self-reflexivity. 
Will talks as if he is writing his answer down on a Likert (1932/1970) style 
response scale. The imagined questionnaire might pose the question `Would you 
consider yourself an academic? ' and then provide a selection of possible answers, 
ranging from `Yes, completely' to `No, not at all. ' By saying that he is `putting 
more no than yes' Will seems to be indicating his preference for an answer which 
is closer to `No, not at all' than `Yes, completely. ' But, as was the case with his 
`generally no' reply, Will is implicitly conceding that he is putting some `yes. ' He 
is not saying `No, not at all' or `Absolutely not' but rather is keeping open the 
possibility that he might still consider himself an academic. He is putting `more no 
than yes. ' 
By prefacing his reply with markers of dispreference (lines 2 to 8), and 
by 
repeating and revising his initial `yes and no' answer, Will implies that a 
`yes and 
no' answer is a dispreferred kind of answer. In this particular context, a 
dispreferred answer to the academic question is an answer which expresses 
both 
agreement and disagreement, or acceptance and rejection. 
Will gives the 
impression that the preferred form of answer to the academic question 
is one 
which expresses either `yes' or `no' - 
like the answers of Ben, Fiona and Rachel - 
rather than both `yes and no. ' 
The final part of Will's initial answer to the question comes when 
he says `I 
wouldn't tend to position myself as a as an academic' 
(lines 12 to 13). By saying 
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that he `wouldn't tend' to position himself as an academic, Will disclaims an 
academic identity. However, he does not dismiss this identity entirely. While he 
might not `tend' to position himself as an academic now, he might tend' towards 
doing such a thing some time in the future. After all, tendencies have the potential 
to be fleeting, and change over the course of time. Also, to `position' oneself as a 
particular kind of person implies a public dimension. Will could be putting 
himself on show, in a visible sense, by positioning himself as an academic. By 
claiming that he wouldn't tend to position himself as an academic, Will could be 
showing his reluctance to display his academic identity publicly to other people. 
(This also relates to Fiona's comments on the academic `label'). 
In summary, Will gives the impression that the academic question is a 
question for which it is difficult to provide a simple and straightforward answer. 
His dispreference seems to be associated with being able to give an appropriate 
kind of answer, such as one which is straightforwardly `yes' or `no. ' Even though 
Will revises his initial `yes and no' answer to an answer which is generally 'no, ' 
he leaves open the possibility that he might still consider himself an academic (for 
similar conversation analyses of troubled identities, see Widdicombe and 
Wooffitt, 1995, chapter 5). 
The evidence against: ideas and ideals of teaching 
By changing his answer from `yes and no' to `GENERALLYNO I'm putting more 
no than yes' Will changes the order in which he will justify his answer. 
He 
proceeds to justify why he is saying generally no first, before going on to 
justify 
his partial or implicit yes. In this section, we will consider the evidence against 
the 
idea that Will would consider himself an academic. 
Will's argument for not considering himself an academic concerns the 
teaching that he does as part of his job. He says that, within his job now, there 
is `a 
lot of teaching' (lines 14 to 15). By saying that there 
is `a lot' of teaching, Will 
suggests that there is a problem with the amount of teaching 
that he has, rather 
than the level of the teaching. It might be that there is too much teaching 
in his 
job. Furthermore, by choosing the word `teaching' rather than for example 
`lecturing, ' and by putting emphasis on the word 
`teaching, ' Will subtly suggests 
that the level of the teaching is also itself something of a problem. 
Indeed, he goes 
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on to say that `really a lot of it isn't that different from (. ) what I t- went from 
teaching A-Level' (lines 16 to 17), and brings attention explicitly to the level of 
the teaching that he does. Will is suggesting that `a lot' of the `lot of teaching' is 
similar to the teaching he did as an A-Level teacher. Will is suggesting that both 
the amount and the level of the teaching that he does in academia make it difficult 
for him to consider himself as an academic, and therefore that he resembles an A- 
Level teacher, more than he does an academic. 
Will goes on to say that `yes the level is higher th- it's theoretically more 
complex' (lines 17 to 18) and concedes that there may be points of difference 
between his A-Level teaching and his university teaching. After making this 
concession, Will comes in with `but' and says `I spose I had this idea of academia 
(. ) or academe' (lines 18 to 19). By following the concession with 'but' Will 
implies that he is introducing his `idea of academia' as a justification for him not 
considering himself an academic. He is suggesting that his `idea' contradicts the 
concession about the level and theoretical complexity of his university teaching, 
and that it works as evidence against him being an academic (for more on the 
analysis of concessions, see Antaki and Wetherell, 1999). 
By saying that he `had' this idea of academia, Will suggests that he used to 
have this idea in the past, but that he does not necessarily have this idea any more. 
The idea is resigned to his past self; he implies that his present self no longer 
shares this idea. Will continues to use the past tense as he describes the idea he 
once had ('it was (. ) me, ' line 19; for more on tense variation and narrative, see 
Schiffrin, 1981). It is also worth noting at this point the serious way in which 
Will's idea is initially introduced. There is no laughter or sign of irony. The only 
distancing involved is the use of the past tense, and the expression of `I spose. ' By 
saying `I spose I had this idea of academia' Will gives a sense of reluctancy and/or 
caution about introducing his idea. There is another subtle feature of the way in 
which the idea is introduced. Will makes a change from the Latin `academia' to 
the Greek `academe. ' This subtle change of register might be an early indication 
that the `idea' Will had was archaic and/or pretentious in nature. However, there is 
no sign of jokey irony or distancing when he says `academia (. ) or academe, 
' even 
though these terms are themselves archaic. Will speaks as though he is either 
making a repair, or giving the alternative and equivalent category of 'academe. 
' 
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Will begins to explain the idea he had about academia/academe, saying it 
was (. ) me sitting in my office sucking on a pipe even though I don't smoke' (lines 
19 to 20). It is worth thinking about this initial description of the `idea' in some 
detail, because some of the themes it raises are developed throughout the rest of 
this chapter. Will's description begins superficially in the sense that he is painting 
a picture of his appearance as an academic. He was sitting in his office, sucking on 
a pipe. But what is the significance of this pipe smoking? In their paper The PhD 
and the Autonomous Self, ' Johnson, Lee and Green (2000) make the argument 
that such images are essential components of aspiring academics' fantasies about 
academia: 
The `dreaming spires' of the ancient university, the lure of just the name `Oxford', or the 
image of the scholar in `his' library, all represent continuing group fantasies or social 
utopias for the aspiring academic, just as the imagined, longed for, community of scholars 
continues to be a reference point which academics frequently invoke as representing the 
`real university' of `the past'. These fantasies are productive and sustaining of the desire to 
be a certain figure, the independent scholar. The body of the scholar that frequents these 
spaces is often the tweed-coated figure conjured up by Riemer's library full of leather- 
bound tomes (and echoed by many of the women and men who have participated in this and 
our earlier research). Of course, it is a masculine figure, even though women have managed 
throughout the history of the PhD to imagine themselves into these spaces, and hence to 
submit themselves to the pedagogical practices that both rely on and sustain these practices 
(p. 139). 
So the image of Will sucking on a pipe is not a mere narrative detail, giving a 
sense of realism to his idea. It has a deeper, psychological and historical 
significance. For instance, the `pipe' which Will is sucking on works 
metonymically in this context, as a single object standing in for something much 
broader. Like the dreaming spires and the leather-bound tomes, it is part of a 
romantic version of academic history. It represents a mythical version of the 
privileged university of the past. The idea of Will sitting in his office sucking on a 
pipe might therefore be part of a `fantasy' or `social utopia' about 
academia/academe. The image conjures up a particular mood or sensibility, which 
might have once been desirable to this young scholar. 
The image of the pipe 
smoking academic is archaic, and as 
Johnson, Lee and Green suggest, it is also 
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gendered. (Indeed, there are even phallic connotations to be read from the 
description of the pipe smoker, which we shall not go into). 
Will is speaking as a present day scholar, recounting an idea he once had 
about what academia, or academe, would be like. Paradoxically his idea of the 
future is itself an image from the distant past. Will imagines himself as an 
outdated, somewhat stereotypical, academic figure. By thinking of himself as a 
mythical stereotype, Will strikes a necessary distance between himself and the 
figure represented in the idea (on the paradoxes of stereotyping, see Pickering, 
2001). When he says that he was sitting in his office, sucking on a pipe. `even 
though I don't smoke, ' Will gives the impression that he is having trouble 
imagining himself in this way. He is having difficulty putting himself into the 
picture. Indeed, the image comes across as comical, and not to be taken seriously. 
The laughed `hmhmhm' by Steven at this moment (line 21) indicates that he is not 
taking the comment entirely seriously. 
Will's `idea' does not work straightforwardly as an `ideal' because it is not 
implied to be an attainable, or necessarily desirable, idea about 
academia/academe. Will switches between the serious realm and the humorous 
realm during this sequence (Mulkay, 1988). He veers between taking his idea 
seriously, on the one hand, and treating it as something comical, on the other. 
Basically, Will displays an ambivalence about how he is relating to his idea. For 
instance, when he says that he was `with er a little group of three or four students 
that had read lots of articles' (lines 21 to 22) he is giving the impression that he 
is 
being serious. After all, this particular part of the idea is at least feasible. It 
is 
actually possible for a little group of three or four students to have read 
`lots of 
articles, ' even though it might be unlikely. The idea is imaginable, realistic and 
therefore potentially realisable. That is, unlike the idea of a non-smoker sucking 
on a pipe, which is implied to be an undesirable and unattainable 
idea. Will does 
not say that his imaginary students had read `a ridiculous number of articles' 
for 
example. Instead, he implies that they are studious. 
The rhetorical contrast 
between the number of them ('a little group of three or 
four') and the amount of 
articles they have read ('lots of articles') gives the 
impression that they are hard- 
working and eager about their studies. 
However, when Will goes on to say that they were `having this 
kind of ... 
desperately pretentious and precious theoretical 
discussion about something' 
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(lines 22 to 23) he returns to the mode of humour. Steven starts laughing just as 
Will says the words `desperately pretentious and precious' (line 25) and this 
laughter constitutes the humorous and not to be taken seriously character of this 
part of the idea. By describing something or someone as `pretentious' a person can 
be making a criticism. For example, in the previous chapter, Fiona said that `I 
think a lot of people think of academics as quite pretentious as well' (extract 2, 
lines 38 to 39) and thereby identified some of the critical thoughts that people 
have about academics. In the present example, Will is mocking the pretension of 
the theoretical discussion. He is making a jokey criticism of it. Will describes the 
theoretical discussion as `desperately pretentious. ' The word `desperately' is used 
here to intensify the pretention of the discussion. The discussion is so pretentious 
that it is comical and/or ridiculous. Will suggests that the characters are 
intellectually pompous. They are caricatures, acting in an exaggeratedly 
stereotypical way. And, after all, they are imaginary characters. In this sense, their 
pretension is not to be taken entirely seriously. 
Despite critically mocking his own idea, Will also displays a fondness for 
the discussants and their activities. They are unselfconsciously partaking in a 
precious theoretical discussion, blissfully unaware of how desperately pretentious 
they appear. This impression of fondness might be to do with the fact that, by 
making fun of his idea, Will is also making fun of himself. After all, Will is a 
character in this play, and he is also the playwright. He is making a mockery of 
himself for having such a desperately pretentious idea of academia/academe in the 
first place. 
Soon after describing his `idea' about academia/academe, Will begins to 
criticise his actual present day job situation. Thus, his `idea' of the past comes to 
evoke a desirable and attainable `ideal' about what academia/academe should 
be 
like. We can begin to appreciate that this is happening when 
Will says `ERM 
AND you know (. ) I don't do anything like that at all' (lines 
24 to 26; emphasis 
his own). Here, Will is making a serious contrast 
between his past `idea' and what 
he actually does in his university job. He uses a total case 
formulation to stress 
how much his job contrasts with his idea of what once 
happened in the privileged 
universities of the past (Pomerantz, 
1986). Will says that he doesn't do `anything 
like that at all' and pushes the difference 
between his idea of the past and his job 
to its limit. This particular total case 
formulation comes across as a complaint. 
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Will might be complaining about the total lack of resemblance between his job 
and his idea. The implication is that Will's job might have resembled his idea, and 
that he wanted his job to be like his idea, and represent the reality of past 
privilege, at least in some regard. 
Will goes on to concede a similarity between his idea and his job. He says 
`actually II do- most of my teaching is se- third year or second year' (lines 27 to 
28). Here Will uses the word `actually' and makes a concession which works to 
contradict his previous total case formulation. Will is suggesting that third and 
second year undergraduate students - unlike first year undergraduates - might in 
some way resemble the enthusiastic students he imagined in his idea. Will thereby 
shows that the total case formulation of him not doing `anything' like his idea 'at 
all' was brittle, and not necessarily to be taken literally (Edwards, 2000). Sti11, 
Will is continuing to take his `idea' seriously enough to compare it with his actual 
university teaching. 
After making the concession, Will comes in with `BUT' and returns to the 
task of contrasting his idea with his job (line 28). The descriptions of Will's job 
are rhetorical, in the sense that they work to point out how his `idea' of the past 
differs to his actual job. Three rhetorical contrasts are made. Firstly, the number of 
students who attend his seminars is highlighted. Will says that `in a seminar group 
I have twenty students' (line 29). By emphasising the word `twenty' Will marks 
their number out as contrastive to the `little group of three or four students' (lines 
21 to 22) who were present in his idea. Secondly, the number of articles that 
his 
seminar students have read is highlighted. Although there are `twenty' students 
in 
his seminars, which is around five times the `three or four' students 
he had in his 
`idea, ' the number of articles which his seminar students have read 
have not gone 
up proportionally. In fact, Will says that `I have twenty students who might 
have 
read one paper if I'm lucky' (lines 29 to 30). While the students 
in his idea had 
read `lots of articles, ' his seminar students `might' 
have read `one paper' if he's 
`lucky. ' The implication is that it is unlikely that his seminar students will 
have 
read anything at all, and whether they 
have done any reading comes down to a 
matter of chance. The impression of student apathy 
is thereby given (for similar 
examples of this from the student perspective, see 
Benwell and Stokoe. 2002). 
Will's seminar students are implied to 
be disinterested in their work. This 
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contrasts starkly with the enthusiasm of the students in his `idea' who now appear 
somewhat like `ideal' students. 
Thirdly, Will compares what goes on in a seminar to what goes on in a 
classroom. He says that `a seminar isn't really that different to a lesson ... 
in 
school terms' (lines 31 to 32) and thereby minimises the difference between his 
university seminars and school lessons. If university seminars resemble school 
lessons, then Will resembles a school teacher, rather than an academic. Indeed, he 
goes on to say that he has difficulty, from that point of view, seeing himself as an 
academic (lines 32 to 34). By making the first two descriptions of his job, about 
the number of students and their lack of reading, Will constructs the seminar 
situation in such a way as to suggest that he has no choice about how he teaches. 
There are too many students, and they lack the enthusiasm to do their reading, and 
so he has to teach like a school teacher. The focus of criticism in this sequence is 
the number of students and their activities, rather than Will's own ability as a 
teacher. 
The answer to the question of whether Will wants academia/academe to 
resemble his idea seems, ironically, to be `Yes and No. ' Initially, he gives the 
impression that his `idea' is not to be taken seriously. He does this by resigning it 
to his past self, and by mocking and deriding it for being fanciful and/or naive. 
However, Will does not go on to ridicule his idea completely out of hand. When 
he contrasts his idea with his present day job situation, the mood of argument 
changes. The rhetoric of the latter part of this sequence is such that his `idea' has 
to be taken seriously in order for his complaints to work. And as we have seen, his 
`idea' of the past becomes a serious, desirable, and potentially attainable `ideal' of 
what academia/academe should be like. In this sense, we can appreciate that 
Will 
does not present his idea `just for laughs. ' 
The early part of this sequence has the feel of a `laughing about 
it later' 
episode (Billig, 2001). Will is jokingly reflecting upon past expectations, which 
turned out to be naive and misguided. He is making a mockery of 
both his `idea' 
and himself. However, this joking around should not necessarily 
be taken 
innocently. There is the possibility that Will is remembing past hopes which have 
not come to fruition. And, in talking about the past, 
Will might be negotiating the 
vulnerability of a dreamer whose 
dreams have not come true. (Indeed, this would 
explain the reluctance with which 
Will introduced his idea. ) Just as Will is 
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showing a fondness for a particular period of academic history, he is also 
displaying a fondness for who he used to be. He is reminiscing about a past self 
who used to have romantic ideas about what the future would hold. The humour 
and laughter may, in this sense, work to lessen the difficulty of speaking about an 
abandoned past self whose hopes have been dashed. 37 
Johnson, Lee and Green (2000) have rightly argued that `[u]nderstanding 
the role of such fantasies is important in explaining the deep investments in, and 
attachments to, the existing structures and processes of the PhD that prevail in the 
humanities and social sciences today' (p. 136). We can appreciate how Will's idea 
plays a profound and central role in his account of his identity. The particular 
stereotype of the pipe smoking academic is so powerful that a non-smoker can 
find themselves imagining that they are such a figure. However, it is also 
important to acknowledge how such fantasies of academia/academe can play an 
ambivalent role in the imaginations of young scholars. We have seen that Will 
does not want to be the desperately pretentious, pipe smoking academic in any 
straightforward way. He distances himself from this fantasy, while also at the 
same time displaying a fondness for it. He suggests that he both does, and does 
not, want to be the archaic academic figure. And so, whilst Will's idea plays a 
crucial role in his account, this role is a dilemmatic one. It is a pivotal part of his 
construction of an ambivalent, dilemmatic academic identity. 
This ambivalence of desire surrounding ideas of academia/academe may 
well be part of a broader phenomenon. Will presents himself as a critic of the 
present day academic climate. He makes serious criticisms of the lack of reading 
the students in his seminars do, and implies that something has gone wrong 
in the 
present. But his relationship with the past, including his own past, 
in which he 
once held particular ideas, and the mythical academic past, which 
he invokes, is 
ambivalent. Whilst Will is a critic of the present, he seems to 
be ambivalent about 
the past. In a paradoxical sense, Will is reminiscing nostalgically about a past of 
which he was never a part. But it is not so straightforward as 
him looking back on 
an academic past and wishing that the present would resemble 
it. Will is not 
37 The humour may also play an interactional role, 
in the sense that it eases the difficulty of telling 
a trouble to Steven, as the 
interviewer, and of Steven receiving this troubles telling (see Jefferson, 
1984b, 1988). 
159 
arguing for a straightforward return to past traditions and values, because he 
mocks those traditions and values as he introduces them. 38 
The evidence in favour: `of course I'm an academic' 
When Will says `so I have difficulty from that point of view (mmm) seeing myself 
as an academic' (lines 32 to 34) he is drawing a conclusion, based upon what he 
has just said. He is returning to the task of answering the academic question, and 
staying within the remit of that question. The issue is whether Will can `see' 
himself as an academic or not, and not whether he actually `is' one. By making 
this conclusion, Will suggests that his teaching makes it difficult for him to see 
himself as an academic. However, by saying that he has difficulty `from that point 
of view' Will suggests that there might be other `points of view' from which he 
can more easily see himself as an academic. Indeed, he follows his conclusion 
with `having said that' (line 34) which works rhetorically in a similar way to the 
word `but' to introduce a contradictory `point of view. ' Will proceeds to give 
evidence which, he suggests, works in favour of him being an academic. It can be 
noted that none of his reasons `for' being an academic concern students or 
teaching. 
The first evidential warrant that Will provides in favour of him being an 
academic is the claim that `I do (0.8) talk to my colleagues and we bounce ideas 
around' (lines 34 to 35). Talking to colleagues and bouncing ideas around are 
implied to be the kinds of things that academics do. It is interesting that this 
description lacks the desperate pretension and preciousness of Will's former `idea' 
about what academia/academe would be like. His use of the social identity 
category `colleagues' gives the impression of a business-like relationship, and the 
bouncing around of ideas comes across as casual and carefree, unlike the 
pretentious and precious theoretical discussion, which came across as careful, 
in- 
depth and extended. When he describes his actual academic activities, then, 
Will 
does not imply that he and his colleagues are being 
`desperately pretentious and 
precious. ' 
38 The German philosopher and critic Walter Benjamin 
(1970/1999, p. 46) displayed a similar 
`peculiar duality' of wanting to both preserve and 
destroy past traditions (see also Billig. 1996). 
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Will carries on giving evidence which, he argues, works in favour of him 
being an academic. He says `and (. ) you know I have continued to do research and 
I have published things in (. ) yknw peer rate- peer reviewed journals (yeah)' (lines 
35 to 37; emphasis his own). Again, Will is displaying his understanding of what 
qualifies a person to be an academic. As with Rachel in the previous chapter, he is 
suggesting that `research' and `publishing' are straightforward and taken for 
granted signs of academic status. However, Will is initially quite vague about his 
publishing: he says that he has published `things. ' He does not specify precisely 
how many `things' he has published, although it is implied that he has published 
more than once. The word `things' is ambiguous as an index of the number of 
publications which Will has done. On the one hand `things' could mean two, three 
or four publications and as such may work to cover him for not being particularly 
prolific. On the other hand, `things' might be working to display modesty and self- 
effacement. Will might be trying not to boast about his extensive publication 
history in the presence of Steven, a younger doctoral student. 
Just as he is about to say where he has published his `things' Will stumbles. 
First, he hesitates. Then he says `yknw. ' This is then followed by the cut off `peer 
rate-' which is then quickly repaired with `peer reviewed journals. ' Will then 
finally gets a `yeah' confirmation from Steven (see lines 36 to 37). What is the 
significance of the cautious and tentative way in which Will identifies the 
locations of his publications? By specifying that the journals are `peer reviewed' 
Will brings attention to the quality of the publications he has done. Within 
academia/academe, the peer review process is said to guarantee the 
high status of 
the articles that are selected for publication. Peer reviewed journals are the quality, 
esteemed journals of academia/academe. This status aspect may explain some of 
the caution which Will displays. Will implies that he has published 
in more than 
one peer reviewed journal. The unfinished `peer rate-' could 
be a start on `peer 
rated' although one cannot be sure. We might suggest that there 
is a risk that Will 
is understood as boasting about his publishing credentials. 
After all, he does not 
give any sign of irony or distancing when 
he says `peer rate- peer reviewed 
journals. ' 
Will presents his reasons `for' being an academic 
in a much more succinct 
and straightforward manner than 
he did his reasons `against. ' Whereas his 
discussion of his teaching and his `idea' was qualified and 
hedged, the evidence 
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that Will gives in favour of him being an academic has a list-like quality. He talks 
to his colleagues and they bounce ideas around; he has continued to do research: 
has has published things in peer reviewed journals. This is similar to how Ben. in 
the previous chapter, implied that he was a successful researcher, giving the 
impression that his research activities progressed smoothly and straightforwardly 
from one to the other (see chapter six, extract 1, lines 10 to 11). Will's 
straightforward reeling off of evidence that he `is' an academic works in a similar 
way, and contrasts with the earlier extended and qualified discussion of him 
having difficulty seeing himself as an academic. While Will claims that he 
generally would not consider himself an academic, the way in which he provisions 
his answer seems to suggest that he is saying the opposite. 
After mentioning that he has published things in peer reviewed journals. 
Will makes a conclusion. He says `so from an objective point of view I spose it 
would be f- (0.6) silly to sorta say well of- you know of co- you know anything 
but of course I'm an a- of course I'm an academic' (lines 37 to 40). Will thereby 
characterises what he has just been saying about bouncing ideas around with his 
colleagues, researching and publishing as an `objective' point of view. This is an 
alternative `point of view' to the earlier `teaching' point of view, from which Will 
was having difficulty seeing himself as an academic (lines 32 to 34). From an 
objective point of view, he supposes, it would be silly to say anything but of 
course I'm an academic. ' 
Earlier on in his answer, Will said that he was putting `more no than yes' in 
reply to the academic question, and thereby gave more argumentative weight to 
the `no' side of his answer than to the `yes. ' However, when he makes 
his 
conclusive remarks, Will aligns the `yes' side of the argument with the 
`objective' 
point of view. The objective `yes' point of view is thereby given more rhetorical 
weight than the subjective `no' point of view. It is also 
interesting that, while Will 
implied that his earlier sentiments about teaching were based upon 
his own 
subjective personal opinion, his research and publications are, 
by contrast, placed 
within the realm of `objective' fact. Publications can 
be quantified and assessed 
for their quality, as in the Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE) for example. and 
this is part of their status as `objective' markers of academic 
identity (for more on 
the rhetoric of fact construction, see 
Potter, 1996). 
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The imagined sentiment `of course I'm an academic' connotes a 
straightforward certainty of being. Of course I'm an academic. Ironically, 
however, the lead up to the making of this sentiment is anything but certain. Will 
makes a total of four false starts on his run up: `I spose it would be f- (0.6) silly to 
sorta say well of- you know of co- you know anything but of course I'm an a- of 
course I'm an academic' (lines 38 to 40), and after then he contradicts the 
conclusion that he has just made, saying `but it's probably not a g- it's not a 
position I feel wholly comfortable with' (lines 40 to 41). Will certainly shows his 
discomfort with the idea of being an academic, both through his false starts, and 
also by discounting the `objective point of view, ' from which he so obviously 
appears as an academic. 
When he says that academic is `not a position I feel wholly comfortable 
with' Will is using his personal feelings to counter the `objective' idea that he is 
an academic. While he might be an academic objectively, this does not mean that 
he feels like an academic, or that he feels comfortable with the position of 
academic. Will disclaims the academic identity by using his own personal, 
subjective feelings on the matter. What is implied, however, is that Will could 
identify himself as an academic, if he really wanted to. It is just that he is not 
wholly comfortable with that position. Basically, his feelings are getting in the 
way. However, the use of the word `probably' (line 40), and the idea that Will is 
not `wholly' comfortable with the position of academic, work to lessen this 
discomfort. Will is again giving the impression that he is not completely 
dismissing this identity for himself. There is still a chance that he might feel 
partially comfortable with the position of academic. 
The snobbery of minor differences 
We have seen that, in his answer to the academic question, Will introduces several 
different evidential warrants, which work either to qualify or disqualify him as an 
academic. These include teaching, researching, and publishing. However, it 
is not 
until around halfway through his answer that Will introduces the 'PhD' 
qualification as a warrant to potentially credential him as an academic. 
He then 
proceeds to discuss the significance of the 
doctorate throughout the remainder of 
his answer. In this section, we will concern ourselves with some of what 
Will has 
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to say about the doctoral qualification, before finally commenting on his general 
situation. 
Will makes the comment that `there is a huuuuge huuuuge snob value in the 
PhD non-PhD thing' (lines 42 to 43; emphasis his own). The nature and logic of 
this `snob value' is an important part of this sequence, so we will begin by 
considering some of the background assumptions of `snobbery. ' The modem 
meaning of the word `snob' can be traced back to the late nineteenth century. to 
the writings of William Makepeace Thackeray. In the introduction to The Book of 
Snobs, Sutherland explains that, 
In his Punch serial, The Snobs of England, Thackeray sorted out that bundle of 
characteristics which make up snobbery as we now use the term: arrogant pride in position, 
pretension to yet higher position, stiff hauteur to inferiors, supple abasement to superiors, 
obtuse fidelity to the vertical placings of the rank system (Thackeray, 1978, p. 3; emphasis 
in original). 
Essentially, to accuse a person of being a `snob' is to insult that person. When 
Will says that there is a `snob value' in the PhD non-PhD thing, he is making a 
criticism of that value, and distancing himself from it. After all, snobbishness is 
`one of those vices which we can discern in everyone else but never in ourselves' 
(Orwell, 1937/1989, p. 145). Furthermore, a `snob' value is not a genuine `value, ' 
because it is only valuable to a snob. Will is therefore putting a question mark 
over the value of this `snob value. ' 
As Thackeray made clear, snobbery exists within the context of a `rank 
system' or social hierarchy, in which people are differentiated from one another, 
based upon their relative positions in society. Social class membership can, for 
example, form the basis of `class snobbery' (see Orwell, 1937/1989, part II). In 
the present case, the very distinction between the PhD and the non-PhD might be 
regarded as snobbish. The social hierarchy of academia, and also of the wider 
society, is such that people are differentiated from one another by their 
qualifications, diplomas and social titles. The potential problem is that such 
practices are essentially anti-democratic. They contravene the spirit of equality 
and egalitarianism which exists within societies imbued with 
democratic values 
(see Billig et al., 1988, chapter 5). The 'PhD non-PhD thing' 
implies a process of 
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social comparison, in which the person with a doctorate is contrasted with the 
person who lacks that qualification. While the 'PhD' is implied to be complete 
and whole, the `non-PhD' is lacking and inadequate. Will suggests that the huge. 
huge snob value is associated with the allegedly high status position of the 'PhD' 
which lies in contrast with the relatively lower status position of the `non-PhD. ' 
By identifying this snob value, then, Will seems to be `battling enlightenedly 
against the irrationality of those who revere status for its own sake' (ibid., p. 72). 
He is suggesting that the `snob value' of the PhD non-PhD thing is wrongheaded, 
and that it should be modified or replaced with some other sort of value system. 39 
By saying that there is a `huuuuge huuuuge snob value' in the PhD non-PhD 
thing, Will implies that the snob value has been blown out of all proportion. By 
repeating the word `huuuuge' and by stressing its vowels, he suggests that the 
PhD non-PhD snob value is enormous, and well beyond the realm of reason. By 
bringing attention to its incredible size, Will is suggesting that the snob value is 
problematic (Pomerantz, 1986). It is so massive that it is a source of trouble. By 
making this claim, Will is also giving a subtle indication of the logic of academic 
snobbery. He is suggesting that academic snobs over-emphasise the importance of 
the difference between the 'PhD' and the `non-PhD. ' While the difference 
between these categories of people is implied to be rather small, and its 
significance therefore relatively minor, the snobs pertain that the difference has a 
huge, huge value. 
There are similarities between this snobbish logic and the `narcissism of 
minor differences' which Sigmund Freud described (1963, p. 51; see also 195 5, p. 
101). He observed that `it is precisely the minor differences in people who are 
otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of strangeness and hostility between 
them' (1957, p. 199). When Will talks about the huge, huge snob value, he is 
suggesting that the snobs go over the top in their valuation of the `minor 
difference' of the PhD non-PhD thing. They amplify small differences, as Freud 
39 William James, in his early essay `The Ph. D. Octopus, ' makes a similar argument. He writes that 
`America is thus as a nation rapidly drifting towards a state of things in which no man of science or 
letters will be accounted respectable unless some kind of 
badge or diploma is stamped upon him, 
and in which bare personality will be a mark of outcast estate. 
It seems to me high time to rouse 
ourselves to consciousness, and to cast a critical eye upon this 
decidedly grotesque tendency' 
(James, 1911, p. 334). 
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said narcissists do. In the remainder of this section, we will investigate the nature 
of this `snobbery of minor differences. ' 
Will says that he is `acuutely aware' of the snob value, and uses the word 
`acuutely' to intensify his degree of awareness (lines 43 to 44). By saying that he 
is `acuutely aware' Will gives the impression that he has had personal experience 
of the snob value. The extremity of this awareness is suggestive of its problematic 
nature. Will implies that he is suffering from his awareness, in a similar way to 
how someone who has an acute physical illness suffers. Will goes on to explain 
his acute awareness, describing the pressure which exists within his department. 
He says `I mean there is some pressure (. ) it's fairly subtle here to be fair but there 
is some pressure that `for God's sake (. ) when are you going to get this kind've 
PHHD that we thought you were gonna have (yeah) pretty muHHch as soon as 
you kind of arrived in ni- January nineteen ninety eight" (lines 44 to 49). Will 
introduces his critical comments by saying that there is `some pressure' but then 
quickly concedes that it is `fairly subtle' in his department, `to be fair. ' He then 
reinstates his initial position, saying `but there is some pressure. ' By saying `to be 
fair' Will gives the impression that he is being fair to his department. It seems as 
though he is praising his department for only having some fairly subtle pressure, 
which is unlike other departments in other universities, where the pressure might 
be rather less subtle. However, a pressure which is `fairly subtle' can still be 
insidious, hard to detect, and therefore difficult to bring out into the open, and 
combat. Will does not say that there is a `small' amount of pressure in his 
department, for example. Ironically, by making the concession that the pressure is 
`fairly subtle, ' Will is claiming that there is pressure in his department, and also 
characterising the precise nature of that pressure (cf. Burke, 1969). 
40 At this 
moment, then, Will is subtly showing an ambivalence towards his department. He 
is both praising and criticising his department. 
Ironically, when Will proceeds to give an example of the pressure in his 
department, it comes across as anything but `fairly subtle. ' The reported speech 
expression `for God's sake' does not come across as a subtle remark. 
If someone 
actually said this to Will in person, it would sound like an extreme and 
demanding 
ao It can be noted that Will's detection of the 
`fairly subtle' pressure attests to his previously 
avowed acute awareness of the snob value. 
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expression of exasperation. However, Will is not suggesting that anyone has 
actually said this to him directly. He is suggesting that this is a hypothetical 
utterance, and merely emblematic of the pressure which exists within his 
department. 
While the sentiment `for God's sake' does not fit Will's prior 
characterisation of the fairly subtle `pressure, ' it does fit in with his description of 
the `snob value. ' The `for God's sake' utterance echoes the extremity of the huge. 
huge snob value. Will is suggesting that these speakers are making a 'mountain 
out of a molehill' in their demands about when he is going to get his PhD. They 
are snobs, blowing something up out of all proportion, without having reasonable 
justification for doing so. 
Will goes on to evaluate these speakers' demanding expectations. saying 
`which is (. )fair enough (yeah) d-d-d'you know what I mean t-to a certain extent' 
(lines 49 to 50). Although he initially presented the prior sequence of direct 
reported speech as merely emblematic of the pressure in his department, by 
evaluating what these people are saying to him, Will suggests that he is taking 
their words seriously. Their comments are implied to be real enough to warrant 
this assessment. Initially, Will suggests that they have a fair point. He says that 
what they are saying is `fair enough. ' Whilst their comments might be somewhat 
bothersome, they are not implied to be entirely unacceptable. For example, the 
prior reference to the month and year of Will's arrival ('January nineteen ninety 
eight, ' lines 48 to 49; this is some three and a half years prior to the interview) is 
difficult to argue with, because the facts of the matter cannot so easily be denied 
(cf. Potter, 1996). However, when Will goes on to say that what they are saying is 
`fair enough ... t-to a certain extent' 
he is rhetorically conceding that, to a large 
extent, what they are saying is not fair enough (see Burke, 1969, p. 52). He 
suggests that he is mostly rejecting what they are saying to him. 
Will displays an ambivalence towards the snobs, and gives the impression 
that he is experiencing `the ideological dilemma of the liberal expert, who 
simultaneously accepts and rejects authority' (Billig et al., 1988, p. 80). 
The word 
`authority' is appropriate in this context, because even though Will presents the 
direct reported speech as merely emblematic of the pressure, 
he nevertheless 
implies that certain people are speaking these words. While 
he does not identify 
the speakers explicitly, he strongly suggests who they might 
be. The first clue is 
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that they are positioned with the plural pronoun 'we. ' The use of the 'eye' suggests 
that this is a group of people, rather than an individual person. Secondly. the group 
is reported as asking Will `when are you going to get this kind've PHHD that we 
thought you were gonna have ... pretty muHHch as soon as you kind of arrived' 
(lines 46 to 48). This expectation is characteristic of employers. They would know 
about Will's situation upon arrival, and would also be concerned about the 
progress (or lack of progress) that he is making on his PhD. 
It appears as though the institutional `powers that be' in Will's department - 
his bosses - are responsible for the demanding words that are spoken. Tragically, 
Will is suggesting that the `snob value' has an institutional backing. The snob 
value is certainly 'huuuuge huuuuge' because it has a powerful institutional 
support. Indeed, the snobbery is massive, because it exists within the hierarchy of 
Will's university department, and possibly throughout the university system as a 
whole (something like this is implied between lines 50 and 56). When he makes 
his conclusion, Will says that he supposes he feels `wary' of styling himself as an 
academic, until he has got his thesis, when he will be on the other side of the 
`huge schism' (lines 57 to 58). This wariness might be associated with the 
powerful, judgemental gaze of the snobs. The PhD non-PhD snobs might criticise 
or look down upon any premature and/or presumptious academic styling on the 
part of Will. The snobs are in power in this department, and Will is suffering from 
his employers' snobbish ways, because of his status as a non-PhD. 
Concluding remarks 
In The Book of Snobs, Thackeray (1978) casually remarked that `I should 
like to 
fill several volumes with accounts of various University Snobs; so 
fond are my 
reminiscences of them, and so numerous are they' (p. 
60). Although Thackeray 
was writing about University Snobs some one hundred years ago, we can 
appreciate how his comments are still pertinent today. 
University Snobs remain 
numerous. However, while Thackeray's reminiscences of 
University Snobs might 
have been fond, we have learnt from Will's account that experiencing 
University 
Snobbery can be a decidedly unpleasant experience. 
A `hidden hand of power' can 
be detected in Will's identity project. While his employers are not named as such, 
they are still implicitly identified as exerting 
`pressure' upon him to complete his 
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thesis. Will's identity work as an academic, or as a non-academic, is therefore 
implied to be part of a broader University College departmental framework, in 
which there are social hierarchies, differences in power, and ideological values. In 
the next chapter, we will explore in more detail the subtle, and not so subtle, 
dynamics of power and ideology in contemporary doctoral postgraduate life. 
I discovered during the course of Will's interview that, as part of his 
doctoral thesis, he was using a theoretical concept originally developed by Karl 
Marx. This concept carried with it critical overtones, and embodied a critique of 
the organisation of society. As he wrote his thesis, Will used this concept, and 
made criticisms about the organisation of contemporary society. In the 
background of these criticisms, however, were actual social divisions and 
hierarchies, which functioned both to enable and constrain Will's own intellectual 
life. In a paradoxical sense, Will was making his criticisms of society within that 
same society, and working within particular social conditions, which he was also 
critical of. I think that Marx expressed the dilemma succinctly when he proposed 
that: 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it 
under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs 
like a 
nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing 
themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely 
in such 
periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their 
service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes 
in order to present the new 
scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this 
borrowed language (Marx, 
1852/1950, p. 225). 
169 
Chapter Eight - Power Dynamics of Doctoral Research 
In this final discourse analytic chapter of the thesis, the analysis turns to some of 
the power dynamics involved in the process of doing a PhD in the social sciences. 
It was pointed out in chapter 2 that studies of the doctoral research process often 
ignore or skate over the role that power and ideology can play in the doing of a 
doctorate. When researchers do acknowledge the role of power, they often fail to 
look in detail at its actual workings. In this sense, the academic study of doctoral 
research often seems to work in the interests of power. The neglect makes it more 
difficult to identify and challenge the structures of power inherent in the PhD 
process. The present chapter aims to contribute to empirical discourse studies of 
the power relations between teachers and their students (e. g. Benwell and Stokoe, 
2002; Edwards and Mercer, 1987; Hepburn, 2000). By bringing attention to and 
analysing some of the power relations between doctoral students and their 
supervisors, the thesis both resists and reproduces the power dynamics involved in 
doing a doctorate. 
The general argument of this chapter is that when liberal power is working 
successfully, it is mostly hidden, and therefore difficult to detect and bring out into 
the open. The first section concerns the liberal ideology of doctoral supervision, 
and shows how this ideology can work to hide the operation of power. It is 
suggested that a detailed discursive analysis of student-supervisor relations has the 
potential to bring out into the open the machinations of hidden liberal power. The 
second section concerns different forms of power which can influence a student as 
they do their doctorate. While the doctoral student in question denies that his 
supervisor has `pushed' him towards publishing in a particular journal, he 
nevertheless acknowledges that there are wider forces which can `push' one 
towards publishing. In this sense, it is suggested that there is more to doctoral 
power than the interpersonal aspect between students and their supervisors. The 
third section concerns claims about the obvious or blatant exertion of supervisory 
power, and appears to result in the doctoral student in question 
becoming 
disillusioned with academic life. We will find that when the supervisory 
relationship breaks down, the workings of power often 
become clearer. and the 
role of ideology can be appreciated more explicitly. 
It therefore follows that, as 
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power becomes more obvious and blatant, the need for detailed discursive analysis 
lessens. 
It is important to point out that the argument of this chapter is not that 
supervisors `have power' over their doctoral students in any straightforward sense. 
Although supervisors may attempt to control their students, this `top down' 
exertion of power is not the main focus of interest. Instead, power is understood as 
something which works between people, from the `bottom up' so to speak. ' Thus, 
power is understood broadly in the sense given to it by Michel Foucault (1991; see 
also Hepburn, 2003). The supervisory relationship is understood as a largely 
consensual power relationship, which doctoral students both participate in, and 
resist. Furthermore, this relationship is backgrounded by much wider ideological 
patterns, as we shall begin to appreciate as the analysis progresses. 
(i) Hidden Power 
In the previous chapter, Will spoke of the `fairly subtle' pressures in his 
department for him to get his PhD finished, and implicitly suggested that a hidden 
hand of power affected him in his life as a doctoral student and young lecturer. 
While the figures who held this power were not explicitly named, they 
nevertheless seemed to play an important role in his identity work. The present 
section picks up on some of the `hidden' or `subtle' power dynamics in doctoral 
work by focusing upon the relationship between a doctoral student and her 
supervisor. The extract to be analysed is taken from an interview with `Hanako. 
' 
Hanako is a Japanese mature student of psychology in the final year of 
her 
doctoral study. In the sequence presented, Hanako tells a story about attempting to 
publish a book chapter with her supervisor, `Pete. ' The extract 
begins with Steven 
asking Hanako a question about publishing. Through the analysis of 
the story that 
Hanako tells, wider stories can be told about doctoral research, along with 
the role 
of power and ideology within contemporary 
higher education. 
41 `[P]ower, whether it be `in' or `behind' 
discourse, is never definitively held by any one person, 
or social grouping, because power can 
be won and exercised only in and through social struggles 
in which it may also be lost' 
(Fairclough, 2001, p. 36). 
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Extract 1 
1 Steven 
2 
3 Hanako 
4 Steven 
5 Hanako 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 Steven 
13 
14 Hanako 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
have you published anything from the thesis? 
(0.7) 
mmmmmmm no- not yet 
right 
I've written some (. ) draft chapter (. ) (mm) of erm (0.6) a book 
chapter that my supervisor and I decided to do (mm) but (. ) ahh 
(. ) draft came back with comments (. ) and we need to woHHrk 
on (. ) a lot of things (a- riHHght) so (. ) I decided to focus on my 
thesis first (. ) (yes) and then (. ) after (1.0) the (0.7) thesis then 
(0.6) I can (0.7) take the chapter (. ) and then in- (1.5) (mm) ahm 
made into a (0.6) journal aHHrticle hopefully 
right (0.9) how did that draft (. ) chapter come about? 
(0.6) 
mmmmm (2.4) the draft chapter (0.7) of the book (. ) 
(mmm) (0.8) aahhm (2.5) I (. ) I did it (1.0) with the momentum 
of the conference (. ) I did in Australia this this past summer (. ) 
(right) and er as a way of finishing the conference (. ) (mm) paper 
(mm) (0.9) and also I was planning to do that- (. ) ahh (. ) do a 
chapter (. ) based on the conference paper so (m) it wa- a- e- 
(0.6) for me it's always (1.0) related (. ) like I use something (. ) 
that I did (. ) as a small project (yes) and then (. ) 
making it bigger and deeper (. ) in terms of (ye-) analysis (yes) 
is always (. ) practical way of getting myself motivated (. ) (yeah) 
and seeing the realistic (. ) goal (. ) (yeah) so (0.6) from that (0.6) 
conference paper chapter ((smiley voice)) (mm) and then (. ) 
Pete suggested that it- we should do a book chapter on 
somebody's ahm edit- edited (. ) book (yes) so I just use (. ) the 
Australia paperHH (uhuhm yHHeah) and get some more (0.6) 
ahm (mm) (0.9) ahm (0.8) adjustment (mm) to the orientation 
to the book (right) (. ) and Pete put some touch ups (. ) ahm to 
make it (. ) work (mm) and he said `okayt- you don't have to 
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32 do much just do this and this and this' and then I did what he 
33 suggested to do ((smiley voice)) (yes) and he just submitted it 
34 and then we received commen- a lot of comments (. ) ahh saying 
35 (1.0) basically I feel hhhuh they didn't understand this (. ) 
36 (. ) cognitive (. ) perspective (right) (. ) the kind of analytical take 
37 (. ) (yes) that (0.6) we had 
38 (0.6) 
39 Steven so you submitted it twice then (. ) is that right? 
40 (. ) 
41 Hanako ahm (1.4) I- we submitted it once and then we received the 
42 comments (oh) yah (I see) 
In discursive psychology, if a story is told within the context of an interview, then 
it is important to acknowledge this social context by transcribing and analysing 
what the interviewer says, along with what the interviewee says (see, for example. 
Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995). To understand what Hanako is doing when she 
tells the first story about the draft chapter (line 5 onwards), we need to look back 
to see what happened in the preceding lines. By asking the question `have you 
published anything from the thesis? ' (line 1), Steven establishes a subtle frame of 
accountability. He implies that Hanako might have, or should have, published 
something from her thesis. When Hanako answers with `mmmmmmm no- not yet' 
(line 3), she shows her awareness of this accountability. While she might not have 
published anything from her thesis `yet, ' she implies that she expects to publish 
from it in the future. It is only after giving this reply that Hanako then proceeds to 
tell the first story of the draft book chapter (lines 5 to 11). As Richard Buttny 
(1993) points out, speakers often use narratives to `re-present past events in such a 
way to defend their conduct' (p. 18). By telling her story, Hanako defends or 
justifies her `no- not yet' reply to the question. She implies that she has good 
reasons for not yet having published, and that these reasons will be evident, 
based 
upon the story she tells. 
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Dilemmas of doctoral publishing 
The literature on doctoral study gives some indication that publishing at doctoral 
level is by no means straightforward. Doctoral postgraduates are expected to 
publish to show that they are being productive researchers and that they can secure 
academic jobs. However, the concern expressed in the United Kingdom about the 
falling submission rates of social science doctorates has meant that doctoral 
postgraduates are expected to complete and submit their theses as quickly as 
possible. The tension between completing the thesis and working on publications 
is not in itself ideological, but it becomes ideological within the context of the 
supervisory relationship, for it directly relates to issues of power, and to the 
demands of the wider institutional and economic context. As we found in the 
review of the sociological literature in chapter 2, the role of the doctoral 
postgraduate is ambivalent, being composed of the contradictory demands of 
autonomy and dependency (e. g. Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 2000). Hanako 
strikes a balance between her autonomy and dependency with regards her 
supervisor by placing a rhetorical limit on her publishing activities. For example, 
she describes her attempt at publishing in such a way as to imply that it did not 
involve that much work. When asked how the draft chapter came about, she says 
that she did it as a way of finishing the conference paper (lines 15 to 17). By 
saying this, Hanako implies that the conference paper was nearly finished already, 
and therefore that most of the work on the draft chapter had been done previously. 
Similarly, when she says that the draft was the Australia paper, with adjustments 
to fit the orientation of the book (lines 28 to 30), she is implying that the 
publication involved minimal work. 
When Hanako says that she was planning to do a thesis chapter, based on the 
conference paper (lines 18 to 19), she is again justifying doing the publication. 
This description of a plan is what discursive psychologists have called a `stake 
inoculation' because Hanako is protecting herself against the possible accusation 
that the book chapter was topically unrelated to her thesis, and therefore a 
diversion from her doctoral work (Edwards and Potter, 1992). While Hanako 
implies that this attempted publication did not involve that much work, she also 
implies that it might have involved a lot of work, had it been pursued any 
further. 
For example, she says that the draft 
book chapter came back from the editors with 
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comments, and that her supervisor and herself need to work on `a lot of things' 
(line 8). The description `a lot of things' is rhetorical in the sense that it is used to 
justify why the publication was abandoned. After all, to work on `a lot of things' 
might involve a lot of work: possibly too much work for a thesis publication 
during the period of doctoral study. 
Hanako identifies her thesis as the reason for the publication being 
abandoned. She says that she decided to focus on her thesis first, and that after the 
thesis she hopes to take the chapter and make it into a journal article (lines 8 to 
11). By saying that she decided to focus on her thesis first (lines 8 to 9), Hanako 
gives priority to her thesis, and thereby presents herself as a dependent thesis 
student. However, there is also the subtle implication that publishing in the future 
is expected. This is implied by her addition of the word `first. ' While she presents 
herself as dependent by claiming to focus on her thesis, Hanako does not dismiss 
future publishing and the corresponding identity of the independent research 
academic completely. 
Dilemmas of credit and positioning 
The doctoral student's pushing and pulling alternation between autonomy and 
dependency with regard to the supervisor can be appreciated more explicitly when 
Hanako describes the work that went into the draft book chapter. This is because 
she negotiates a balance between crediting herself and crediting her supervisor for 
the work done on the chapter. Van Langenhove and Harre (1999) point out that 
conversations `have story lines and the positions people take in a conversation will 
be linked to these story lines' (p. 17) and go on to claim that `whenever there are 
story lines, there are positionings' (p. 30). But what is positioning? `Positioning ... 
is the discursive process whereby people are located in conversations as 
observably and subjectively coherent participants in jointly produced story lines' 
(Davies and Harre, 1999, p. 37). 
In the present extract, there are variations in the positionings that are made in 
the story of the book chapter. At the beginning of the extract, Hanako says that she 
and her supervisor decided to do the book chapter (lines 
5 to 6). However. when 
she is asked how the book chapter came about 
(line 12). she says that she did it 
with the momentum of the conference she 
did in Australia during the previous 
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summer (lines 15 to 16). It could be suggested that variation in this story is to be 
expected, because any coauthorship is going to involve an element of negotiation 
(Fox and Faver, 1982). However, collaborative publications of doctoral 
postgraduates and their supervisors are ideological because the negotiation itself is 
not egalitarian (see Heffner, 1979). The variation in this particular story is 
therefore argued to reflect the contrary themes of ideology (Billig et al., 1988). 
The ideological tension between autonomy and dependency in the 
supervisory relationship unfolds in a subtle manner as soon as the sequence 
begins. Derek Edwards (1997) argues that where to start a story is `a major. and 
rhetorically potent, way of managing causality and accountability' (p. 277). By 
starting the story by saying `I've written some (. ) draft chapter ... of a 
book 
chapter' (lines 5 to 6), Hanako prioritises her own agency and takes sole credit for 
the writing of the chapter. Hanako's appearance as a singularity is 'achieved 
grammatically through the use of the first person singular' (van Langenhove and 
Harre, 1999, p. 24). At this moment, Hanako is presenting herself as an 
independent researcher or scholar. However, by going on to say that it was a book 
chapter that `my supervisor and I decided to do' (line 6), she gives the impression 
that the decision to do the book chapter was made jointly. The contradiction is that 
while the decision to write the book chapter might have been made mutually. 
Hanako is also claiming to have written the draft chapter all by herself. 
Hanako goes on to say that the book chapter came back with comments and 
that `we' need to work on a lot of things (lines 6 to 8). In Hanako's use of the 
plural pronoun, `other persons are brought into an obligation pattern and the 
responsibility of the speaker is accordingly reduced' (Mühlhäusler and 
Harre, 
1990, p. 178). While she initially takes credit for the writing of the 
draft chapter, 
Hanako goes on to bring her supervisor into an obligation pattern 
for the 
subsequent work that needs to be done on the draft. However, 
Hanako goes on to 
say that she decided to focus on her thesis first, and that after the 
thesis she hopes 
to take the chapter and make it into a journal article (lines 
8 to 11). She thereby 
imagines herself making the chapter into a journal article independently of 
her 
supervisor. 
When Steven asks the question `how did that draft (. ) chapter come aboutT 
(line 12), he uses a formulation that does not ascribe agency to 
the action of how 
the draft chapter came about. The agency 
for the production of the draft chapter is 
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obscured through this agentless formulation. This formulation allows him to 
`avoid endorsing a particular story about responsibility' (Potter, 1996, p. 182). 
Steven therefore leaves the question of agency for the production of the draft 
chapter to Hanako (on the ideological implications of agentless formulations. see 
Fowler et al., 1979). When Hanako says `I (. ) I did it (1.0) with the momentum of 
the conference (. ) I did in Australia this this past summer' (lines 15 to 16; 
emphasis her own), she brings attention to, and emphasises, that she was the one 
who did the draft chapter. She presents the chapter as something she did by 
herself. In fact, she does not even mention her supervisor until much later (line 
26). This sequential ordering of the story has a rhetorical effect in the sense that 
Hanako is prioritising her own part in the draft and minimizing the part played by 
her supervisor. A `we did it' form of accounting, which might have been expected 
based on what Hanako said earlier about the joint decision to do the book chapter 
(line 6), is absent from this telling. 
By giving the impression that she has done most of the work on the chapter. 
Hanako presents herself as independent of her supervisor, and as someone who is 
working autonomously. However, this semblance of autonomy is contradicted 
when Hanako introduces `Pete' into the story line (line 26). Earlier on in the 
extract, when she used the institutional identity category `supervisor' (line 6), 
Hanako gave the impression that this relationship was not a relationship of equals. 
By positioning her supervisor, Hanako implicitly positioned herself as a student, 
as someone who is supervised. After all, `when somebody positions somebody 
else, that always implies a position of the person him/herself 
(van Langenhove 
and Harre, 1999, p. 22). When she comes to tell the story again, 
however, Hanako 
uses the shortened first name of her supervisor ('Pete' rather than 
`Peter') to 
position him in the story line (line 26). By saying `Pete' 
Hanako implies that she 
is on equal terms with her supervisor. Hanako gives the 
impression that she and 
her supervisor are friends or colleagues, rather than student and supervisor. 
The utterance `Pete suggested that it- we should 
do a book chapter on 
somebody's ahm edit- edited (. ) book' (lines 
26 to 27) comes across as a proposal 
for an egalitarian collaboration between equals. 
This is because Pete is reported as 
using the pronoun `we' which implies that the authorship of 
the book chapter will 
be a mutual, collaborative affair. 
However, within this context of the supervisory 
relationship, a `suggestion' 
like the one attributed to Pete is rarely a mere 
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suggestion. Rather, such a suggestion can work as a piece of advice, a 
recommendation, or even a command (Li, 2000). Pete's suggestion that 'eve' 
should do a book chapter should therefore not be taken at face value. The 
ambivalent or dilemmatic character of the proposed coauthorship becomes 
apparent when Hanako goes on to say `so I just use (. ) the Australia paperHH' 
(lines 27 to 28) and when she uses the first person pronoun 'I' to position herself 
as personally using the Australia paper. Hanako does not suggest that 'we' used 
the Australia paper, as might have been expected, based on what Pete is claimed 
to have said to her previously. As Hanako said that she did the conference herself 
(line 16), the Australia paper is implied to consist of her own work. Also. by using 
the word `just, ' Hanako implies that her use of the Australia paper was simple or 
straightforward. She mitigates the possibility that the book chapter involved a lot 
of difficult and time-consuming work. 
Hanako proceeds to say that `Pete put some touch ups (. ) ahm to make it (. ) 
work' (lines 30 to 31). What Pete is described as doing is implied to be minimal, 
both in terms of the amount of work he did (`some'), and the type of his 
contribution ('touch ups'). Hanako gives the impression that what Pete did was 
superfluous, for `touch ups' might connote superficial changes to the document, 
such as changes in spelling and grammar, for example. Also, the amount of touch 
ups (`some') implies a couple or a few (i. e., not that many). In this sense. the 
claim that `Pete put some touch ups' is a risky one. Hanako might be understood 
as undermining her supervisor's work, or as criticising him for not doing enough 
work. However, by carefully adding `ahm to make it (. ) work' Hanako implicitly 
praises Pete. She gives him the ability to make the paper work merely by making 
`some touch ups. ' Hanako implies that the paper did not work as it was, and that it 
might not have worked, had it not been for Pete's supervisory 'touch ups. ' Pete is 
thereby given expertise and authority as a supervisor, and Hanako implicitly 
presents herself as being dependent on his textual `touch ups. ' 
In summary, Hanako strikes a balance between presenting Pete's work as 
minimal and superficial on the one hand, and as essential and vital on the other. 
By bringing attention to his expertise and authority, Hanako is positioning 
herself 
as a student, someone who is dependent on her supervisor. 
However, as the role of 
the doctoral student is ambivalent, this presentation of dependency cannot 
be left 
unchecked. By minimising both the amount and the significance of 
her 
178 
supervisor's contributions, Hanako lessens the apparent hold that her supervisor 
has over her, and over her work, and thereby presents herself as somewhat more 
independent. 
Natural divisions of labour 
In Ideology Terry Eagleton (1991) brings attention to how ideology can 
`naturalise' forms of social life. `Successful ideologies are often thought to render 
their beliefs natural and self-evident - to identify them with the `common sense' 
of a society that nobody could imagine how they might ever be different' (p. 58). 
The extract under analysis can be understood as a general example of the 
naturalisation of the ideology of supervision, because at no point is the 
supervisory relationship ever questioned or criticised. It is never implied that 
supervision is a partial and/or contingent form of relationship. Along with this 
general sense of naturalisation, however, there are specific moments in this 
sequence when the supervisory relationship is being naturalised. One of these 
moments comes after Hanako credits Pete for making the touch ups on the draft 
chapter. She says that `he said `okayt- you don't have to do much just do this and 
this and this" (lines 31 to 32). At this point, Hanako changes her footing and uses 
direct reported speech to articulate what Pete is supposed to have said to her 
(Goffman, 1983, chapter 3). Hanako claims that Pete said `you don't have to do 
much just do this and this and this. ' The `this and this and this' is what 
conversation analysts have called a `triple single' (Jefferson, 1990). Triple singles 
can sometimes be used in conversations to imply `muchness. ' The repetition of the 
same word three times can imply `many things. ' However, the earlier `you don't 
have to do much' and the use of the word `just' both work to contradict this 
meaning of the triple single. The word `just' for example places a rhetorical limit 
on the number of things that are to be done on the draft chapter. Pete's suggestion 
that Hanako has to `just do this and this and this' comes across as a suggestion 
that is specific in its scope. Hanako is not criticising Pete for being a slave driver 
who orders her to do a great deal of work. She is only being told to do three 
specific things on the paper. 
The implied specificity of this suggestion constructs Pete as someone who 
can make appropriate suggestions about what needs to 
be done. By going on to 
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say that the draft chapter was then submitted (line 33), Hanako implies that the 
`touch ups' and the suggested `this and this and this' were enough to complete the 
draft chapter sufficiently for submittal. Thus, Hanako again constitutes her 
supervisor's expertise and her own dependence on that expertise. Reliance on 
expertise, however, often comes at a price (Billig at al., 1988, chapter 5). After all, 
Hanako did not report Pete's saying that `he' doesn't have to do much, or even 
that `we' don't have to do much. His actual reported speech - `you don't have to 
do much' (emphasis added) - gives the impression that it is obvious that Hanako 
is to do the work on the draft chapter. The inequality of this coauthorship, and of 
the supervisory relationship itself, is therefore presented as something self-evident 
and natural. After reporting Pete's suggestion, Hanako goes on to say 'and then I 
did what he suggested to do' (lines 32 to 33). 
The dilemmatic submittal 
Hanako says that Pete `just submitted' the draft to the editors (line 33). Here, she 
is referring to the physical act of submitting, and attributing this act to Pete. When 
Hanako makes this attribution, she is again negotiating the themes of autonomy 
and dependency. By using the word `just' she gives the impression that her 
supervisor's submitting act was simple or straightforward. Pete is said to have 
`just' posted the chapter off to the editors, for example. By suggesting that Pete's 
act was minimal or marginal, Hanako presents herself as somewhat autonomous 
(or potentially autonomous) from her supervisor. However, this suggestion of 
autonomy is undermined, because the draft chapter would have had no chance of 
being published, had it not been `submitted. ' In a way, the conference paper 
cannot be a proper paper unless it becomes a book chapter, that is, unless it is 
published. At an implicit level, then, Pete's act of submitting comes across as vital 
or necessary, and Hanako's dependence on him therefore becomes apparent. 
When Steven asks Hanako for clarification about the submittal, the 
following exchange takes place. It is at this moment that the doctoral dilemma of 
autonomy and dependency appears to come to a head, albeit 
in a very subtle way. 
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Extract 1 (continued) 
39 Steven so you submitted it twice then (. ) is that right? 
40 (. ) 
41 Hanako ahm (1.4) I- we submitted it once and then we received the 
42 comments (oh) yah (I see) 
Earlier on, Hanako said that Pete submitted the draft chapter to the editors, and 
thereby identified him as the sole submitting agent. However, when Steven asks 
for clarification about the submittal, he does not take into account this earlier 
claim. For example, he does not ask Hanako whether `Pete' submitted it twice. 
Instead, Steven uses the pronoun `you' (line 39), which in this context refers to a 
somewhat ambiguous submitting agent. The agent denoted by `you' could be 
either Hanako, or Hanako and her supervisor. Hanako shows her awareness of this 
ambiguity when she says `I- we' (line 41), and uses the first person singular, but 
then abruptly cuts herself off and repairs with the first person plural. The version 
that is left unrepaired is `we submitted it. ' 
When Hanako said that Pete `just' submitted the draft chapter, she was 
referring to the physical activity of submitting (line 33). There, Pete was credited 
for sending the draft off to the editors. In the later clarification sequence (lines 39 
to 42), however, it is not necessarily the case that the physical act of submitting is 
being invoked. This is because to `submit' a paper can also mean to `author' a 
paper in the sense that several authors can `submit a paper' without them all 
posting it off to the editors together. This double, or ambiguous, meaning of 
`submit' is being played on in this final part of the extract, and it is what allows 
Hanako to say `we submitted it' and leave it unrepaired. 
But what of the `I' who submitted it? The ambiguity of the meaning of 
`submit' means that Hanako, had she said `I submitted it, ' might have given the 
impression that she was the sole author of this draft chapter. By repairing with the 
plural `we, ' she takes partial credit, rather than sole personal credit, for the 
authorship. The use of the pronoun `we' seems to be a more persuasive taking of 
credit and responsibility than the use of `I' (for more on the ideological aspects of 
pronoun use, see Billig, 1995; Maitland and Wilson, 1987). 
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Concluding summary 
The suggestion that Pete is said to have made to Hanako, that `we' should do a 
book chapter, came across as a proposal for an egalitarian collaboration between 
colleagues of equal status. However, this implied equality was contradicted by the 
details of the book chapter narration, in which a taken-for-granted inequality was 
articulated. The publication eventually came across not so much as a collaboration 
between colleagues, but as a decidedly unequal affair. 42 
One of the functions of ideology is to soften or conceal the operation of 
power. Thus, Hanako does not directly talk of power - her supervisor appears as a 
friend, a colleague, or an advisor - but not directly as a figure with power. The 
analysis implicitly points to the possible operation and hiding of power within the 
liberal relations between a doctoral student and her supervisor (for more on 
ideology critique, see Simons and Billig. 1994; Fairclough, 2001). The dilemmas 
identified stretch further than this individual student and her supervisor, however, 
for they are reflections of broader themes relating to the roles of doctoral students 
and their supervisors, the conflicting themes of autonomy and collaboration, and 
the institutional powers of British universities, which are funded directly by 
government. 
(ii) Different Forms of Power 
In the following analysis, we will continue to look at how the themes of autonomy 
and dependency are played out in doctoral student life, but go further than the 
power dynamics which can be said to exist between doctoral students and their 
supervisors. We will consider a case in which the notion of `pushing' is 
introduced in a description of doctoral student publishing. While the doctoral 
student in question denies that his supervisor has `pushed' him into publishing 
his 
thesis work in a particular journal, he nevertheless suggests that 
he has been 
42 For more on the somewhat illusory nature of `equality' within the context of 
liberal educational 
practice, see Edwards and Mercer (1987); Tracy and 
Carjuzäa (1993); Tracy and Muller (1994); 
Tracy (1997). 
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pushed towards publishing in general, but by wider forces which are not explicitly 
named. 
The extract to be analysed is taken from a pilot interview which I did when I 
was less than one month into the first year of my own PhD (October, 2000). The 
interview was with David, who was a third year doctoral student of social 
psychology, and about to submit his thesis. We are sitting in Linford's Restaurant 
at Loughborough University during lunch time, hence the eating (see lines 4 and 
31). I think that this interview extract is interesting for several different reasons. 
not least because we were eating lunch. The first reason is that David and I shared 
the same supervisor, Michael Billig, and therefore knew each other prior to the 
interview. Our acquaintedness results in some rather peculiar interview moments. 
For example, David does not refer to his `supervisor' (line 21) by name until I say 
`Mick' (line 28), after which he himself uses the same shortened first name form 
(line 31). The second interesting feature is that I ask a challenging question quite 
unlike any of the questions we have been looking at previously (see lines 26 to 
28). Whether the asking of this question was a result of my relative inexperience 
as an interviewer, or because I was previously acquainted with David, I cannot be 
sure. Nevertheless, it is interesting to look at what happens when this question 
is 
asked, as well as the various different issues which it raises. 
Extract 2 
1 Steven do you have like a- (1.8) what- what's your view on publishing 
2 at the moment with respect to that work that you're 
doin' now? 
3 (2.0) 
4 David erm (1.9) well- ((eating)) (1.2) hopefully (1.0) 
I'm not really 
5 thinking about publishing at all (. ) at the moment (mmm) 
but 
6 as soon as I've submitted t- by the end of this year 
(. ) (mmm) (. ) 
7 then (. ) I hopefully will be- (. ) publishing (1.4) various 
bits of it 
8 pulli- pulling various bits of it together and publishing 
9 something in (. ) Discourse and Society will 
be the first choice 
10 (. ) 
11 Steven right right 
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12 David 
13 Steven 
14 
15 
16 David 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 Steven 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 David 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
but that's the immediate thing (. ) aaahhm (1.4) yeh 
where has that choice t- (. ) go for Discourse and Society? (. ) 
come from 
(1.3) 
it seems- because my PhD is basically (. ) ahhm (. ) taking a 
discursive approach (. ) to (. ) looking at (. ) ideol- ideology and 
(mmmm mm) aahhm (0.6) current politics (. ) it seems the 
obvious choice cos it's (. ) a critical journal (. ) (mmm) er it's 
interested in s-s-s-s- systematic discourse analysis (. ) 
(yeah yeah) aaaaannnd (. ) aaaahhm my supervisor happens 
to be a co-editor? (mmm ((laughing voice))) ahh (mm) 
you know all those things which push you (. ) (yeeaaah) 
towards it 
(0.6) 
night (0.7) y'use this idea of pushing towards it (. ) is-is- (0.6) 
is that something that you (1.1) welcome that (0.6) that 
opportunity (1.1) say o- offered through Mick? 
((hearably challenging)) 
(0.7) 
erm (1.4) ((eating quickly)) wel- no- (0.7) Mick hasn't pushed 
me towards it that's wrong I mean- (. ) (mmm) what I'm saying 
is that (. ) the basic context is (. ) that it's a sort've very familiar 
(. ) you know it's close it's (. ) (yeah) it's what we're sort've- 
you know we read regularly (. ) (absolutely) it's not like 
pushing towards it it's an obvious choice in that sense (yeah) 
ahhm (1.1) thee (. ) what's being pushed towards is just the 
idea that I have to publish (. ) aannd (mm mm) after all that 
work I should really publish something from the PhD (yeah) 
okay? (yeah) that's what (. ) I mean (. ) (mm) aahhm (. ) the 
journal itself I don't- (0.6) that- that just seems an obvious 
choice the most (. ) (yeah) appropriate stuff because there's 
very similar analysis to what I'm doing (absolutely) like people 
like Salskov-Iversen and Condor recently have do- (. ) which is 
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such a similar approach that- (mmm) you know it's the place 
to do it really (yeah) ahhm (yeah) (1.1) but (1.7) yeah erm 
At the beginning of this extract, we can detect the same tension found in the 
Hanako extract, between publishing during the thesis, or waiting until after the 
thesis is completed to publish. Steven asks David what his view on publishing is 
`at the moment' with respect to the work he is doing `now' (lines 1 to 2). When he 
replies, David says that he is not thinking about publishing `at all at the moment' 
but that `as soon' as he has submitted, he hopes to publish something in the 
journal Discourse & Society. Thus David does not discount publishing entirely. 
but claims to be delaying his publishing until after he has submitted his PhD 
thesis. David's hope to publish something after submitting his thesis is similar to 
Hanako's hope of publishing a journal article after her thesis is finished (extract 1, 
lines 8 to 11). In both cases, the thesis publishing must wait until after the doctoral 
thesis is completed. 
Academic ambition 
As was the case with Hanako, David does not say that he intends to publish an 
article in collaboration with his supervisor in the future. Instead, he gives the 
impression that he will be publishing on his own (see lines 7 to 9). By describing 
his hope to publish in this way, David presents himself as someone who is, or is in 
the process of becoming, an independent academic or researcher. However, David 
subtly mitigates how confident he appears to be with regards his publishing 
intentions. For example, he says that, as soon as he has submitted his thesis by the 
end of the year, he will `hopefully' be publishing various bits of it (lines 6 to 7; 
line 4; see also Hanako in extract 1, line 11). At this moment, David does not 
come across as arrogant about his future publishing intentions. Instead, he retains 
a degree of modesty and caution, appropriate to his position as a doctoral student. 
When he goes on to say that he will be `publishing something in (. ) 
Discourse and Society will be the first choice' (lines 8 to 9), however, David runs 
the risk of sounding too presumptuous or ambitious about his publishing. 
This is 
firstly because he specifically names the location of his hoped for future 
publication: the academic journal Discourse & 
Society (for the editor's opening 
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remarks in the first issue of this journal, see Van Dijk, 1990). The naming of this 
particular journal is significant, because not all journals are equivalently regarded 
within the academic milieu of which they are a part. Different academic journals 
can be inferred as having different levels of status or prestige associated with 
them. Furthermore, in a society saturated with the vales of marketisation, 
academic journals come to differ in terms of the value or worth they are accorded 
within the academic marketplace (see, for example, Harvie, 2000). 43 One of the 
inferences which could be made about David, based upon his expressed hope to 
publish in Discourse & Society, therefore, concerns his academic ambition. Is he 
being too ambitious, relative to his status, in intending to publish in this particular 
journal? Secondly, when David says that Discourse & Society will be the first 
choice' (line 9), he might be suggesting either that this journal is his first choice of 
submittal, or that this will be the first journal he publishes his thesis work in. 
Irrespective of the particular meaning of the expression `first choice, ' the 
suggestion is that in some sense the journal Discourse & Society is a journal worth 
aiming for. It is not David's last choice, his last resort. It will be the first choice. 
Again, the possible danger is that David might be aiming too high in making this 
particular journal his `first choice, ' especially for a doctoral student publishing his 
thesis work independently. 
David does not immediately offer a justification for why Discourse & 
Society will be the first choice. As such, he implies that this state of affairs is 
something straightforward and taken for granted. It is only when Steven picks up 
on what David said about this journal being the first choice, when he asks the 
question `where has that choice t- (. ) go for Discourse and Society? (. ) come from' 
(lines 13 to 14), that David is held accountable for choosing to publish there. 
Steven does not ask David where the choice to publish in general has come from, 
but rather where the choice to go for this particular journal has come from. 
Steven's use of the word `go' in this question might be important for how it 
relates to academic ambition. As was mentioned earlier, it is possible that the 
journal Discourse & Society is a bit out of David's reach; he might be aiming too 
43 Indeed, the name of an academic journal can act like a promotional 
badge. By naming a 
particular journal, one gives that journal publicity, and simultaneously sells 
the journal as one sells 
oneself as a particular kind of academic, even as a 
`critical' academic (Billig. 2000,2003). 
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high in `going' for this particular journal. David responds to Steven's question by- 
justifying his decision to go for his chosen publication, and as he does so, he 
mitigates against the idea that he is over reaching himself. David's justifications 
seem rhetorically designed to work against the idea that he is aiming too high in 
choosing to publish in Discourse & Society. He says that his PhD is taking a 
discursive approach to looking at ideology and current politics, and that *it seems 
the obvious choice' (lines 16 to 19; the word `it' is used here to denote the journal 
in question. ) By saying that this journal `seems' the obvious choice (line 18), 
David is implying that he is making a measured judgement, based upon the facts 
of the situation. David is suggesting that there is a topical correspondence between 
his PhD thesis and the journal. There is a kind of fit between his work and the 
work of the journal (see also lines 40 to 46), which unproblematically leads to his 
choice to publish there. 
Although David identifies the journal Discourse & Society as being `the 
obvious choice, ' he nevertheless goes on to give justificiations for this choice. He 
explains or defends his choice to go for this particular journal by offering three 
justifications, including the `critical' status of the journal, its interest in 
`systematic discourse analysis' and finally that his supervisor happens to be a 'co- 
editor' (lines 19 to 22). It can be noted that David justifies his choice to publish in 
Discourse & Society through recourse to topic, rather than quality. He specifically 
does not say that he thinks his work is good enough to be published in this 
particular journal. 
The third and final part of the list, that David's supervisor happens to be a 
co-editor, is conspicuous for two reasons. Firstly, David and Steven shared the 
same supervisor, so it is interesting that David refers to his `supervisor' in the way 
that he does. Secondly, when David says that his supervisor `happens' to be a co- 
editor, he is suggesting that it is a mere coincidence that his supervisor is a co- 
editor of a journal he is hoping to publish his thesis work in. What is implied is 
that this state of affairs might be a bit too much of a coincidence, and it is this kind 
of possibility which Steven picks up on in his subsequent question (lines 
26 to 29), 
which we will analyse in the following section. 
It is important to point out at this stage that David's claim about his 
supervisor being a co-editor has a humorous quality to it. When 
Steven says 
4 
mmm' in response to what David is saying (line 
22), he does so in a laughing 
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voice, thereby signalling the humorous nature of what is being said. Indeed, 
David's reference to his `supervisor' adds to this humour. Any serious 
interpretations of David's situation, such as him having a better chance of getting 
published in Discourse & Society because of his supervisor, or using his academic 
connections to further his career, are subtly guarded against through this use of 
humour (for more on the serious import of humour, see Emerson, 1969; Emerson. 
1973). 
Proximal and distal powers 
After offering his justifications for why he has chosen to publish in Discourse & 
Society, David finishes his turn by saying `you know all those things which push 
you (. ) (yeeaaah) towards it' (lines 23 to 24). This final sentiment has a normative 
character to it; by saying `you know all those things which push you ... towards 
it' 
(emphasis added), David suggests that this is a general phenomenon which is 
somewhat ordinary and taken for granted. Steven gives an emphatic ' yeeaaah' 
agreement in response to David's comment (line 23). 
What David is saying here comes across as contrary to ambition. There are 
things which `push' one towards it, rather than one desiring to do it oneself. 
Within this context, `it' could refer to David publishing his work in general, or 
publishing in Discourse & Society in particular. Although David does not say that 
he himself is being pushed, he does indirectly suggest that something like this 
might be happening. (This kind of possibility is expressed soon after, when Steven 
asks his question and David responds. ) And although David does not say that 
there is anyone in particular who is doing the pushing, he does suggest that there 
are situational or contextual factors which may push people towards publishing; 
there are `things' which push you (see also lines 37 to 39). It is noteworthy that, at 
this moment (lines 23 to 24), David does not indicate that he is being humorous. 
and nor does Steven show any signs of humour. This seriousness continues when 
Steven comes in and asks his `challenging' question. 
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Extract 2 (continued) 
26 Steven riight (0.7) y'use this idea of pushing towards it (. ) is-is- (0.6) 
27 is that something that you (1.1) welcome that (0.6) that 
28 opportunity (1.1) say o- offered through Mick? 
29 ((hearably challenging)) 
Steven's question is delicately formulated; he pauses several times, and does 
several false starts. He thereby gives the impression that he is negotiating a 
somewhat difficult and sensitive topic. Firstly, Steven brings attention to David's 
use of the `idea of pushing towards it' (emphasis his own) and thereby holds 
David accountable for using this idea. Steven suggests that there is something 
about the use of this idea which needs to be justified or explained. After saying 
this in a relatively straightforward manner, Steven then starts to show some 
difficulty in formulating what he is asking David. Steven asks `is-is- (0.6) is that 
something that you (1.1) welcome that (0.6) that opportunity (1.1) say o- offered 
through Mick? ' (lines 26 to 28; emphasis his own). By asking this question, 
Steven is taking David's mildly humorous comment about his supervisor 
happening to be a co-editor as serious. Steven assumes something like the idea 
that Mick, as a consequence of his position as a co-editor of Discourse & Society, 
has offered David the opportunity to publish his thesis work in that journal, and 
that David has accepted this offer. Steven asks David whether he `welcomes' that 
`opportunity, ' `say o- offered through Mick? ' 
This is a somewhat unfavourable version of events, because it strongly 
suggests that David will not necessarily be publishing in this journal because of 
the standard of his work, but because of his relationship with his supervisor. 
Steven is suggesting that David would be using his academic connections to get 
published, rather than drawing upon his own ability as a scholar. By referring to 
David's supervisor as `Mick' Steven displays a level of familiarity towards his 
supervisor, and thereby personalises the issue. 
David is quick to take issue with what he thinks Steven has assumed in his 
question. He swallows his food quickly and says `wel- no- (0.7) Mick hasn't 
pushed me towards it that's wrong' (lines 31 to 32). David disagrees with the 
assumption which he suggests Steven has made in his question: that 
Mick has 
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pushed him towards publishing in Discourse & Society. He clearly states that this 
is the wrong interpretation, saying `that's wrong. ' David denies that Mick has 
behaved in an authoritative manner, `pushing' him towards publishing in that 
journal, contrary to normative liberal practice. 
What kinds of power are being invoked at this moment in the exchange? In 
his work on distress and psychotherapy, David Smail (2001) outlines the 
difference between what he describes as `proximal powers' and `distal powers. ' 
In fact, of course, our lives are most powerfully controlled by forces that are completely out 
of site. It is in many ways a truism that those things which you `can do nothing about' are 
the ones which tend to affect your life the most profoundly. Our world is structured, then, 
by powers at varying degrees of distance from us. Those closest to us - proximal powers - 
are the most salient, the ones which preoccupy us most, the ones focused on by psychology, 
the most amenable to our personal intervention, and the weakest. Those furthest from us - 
distal powers - are the least salient, the ones we tend to spend least time thinking about, the 
ones focused on by sociology and politics, almost entirely impervious to merely personal 
influence, and the strongest (Smail, 2001, p. 37). 
The pushing and pulling which might go on between doctoral students and their 
supervisors can be understood as the exertion of `proximal powers. ' That is, they 
are the local, immediate and most visible dynamics of power, taking place within 
the interpersonal context of the supervisory relationship. It is something like 
`proximal power' which was invoked in the Hanako analysis, and it is also 
invoked by David when he says that Mick hasn't `pushed' him towards `it. ' In 
both cases, the power in question is the kind that exists interpersonally, between 
supervisor and student. 
David goes on to explain the choice to publish in Discourse & Society, and 
indirectly argues against the idea that Mick has pushed him towards publishing in 
this journal. David suggests that Steven has misinterpreted what he has been 
saying. He clarifies himself, saying `what I'm saying is that (. ) the basic context is 
(. ) that it's a sort've very familiar (. ) you know it's close it's (. ) (yeah) it's what 
we're sort've- you know we read regularly' (lines 32 to 35; emphasis 
his own). 
Here the familiarity, closeness and regular reading of the journal are offered as 
justifications. The final part of the list - the mutual, regular reading of the 
journal 
- is rhetorically contrastive to 
the idea that Mick has told David to read this 
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journal. David is implicitly constructing himself as an interested researcher or 
scholar, rather than as a supervised student. He is therefore suggesting that theirs 
is a relationship of mutuality, rather than of pushing and pulling. 
David continues to argue against what he understands as Steven's 
interpretation of the situation. He says `it's not like pushing towards it it's an 
obvious choice in that sense' (lines 35 to 36; emphasis his own) and again uses the 
idea that publishing in this journal is `an obvious choice' (see also lines 18 to 19: 
the word `it' in this context refers to publishing in Discourse & Society). The 
expression `obvious choice' is interesting for how it uses a notion of 'choice' 
while at the same time restricting the available options to a single journal. It is 
noteworthy that David does not mention any other journals which he might 
publish his work in during the interview. So, although David denies that 
publishing in Discourse & Society is like pushing towards, the notion of ' choice' 
which he employs is somewhat restrictive. 
While David is quick to deny that Mick has pushed him towards publishing 
in Discourse & Society, David does not `push' the notion of pushing completely 
out of his account. When he concedes or clarifies that `what's being pushed 
towards is just the idea that I have to publish' (lines 37 to 38) David retains the 
notion of pushing, but changes what is being pushed towards, along with the 
nature of the pushing itself. Firstly, he suggests that instead of being pushed 
towards publishing in Discourse & Society, he is being pushed towards just the 
idea of having to publish. Secondly, whilst earlier on there were `things' pushing 
you towards it (lines 23 to 24), later there are no `things' doing the pushing. 
David 
makes a grammatical shift from what was earlier the active voice 
(you know all 
those things which push you ... towards 
it, ' lines 23 to 24) to the passive voice 
('what's being pushed towards ... 
' line 37). Basically, it becomes even less clear 
who is being pushed towards, and crucially who or what 
is doing the pushing. 
This kind of pushing seems different to the `proximal powers' 
kind of 
pushing which was identified earlier, and instead seems closer to 
`distal powers. ' 
David does not say that there is anyone or anything pushing 
him towards 
publishing, such as his supervisor for example. Instead, 
it is as if the context of the 
situation is pushing him towards the idea that 
he has to publish. As Smail argues. 
distal powers are the kinds of powers which are 
difficult to identify, often not 
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thought about, and therefore difficult to speak of. The vagueness and lack of 
specificity about who is doing the pushing is suggestive of such 'distal' forces. 
David mitigates the importance of this `distal' pushing and also provides a 
justification for it. He says that what is being pushed towards is 'just the idea' that 
he has to publish. The word `just' works here to depreciate the significance of the 
pushing towards, and functions in a similar sense to the word `only' in the sense 
that any other things which might be being pushed towards are excluded (for more 
on the word `just' see Weltman, 2003; on the rhetoric of the word 'only' see 
Billig, 1999a). David then defends this pushing towards, saying `aannd ... after all 
that work I should really publish something from the PhD' (lines 38 to 3 9: 
emphasis his own). According to this reasonable form of justification, it is the 
amount of work that David has done on his thesis which is compelling him to 
publish. That is, rather than any influence from his supervisor, or any general 
institutional pressures. The justification comes instead from himself, and from all 
the work that he has done. 
While David suggests that he is free to publish in Discourse & Society. he 
also suggests that he is not free to not publish at all. He can choose which 
particular journal to publish in, but he cannot choose not to publish (for more on 
the pressures to publish doctoral work, see Fox, 1983,1984). In this sense, 
David's autonomy is limited, but not only as a result of the supervisory 
relationship. While David denies that his supervisor has pushed him towards 
publishing in Discourse and Society, he concedes that the idea that he has to 
publish is being `pushed towards. ' But by whom or what, and how so, 
is left 
unsaid. 
(iii) Power, Trauma and Becoming Disillusioned 
In this final section of the chapter, we will turn away from those respondents who 
appeared either generally contented with their experience as 
doctoral students, or 
alternatively somewhat ambivalent, and instead look 
briefly at a case in which a 
doctoral student claims to have had `a few problems' with 
her PhD. This is a story 
in which the student in question - `Anna' - claims to 
have come close to leaving 
her course of doctoral study, for reasons which we will explore presently. 
In this 
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section we will consider the phenomena of disillusionment with the doctoral or 
academic experience, and its association with issues of power and trauma. 
I have chosen to write this analysis as a narrative individual case study. 
Whereas in previous sections and chapters I have worked intensively with singular 
extracts, I will instead attempt to `tell the story' of my encounter with Anna. I will 
draw upon Anna's own words, preserving their initial contexts of use as is 
appropriate for discourse analysis, but through a written narrative rather than 
presenting extended transcripts of dialogue. The reasons for this are threefold: 
Firstly, I wanted to condense around sixty minutes of interview material into a 
single short section of analysis. Anna's interview seems to comprise many, if not 
all, of the issues we have been investigating so far in the analytic chapters, and so 
it seems appropriate to give a sense of the encounter as a whole in one final 
descriptive commentary. Secondly, a narrative approach seems to be better at 
articulating the `mood' of an encounter, say, compared with a more technical turn- 
by-turn analysis (see, for example, the shift of register in chapter 7). Thirdly, and 
no doubt more controversially, the necessity for a detailed discursive-ideological 
analysis seems to lessen as the workings of power become more obvious and 
blatant. One of the main aims of an ideology critique is to expose the workings of 
power, and therefore it seems somewhat unnecessary to go into the detail on a 
case in which power is so clearly at issue (although see the recent debate in the 
pages of the journal Discourse and Society: Schegloff, 1997; Wetherell, 1998; 
Schegloff, 1998; Billig, 1999b; Schegloff, 1999a; Billig, 1999c; Schegloff, 
1999b). 
Preparing a poster presentation 
At the time of interview, Anna was a 27 year old doctoral student, studying 
psychology at a new university. Anna was in the second year of 
her doctorate, and 
on the day I visited her, in June 2001, she was in the middle of writing an abstract 
for a poster presentation, which she hoped to present at a conference 
taking place 
in September. Anna told me that she was not entirely sure whether her supervisors 
would be `particularly amenable' to her attending this conference, 
however, 
because she had had `a few problems' with her PhD 
lately. As such, it was -fifty 
fifty' as to whether they were going to 
be supportive of her going or not. and she 
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had `just gotten on and done it really. ' Soon after, Anna said that this issue was 
the `main thing' for her at the moment; for today, it was 'pretty much at the 
forefront' of her mind. The abstract was sent off to them now, she said. and they 
can talk amongst themselves, and decide what they want to do. 
It appeared as though I had met with Anna at a particularly sensitive 
moment. She seemed to be struggling with a live issue relating to her academic 
autonomy, which in turn reflected broader, more troubling issues relating to her 
overall experience as a PhD student. From the beginning of the interview until the 
end, we find Anna attempting to describe and make sense of a variety of different 
`doctoral dilemmas, ' many of which relate to the `crisis of confidence' which she 
said she experienced towards the end of the first year of her PhD. Although Anna 
implies that this crisis has been central to her recent life as a doctoral student, 
there nevertheless appears to be a lack of clarity or coherence about how she 
describes it. As we might expect from a discourse analysis perspective, there is a 
degree of variability in Anna's descriptions of her `crisis. ' Indeed, Anna does not, 
or cannot, seem to articulate precisely what this crisis was about. 
Different versions of the crisis of confidence 
At the beginning of the interview, Anna said that about six months ago she had 'a 
bit of a crisis in terms of the confidence' she had in the methodology she was 
employing for her PhD. While she started off doing qualitative analysis, and 
enjoyed doing the interviews, enjoyed doing the analysis, `there was no agreement 
between me and my supervisors over the themes. ' There was quite a lot of 
discrepancy and `arguments I s'pose' over what she was finding. The lack of 
agreement, discrepancies and arguments between Anna and her supervisors might 
have arisen as a result of her being supervised by more than one person. Anna said 
that she had three supervisors: two supervisors and a Director of Studies. While 
she has to meet with them formally about three times a year, her Director of 
Studies prefers them to meet together all the time, or as much as possible. Anna 
said that it was an `absolute nightmare' trying to get four people (herself and 
her 
supervisors) to agree on anything. She said that she doesn't 
feel comfortable with 
this; she would much prefer to meet with one person, or at the most two other 
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people (on the dilemmas of having more than one doctoral supervisor, see Phillips 
and Pugh, 2000, pp. 116 - 118). 
Anna went on to say that, in the end, she switched emphasis. Well, she had a 
`huge paradigm shift I spose' from doing qualitative work to refocusing the 
emphasis of her PhD onto quantitative methods. She started using vignettes and 
questionnaire surveys, which she is making more progress with, and which her 
supervisors feel more comfortable with. 44 So everything has gotten back on track. 
but it has meant that she is `a little bit behind. ' Or her supervisors 'see' that she's 
behind; Anna doesn't necessarily agree with this. Nevertheless, as a result, they're 
`quite cagy' of her going to conferences and presenting her work, because they 
think that she should be starting to think about writing her thesis up, as she is over 
eighteen months in now. 
Later in the interview, Anna said that she doesn't know whether the `crisis of 
confidence' was mainly with herself, with the supervisors, or with the 
methodology; `but whatever it wasn't working. ' She says that when she had this 
crisis, her Director of Studies `hit the roof. ' She `absolutely hit the roof. ' Anna 
says that they had this one meeting where her Director of Studies was `very angry 
very emotional' and told Anna that if she didn't understand her point of view, 
there was `no way' that she was going to consider being her Director of Studies 
anymore. Basically, if she didn't agree with, or `shut up and listen to what I'm 
saying' then Anna was not going to be doing the PhD. Anna says that part of her 
Director of Studies' rationale for this was that time was passing, and that she 
wasn't going to finish within the three years. Anna says that in her annual report it 
mentions that although she has done `a lot of work, ' she still has an `uphill 
struggle' to face before completion. Anna remarked that this is a `horrible thing' 
to say to someone, especially when you're facing the remainder of your data 
collection, analysis, and writing up. 
as The direction of Anna's `switch' or `huge paradigm shift' from qualitative to quantitative 
research is interesting because it seems to be the reverse of the usual `paradigm shift' experienced 
in social psychology. Often it is the student working within a quantitative paradigm who switches 
to doing qualitative research. Anna, however, says that she enjoyed doing the qualitative work, and 
suggests that the switch was occasioned by the lack of agreement, 
discrepancies and arguments 
between her and her supervisors over what she was finding. While Anna says that 
her supervisors 
feel more comfortable with this new quantitative emphasis, she 
does not say the same of herself. 
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According to Anna's first version of the crisis, which she gives at the start of 
the interview, it is the lack of agreement, discrepancies and arguments over her 
qualitative themes which appear to result in her having a `crisis of confidence. ' 
When she comes to tell her second version of the crisis, later in the interview. 
however, Anna claims not to know what her crisis was about: she says she does 
not know whether the crisis of confidence was with herself, her supervisors, or 
with the methodology, `whatever it wasn't working. ' Indeed, it is unclear from 
what Anna goes on to say about her meeting with her Director of Studies exactly- 
what the issue is. Although there is a concern about Anna not being able to finish 
her PhD in time, the actual nature of the problem or `crisis' is left unsaid. 
It could be that the variability and confusion in Anna's descriptions of her 
crisis is a result not only of the action orientation of talk (Potter and Wetherell, 
1987), and the contrary nature of ideology and common sense (Billig et al., 1988), 
but also because of the `traumatic' nature of Anna's crisis. There is a sense in 
which Anna has experienced `trauma and distress' similar to the kind Alison Lee 
and Carolyn Williams (1999) discuss in their paper `Forged in Fire. ' Lee and 
Williams argue that the process of attaining an academic identity through the 
doing of a doctorate is often characterised by trauma, contradiction and 
ambivalence. One form of doctoral trauma is the `trauma of supervisory 
abandonment' which comes as a result of relinquishing student dependency 
in 
favour of academic autonomy. In the present episode, Anna's trauma is not 
associated with supervisory abandonment, but rather with what she 
describes as 
her `crisis of confidence' and the implied abuse of power on the part of 
her 
Director of Studies. 
The `unknowable' quality of Anna's crisis gives the impression that 
it is 
something traumatic or distressing. Indeed, my interview encounter with 
Anna 
became something of a `therapeutic hour' in the sense that 
it unintentionally 
resembled what Steiner Kvale (2003) has termed 
`psychoanalytically inspired 
academic interview research' (p. 280). As I attempted to 
listen and understand 
what Anna was telling me, and as she described and redescribed 
her problems, so 
she was attempting to reconstruct and make sense of what 
had happened to her. 
By repeatedly revisiting her `crisis' Anna might 
have been attempting to make 
`known' something which was, in a sense, `unknowable. 
' 
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This unknowable quality also relates to the issues of blame and 
accountability. Throughout the interview, Anna attempts to identify the nature and 
cause of her crisis, and makes suggestions about who or what is to blame for what 
has happened to her. Often the responsibility is placed with her Director of 
Studies; towards the end of the interview Anna says that `I think most of the 
problem was with her. ' Rarely does Anna acknowledge the possibility that she 
might have been to blame for her crisis. In this sense, Anna's claim of not 
knowing' may function rhetorically to direct the conversation away from 
acknowledging her own culpability for her crisis of confidence. Further analyses 
would be required to substantiate such psychoanalytic interpretations, however, 
drawing upon a `depth' discursive psychology (see Billig, 1999a). Ultimately, the 
very identification of the `crisis of confidence' is anything but a neutral affair. 
Afterward: dealing with the crisis 
Anna says that between November (2000) and the end of January (2001), she 
didn't do any work. She did nothing. She even packed up her desk at the 
university and told her friends that she was leaving. But instead she decided to 
take Christmas off and see how she felt. In February, Anna said that she `backed 
down. ' She was like `right I don't believe what I'm doin' anymore I want a 
complete change of direction, ' and said that she knew that if she carried on, she 
wouldn't get her PhD. In the end, she came to the decision that she would give it 
`one last shot, ' came back, and has been working `like a bugger' ever since. 
When I asked her whether she was `not too comfortable' about the direction 
her thesis had taken, Anna replied that she was `now' and that she'd `had a bit of a 
reality check' because she was `very very idealistic' when she started her PhD. 
Incredibly idealistic. She said that she had a very idealistic view of academia and 
academics and that this was `completely shattered' in the first year of her PhD. It 
took her a long time to readjust and she says that, now, her approach to her 
research is `much more pragmatic. ' I asked Anna what being more pragmatic 
involves. She said that she expects less from her research, `a lot less. ' She had 
hoped to go on and present at a lot of conferences, be presenting at an 
international conference, and get publications out. She had probably hoped to go 
on and take up a research post after her PhD. But for her she 
has `just had to be 
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very sort've like, economical I spose with my aspirations for the future' especially 
this next year when she has to start writing up, and basically finish her PhD in 
three years. She said that she had taken her emotions out of it, 'it's work it's a 
job. ' Later in the interview, Anna said that her expectations are now `just to 
produce a PhD thesis. ' Whereas before it was more of a `personal piece of work. a 
creative endeavour, ' it's not anymore. 
When I asked her what she thought academia was going to be like. Anna 
said `oh I think I'm a right old socialist. ' She says that she thought it would be a 
lot of people working on research that they loved, that there would be 
collaborative research projects research students could get involved in, and also 
that there would be research seminars. She says that `it was just an overly 
romanticised view' and that when she got `here' she began to realise that this 
wasn't what academia was about. In her university department, people `just seem 
to lock themselves in their rooms' - you're very lucky if you see most people. 
People don't seem to be interested in what she or anyone else is doing. Anna says 
that she was `completely taken aback' by this. When she started her thesis Anna 
says that she was very passionate about pursuing ideas and expressing them freely. 
and that she expected to have three years and `everyday I'd be able to do research 
that I love. ' However, she found that this was not the case; it's very much that 
you're doing what somebody else wants you to do. And if you don't do that, you 
get effectively punished, or brought into line. 
Naturally, when asked whether she considers herself an academic, Anna 
replied with an immediate `no' followed by `absolutely not. ' Nevertheless, she 
went on to say that she loves research, and that she hopes to go on and do some 
kind of research based job. Preferably not in a university, but if it has to be within 
a university environment, she would rather work as a Research Associate or 
Research Assistant. This is because she doesn't want to get involved in `the 
politics. ' She envisages something tied to a pre-defined project because `the more 
responsibility you get the more involved with the politics you get. ' She had 
thought of maybe working for the women's section at the cabinet office; she 
has a 
friend who works there. 
At the very end of her interview, Anna remarked that there is no way' that 
she would want to be a lecturer or submit herself to this kind of an atmosphere 
ever again. 
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Concluding summary 
This analysis has attempted to illustrate the trauma that can occur when the 
doctoral experience almost breaks down, possibly as a result of a superior's abuse 
of power, and through an exposure to a cold departmental or institutional climate. 
These kinds of experiences may result in doctoral postgraduate students becoming 
disillusioned with academic life. But doctoral disenchantment is unlikely to be 
complete and total. After all, Anna was not entirely overtaken by pragmatism. She 
retained her sense of being `a right old socialist' and attested to her `love of 
research, ' as well as maintaining a critical spirit. Thus PhD students may preserve 
their aspirations of the scholarly life further into their futures. It is in this respect. 
however, that the dilemmas do not end here, with doctoral postgraduates 
becoming lecturers, or choosing to abandon the academy altogether. For the old 
dreams and fantasies may stay with them, troubling their relationship with the 
present, as they begin to negotiate the new dilemmas of being autonomous, 
`doctored' individuals. 
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Chapter 9- Conclusion 
At the beginning of the thesis I talked about the kinds of responses that I have 
tended to get from people when I tell them what my PhD is about. One of the best 
replies I've received after telling someone that I'm doing a PhD on the dilemmas 
of doing a PhD is `will it ever end? ' A PhD has the potential to be never-ending in 
the sense that the author may be so affected by the dilemmas of doing a doctorate 
that they do not write, or are unable to finish. Indeed, for some PhD students their 
doctoral dilemmas are all-encompassing and result in them withdrawing, or not 
completing their studies. Little could be more tragic or ironic than a PhD student 
being unable to complete their PhD on the dilemmas of doing a PhD. Thankfully, 
this conclusion chapter signals the end of the present thesis, and indeed the end of 
my present life as a doctoral student. The chapter looks back on the thesis as a 
whole, and considers what has been lost and found in the present work, how the 
findings of the thesis can be applied to itself, and where the study of social science 
doctoral work might go from here. 
The present thesis has sought to offer a critical analysis of the dilemmas of 
doing a doctorate in the social sciences from the perspective of discursive 
psychology, complementing and extending qualitative work in the sociology of 
education on doctoral research and training. It has focused on how doctoral 
identities and experiences are discursively and rhetorically constructed, and how 
they come to be informed by wider ideological values. It has also analysed the 
different forms of power at play in doctoral research, from the subtle to the more 
blatant, through a detailed analysis of how doctoral postgraduates talk about their 
experiences of publishing and their relationships with their supervisors. In general 
terms, the thesis has presented critical, discursive, and reflexive analyses as an 
argument against descriptive, policy oriented, and supervisory forms of writing on 
doctoral education. 
The study has also brought attention to, and in turn problematised, the role 
of the researcher in studies of doctoral education, and the relationship between 
researcher, topic, method, and participants. Whereas most studies of doctoral 
education have been carried out by doctoral supervisors and established academic 
researchers, the present work has been carried out by a doctoral student 
during the 
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course of their doctoral studies. It is in this sense that the thesis has been implicitly 
reflexive throughout, in that its arguments and findings are applicable as much to 
itself and to its author as they are to its object of analysis. A doctorate on doing a 
doctorate is just as susceptible to the dilemmas of doctoral work as any other 
doctorate, as we shall see. In a more explicitly reflexive sense, my own 
methodological and interviewing practices have been subject to analysis, along 
with the practices of my participants. Also some of the literature on doctoral study 
has been analysed for how the experience of doing a doctorate has been 
discursively imagined and negotiated by academic authors. As such, findings have 
not been kept entirely distinct from theory, method, or argument in the present 
work, as it seems that in the present context, any academic writing or practice 
relating to doctoral study can potentially become an object of enquiry or topic of 
study. 
As a whole, and in the spirit of social critique or political intervention, the 
thesis has aimed to study doctoral dilemmas rather than supervisory dilemmas. 
thereby reflecting the interests of students rather than supervisors, and has 
introduced the critical concepts of discourse, ideology, and power to the study of 
these dilemmas, which are mostly absent from previous studies in the field. 
Whereas it is often claimed that reflexivity is politically problematic in social 
research - in part because it is believed to entail a relativism where one 
is unable 
to take a stand or follow through with an argument (the researcher having no 
grounds to stand upon)45 - the present work has shown 
how reflexivity can be part 
of a political critique of research in higher education, a genre of work where 
academics routinely fail to investigate their own conditions of existence 
(cf. 
Ashmore, 1996). 
Central to the analytic chapters of the thesis has been a concern with the 
topic of doctoral postgraduate and academic identities. The aim 
has been to give a 
`snapshot' of contemporary young academic identity work: the ways 
in which 
doctoral postgraduates construct themselves, and are in turn constructed, as 
both 
academics and non-academics. There has been a concern to show 
how the 
' For example, Parker (1992) has claimed that `in order to analyse 
institutions, power and 
ideology, we need to stop the slide into relativism' 
(p. 22). Ashmore (1989), Edwards, Ashmore 
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rhetorical, interactional, and ideological dilemmas of identity work come to be 
played out and negotiated in sequences of conversational interaction. Rather than 
treating identities as pre-given, the analysis has focused upon respondents' 
identity practices as they are displayed in their talk. In particular, the question of 
whether doctoral postgraduates consider themselves to be academics has been of 
interest. Indeed, this concern has been reflected across the analytic chapters. It is 
apparent that none of the interviewed postgraduates considered this question 
straightforward or the answer self-evident. Participants did not uniformally say 
that they felt, thought, or considered themselves to be, or be becoming, academics. 
Instead, they displayed various degrees of consent and resistance and acceptance 
and rejection to the processes of academic identity formation. Their replies varied, 
for example, depending upon the degree to which they were favourably oriented to 
an academic identity and considered it to be desirable, and/or whether they could 
reasonably provide what they believed were appropriate evidential warrants to 
claim an academic status. Generally, when faced with their respective academic 
questions, respondents often implied that doing academic identity work was a 
fraught process. They did this through the difficulty which they sometimes 
displayed when answering their academic questions; their patterns of 
argumentation, justification, and dilemma management; and the ways in which 
their identities were sometimes shown to be implicated in wider ideological 
processes. 
The analyses in chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated how postgraduate academic 
identity work is a rhetorical project, involving processes of argumentation and 
justification, as well as the negotiation of various interactional and self- 
presentational dilemmas. These themes were followed up 
in chapter 7, where the 
analytic focus was both narrowed and widened to encompass the 
local 
interactional contingencies of identity claims, and the wider 
ideological themes 
and dilemmas which can be negotiated in claiming an 
`ambivalent' academic 
identity. The analysis in this chapter has implications 
for work on the `myths' of 
academia and how academics and students relate with their present and past 
lives, 
revealing the ambivalences that are potentially 
involved in doing academic 
and Potter (1995), Gill (1995), and Parker 
(1999) outline the arguments for and against relativism 
and reflexivity in discourse analysis. 
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identity work (Delamont, Parry and Atkinson 1998; Johnson, Lee and Green, 
2000). The chapter also demonstrated how the identity work was found, in this 
instance, to involve the negotiation of contrary themes, relating to ideological 
values and university department hierarchies, in which there were differences of 
power and status. These were not overtly present in the talk, however, but were 
evident subtly and implicitly in the use of pronouns, for example. The analysis 
therefore demonstrated the value of looking at how ideology is reproduced in the 
detail of routine conversational interactions. This interest in the subtle forms of 
power and ideology in doctoral education was taken up in more detail in chapter 8, 
which we will return to below. 
In the present thesis it has not been assumed that postgraduate students speak 
out of their identities as though their identities existed prior to them being invoked 
in spoken interaction. Nor has it been suggested that their identities can be taken 
for granted or assumed prior to analysis. Rather, it has been argued that 
postgraduates speak and are spoken by their identities; they actively construct 
them at the moment of utterance, but at the same time are constrained by what 
identities it is possible for them to claim, and by the contradictory themes of 
ideology and common sense that structure their thinking about themselves. The 
participants in this study were also making their identity claims in the context of 
interviews, in which they were asked questions that prompted them to do identity 
work, and established what was required and expected of them. In the content 
analysis in chapter 5, it was discovered that I as the interviewer displayed 
particular assumptions about the respondents through the kinds of questions 
I 
asked of them, which had consequences for the answers they subsequently gave. 
Through the asking of `academic questions' it was implied that the participants 
were in fact not academics, or that there was a level of 
doubt and uncertainty 
about their actual status. For example, it was implied that some of 
the respondents 
might be `in-between' in their identities and in the process of 
`becoming' 
academics. It was also subtly suggested that an academic 
identity was something 
in need of justification or accounting, and that potentially unfavourable 
inferences 
could be made about a person who claimed an academic 
identity. 
These findings have direct implications for studies of doctoral education 
where the questions that researchers ask their participants 
tend not to be presented 
or analysed along with the answers they give. 
We need to acknowledge how the 
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particular assumptions we make about our participants - as researchers 5 
supervisors, or students - come to feed into our research studies. such that 
participants' accounts become constructed, through a process of argumentation 
with the assumptions that we display about them in our questions and prompts. 
The implication is not necessarily to not ask questions of our participants, moving 
to more `naturalistic' modes of enquiry, but rather to interrogate the questions that 
we do ask, and try to understand how they are understood by our participants. 
What do our participants think they are doing in our studies? How do they display 
these understandings in their talk? And what are the implications for our findings? 
Small shifts in analytic emphases such as these might entail broader changes in 
how we conceptualise ourselves in our research, and our understandings of the 
impact that we have upon the phenomena we study. 
Further reflexive implications arise from observations that were made in the 
thesis about power and ideology. It was highlighted in chapter 2 how reseachers of 
doctoral education rarely investigate the patterns of power at play in doctoral 
study, sometimes acknowledging power, but rarely analysing it in detail. This lack 
of engagement with structures of power was made up for in chapter 8, where the 
subtle and hidden dynamics of power in doctoral education became the focus of 
analysis. It was found that, when liberal power is working successfully. it is often 
hidden and buried within discursive practices in complex and subtle ways. When 
doctoral research is `going well' for example students will often speak of their 
supervisors as though they are `friends' or `colleagues' rather than unequal 
superiors. It was only in the subtle detail of spoken interaction that evidence of 
inequality was revealed, through the analysis of pronoun use, patterns of 
positioning, and accounting practices. Crucially, the ideology of supervision was 
found to soften or conceal the workings of liberal academic power. 
It was only 
when the supervisory relationship `broke down' that the machinations of power 
became more visible. 
These findings about the concealment of academic power can 
be applied just 
as easily to the research literature on doctoral study as they can 
to the phenomena 
of doctoral study itself. This is because in academic studies of 
doctoral education 
there is a tendency for authors to deny, hide, or push aside the 
inequality of the 
supervisory relationship, such that it appears as though power 
is literally not 
present' in liberal academic settings. Hiding of power might especially 
be 
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necessary in the liberal university, where values of democracy and egalitarianism 
exist, against a backcloth of institutional hierarchies and differences of power 
(Billig et al., 1988; Tracy, 1997). There might be a need to disavow power 
structures and ideological values, especially in formal research reports and written 
documents, because they threaten the egalitarian ethos of the liberal academy. 
Given that researchers of doctoral education tend to be supervisors, there is a 
sense in which the `absence' of power in research studies might more accurately 
be an `avoidance' or a `willed forgetting' of the structures of domination that 
perpetuate their superiority over their students (Billig, 1999a). It is not surprising 
from this perspective that researchers of doctoral education tend not to study their 
own power, or the power that is involved in the relationships they are analysing, 
for in so doing they might actually weaken the hold of their supervisory power. In 
making power more visible, it becomes easier to identify and challenge; 
supervisors become `accountable. ' 
For the reasons outlined above, it appears doubly difficult to bring to the 
foreground patterns of inequality in higher education, because the hiding not only 
occurs at the level of the `phenomena, ' but also at the level of the `research' that 
attempts to elucidate the phenomena. Indeed, there might even be a triple hiding 
occurring in the present context, for research which claims to expose power might 
itself be hiding power. In purporting to identify and reveal patterns of power, 
researchers often imply that their own words and the position(s) they occupy are 
without power. But a certain degree of power is necessary if one 
is to point to 
power elsewhere; personal and social resources must be 
drawn upon in order to 
see into power relationships and show how they work. As such, 
in revealing 
power, one can also be concealing it, whether it is one's own power, the 
relationship(s) of power that one is working within, or even the power 
that one is 
hoping to reveal. 
While in the present thesis the workings of academic power 
have been 
revealed, they have also been concealed. In attempting to address 
forms of power 
that previous studies of doctoral education have ignored, the thesis 
has also 
participated in the disguising of that power. Earlier 
in this chapter, it was claimed 
that `the present work has been carried out by a doctoral student 
during the course 
of their doctoral studies' (pp. 200 - 201). 
Similarly, in the introduction to the 
thesis, it was implied that the present PhD on the 
dilemmas of doing a PhD was 
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conducted by an independent postgraduate author, the argument being that 
doctoral research has so far been carried out mostly by supervisors and established 
academics (pp. 2- 3). But I am not the only person responsible for the work that 
has been done in the present thesis. There is another hidden author, who has aided 
and abetted me, but who cannot be fully acknowledged, less the argument of the 
thesis, and indeed the status of the thesis as a thesis, is jeopardised. The person 
with a hidden hand in the present work is my own doctoral supervisor, who has 
been instrumental in the creation and development of the doctoral dilemmas 
project, but who has not been credited as an official author of the thesis. The 
shadowy figure of my supervisor appears alongside other academic authors in the 
written text of the thesis - in references and citations - but never as a co-author. 
His identity is revealed in the previous chapter, but only because the analysis 
called for this identification. What is missing throughout are his supervisory 
contributions - the comments, suggestions, alterations, corrections - which went 
into the construction of the thesis as a whole. Indeed, the processes of my own 
supervision as a doctoral student are completely absent from the surface of this 
text, and only come through in implicit and subtle ways - in patterns of argument, 
theorising, and analysis, and in certain stylistic features of the writing. This is 
despite the fact that supervision was central to the processes of the production of 
the thesis, and myself as a scholar, especially in the early stages of the work. The 
supervisor might have disappeared from the text, then, but not from the practices 
that produced the text. 
It is evident that my supervisor is an `absent presence' or a `buried presence' 
in this written thesis, and the traditions of academic writing work to 
hide his 
scholarly contributions. The metaphor of the supervisor 
being `buried' in the 
doctoral thesis is appropriate in this context for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, as I 
have suggested, there is a sense in which the supervisor's contributions cannot 
be 
fully revealed in the text of the doctorate, else the thesis 
itself runs the risk of 
being comprised. The central fiction of doctoral study 
is that the student is 
working `alone' and is producing autonomously original work, not collaborating 
on a project with a senior academic figure. Any thoroughgoing acknowledgement 
of the co-produced nature of the thesis threatens the autonomous 
originality of the 
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work, and the identity of the independent thesis student (Hockey, 1994). 6 Thus, 
the supervisor needs to be kept `below deck' while the student captain steers the 
good ship `thesis' for all those on land to see. Indeed, in the present context. it is 
essential that the supervisor stays below deck, in order that the argument of the 
`doctoral dilemmas' thesis itself can actually work. For it has been suggested that 
a doctoral student, rather than a doctoral supervisor, needs to carry out a study of 
doctoral education, thereby challenging existing work in the field. 
There is a further reason why the `burial' metaphor is appropriate in the case 
of doctoral thesis preparation and supervision. This is because in a literal sense the 
supervisor has to `disappear' from the student's life in order for the student to 
become a properly autonomous academic. The ultimate goal of doing a doctorate 
is for the student to develop to the point where they can carry out research or 
scholarship on their own. Until then, the supervisor is both an enabling and 
constraining force in the student's life, allowing them enough autonomy to do the 
work that is required to produce a doctoral thesis, but not complete freedom. Thus, 
from a psychoanalytic perspective, there might be a desire on the part of the 
student for the supervisor to be dead and buried, or at least forgotten. The student 
wishes either to be their own supervisor, supervising themselves and other 
students, or what the supervisory figure represents, i. e., the independent academic. 
In preparing their thesis, the individual doctoral student prepares to become 
autonomous. And just as their name appears on the spine of the bound PhD thesis, 
so their supervisors' name does not appear. Thus, as the student is remembered 
and affirmed, so the supervisor is forgotten and disregarded. The student 
lives on 
through their thesis work, but the supervisor disappears, and must disappear 
from 
the work, if it is to be considered the student's own. 
Just as no argument is inherently ideological, so no research approach 
is 
inherently emanicipatory. The workings of power are never completely revealed. 
The present doctorate on doing a doctorate has both concealed and revealed 
the 
hidden hand of supervision and academic power. As such, 
it both resists and 
46 After all, at the front of this thesis is a statement of originality, which 
guarantees that the thesis 
comprises my own work, and the spine and 
front cover include the name Steven Stanley only. 
which suggests that I am the sole author. 
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reproduces the power dynamics and ideological values involved in the doing of a 
doctorate in the social sciences. 
* 
In the introduction it was claimed that the present thesis seeks to contribute 
to knowledge, especially knowledge in the sociology of education. There is a 
sense in which this is wishful thinking, however, for the knowledge that is 
produced in a doctoral thesis will not necessarily go any further than the thesis 
itself. The relationship between a PhD thesis and the wider scholarly community 
is often fractured, in the sense that the networks of distribution are not in place. 
such that a PhD thesis will be read by an academic audience. Doctoral theses are 
not automatically put on sale in academic book shops, advertised in academic 
journals, or placed on-line to be accessed by an electronic readership. Rather, they 
are placed in the libraries of their host institutions, often separated off from other 
academic works. The way they are bound and presented, and indeed the way they 
are written, often makes them unappealing and inaccessible to even the most 
academic of readers. As such, there is a certain amount of deception involved in 
the PhD writing process. While the whole raison d'etre of the doctoral thesis is to 
make an original contribution to knowledge, the actual processes of knowledge 
circulation seem to come to a halt, once the thesis has been submitted and put onto 
a library shelf, ready to collect dust. The successful PhD candidate may go on to 
publish from their thesis, or distribute parts of the project to interested 
friends and 
colleagues, but they are not required to do so. 
In the introduction to this thesis, and indeed in this very conclusion chapter, 
it was suggested that the present thesis is a `doctoral thesis' sitting 
in a library 
waiting to be read by some unsuspecting reader. At the time of writing, 
however, 
this thesis is not a doctoral thesis. It is just a collection of chapters on a computer, 
waiting to be printed out and bound. The workings of academic power are 
required to turn this document into a doctoral thesis, and 
indeed to turn the author 
into a `Doctor of Philosophy. ' And so it is that 
I now turn to the primary audience 
of the thesis, the examiners, who will decide whether or not 
this is, in actual fact. a 
PhD thesis. 
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Appendix A- Participant Biographical Information at the time of Interview 
Name Age Status 
Anna 
Ben 
Bronwyn 
Cathy 
David 
Fiona 
Hanako 
Louise 
Punya 
Rachel 
Samantha 
Sandy 
Steven 
Wendy 
Will 
Yoko 
27 Second year PhD student 
33 Lecturer awaiting viva 
30 Second year PhD student 
24 Second year PhD student 
27 Third year PhD student 
24 Awaiting viva 
40 Final year PhD student 
36 Second year PhD student 
25 Second year PhD student 
36 Final year PhD student 
27 Third year PhD student 
29 Lecturer awaiting viva 
24 Second year PhD student 
25 Final year PhD student 
30 Lecturer writing up thesis 
40 Final year PhD student 
Location 
Department of Psychology 
Department of Psychology 
Department of Psychology 
Department of Psychology 
Department of Social Sciences 
Department of Psychology 
Department of Human Sciences 
Department of Psychology 
Department of Psychology 
School of Sociology and Social Policy 
Theology and Religious Studies 
Department of Psychology 
Department of Social Sciences 
Department of Psychology 
Department of Psychology 
Theory, Culture & Society Centre 
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Appendix B- Letter of Introduction 
  Loiughborough 
University 
13th December 2001 
Dear doctoral student, 
Hello, my name is Steven Stanley. I am a second year Ph. D. student from the 
Department of Social Sciences at Loughborough University. My doctoral thesis, 
which is sponsored by the E. S. R. C., is about the experiences and views of doctoral 
students in psychology, sociology and the social sciences. I would very much 
appreciate your participation in this research project. 
Presently, I am visiting universities in the East Midlands and North West regions 
of the United Kingdom. I have been doing conversational interviews with doctoral 
students to find out about their experiences of doing doctoral research and their 
views on academia more generally. These conversations have been informal, and 
led by the interests of the respondents themselves. On average, the interviews 
have lasted around 45 minutes. Several of my respondents have appreciated being 
given the opportunity to speak in confidence about their lives as doctoral students. 
I will of course be respecting the anonymity of all my participants. 
If you would like to take part, or if you have some questions you would like to ask 
me, then please send me an email. My address is s. stanley@lboro. ac. uk. If you 
would prefer, you could give me a ring at home, on 01509 561 908. 
Thank you for reading this letter, and for taking an interest in my project. 
Yours faithfully, 
Steven Stanley. 
Postgraduate Research Student 
Department of Social Sciences 
Loughborough University 
Loughborough, Leicestershire. 
LEI 1-3 TU. 
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Appendix C- Interview Schedule I 
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Appendix D- Interview Schedule II 
Interview 
(Say a few words about ethics) 
How old are you? 
And how long have you been in academia? 
Have you done any previous degrees? 
How did you find out about this university? 
What department are you in? 
How are you being funded? 
What year are you in? 
What is your PhD about? 
How was your topic chosen? 
Were you constrained in any way, in terms of what you 
could do? 
What are you doing right now? 
How are you finding the writing? 
Do you find that you're able to say what you want to 
say? 
Has your topic changed since you started? 
Did you have any ideas about what a PhD would be like? 
Are you free to do what you like? 
Did you have to take any courses? 
Have you ever published any of your work? 
How did that come about? 
Did you find that you could say what you wanted to 
say? 
Do you think it's important to publish? 
Are you more concerned about publishing now than you 
were before? i. e. first and second years. 
Would you say there is a pressure to publish? 
I often get asked the question 'so what are you going 
to use your PhD for? ' 
Do you have any kind of career plans? 
Do you like academia? 
Would you say you are becoming an academic? 
So do you want to stay in academia? 
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Appendix E- Interview Schedule III 
, jý 
! /ýý`L lilJ' 
I ýý 
Interview 
Anonymity, confidentiality and withdrawal 
-z. 
Beginning 
How long have you been in academia? 
What previous degrees have you done? 
Why are you at The University of 
How did you find out about the doctorate 
opportunity here? 
How are you being funded to do this 
research? 
What is the topic of your thesis? 
How was this topic chosen? 
Middle 
What year are you in? 
What stage are you at at the moment? 
How is it going? 
Has your topic changed in any way? 
Do you have freedom to pursue your own 
ideas? 
Did you have any expectations about what it 
would be like to do a doctorate? 
Have you changed as a person whilst you 
have been doing your doctorate? 
Do you consider yourself an academic? 
End 
Have you published any of your thesis work? 
How did that/those come about? 
Have you started to write up? 
When do you intend to finish? 
What are your plans for the future? 
How old are you? 
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Appendix F- Transcription Notation 
The transcription notation used in this study is a simplified and modified version 
of the system developed by Jefferson (1984a) for conversation analysis. 
Notation Definition 
(0.7) Pauses appear in rounded brackets and are measured in tenths of 
(. ) seconds. Pauses lasting for 0.5 seconds or less are marked with () 
(yes) Minimal acknowledgement tokens by speaker (usually the 
interviewer) during an interlocutor's turn also appear in rounded 
brackets 
((smiley voice)) Commentary appears in double rounded brackets 
a career [at all Overlap is indicated by square brackets 
[oh yeah 
I- we The abrupt cutting off of a word is marked with a 
dash 
twice Speaker emphasis is indicated with italics 
ERM An increased in volume is indicated with capitals 
woHHrk Within-speech or interpolated 
laughter is marked with capital 
aitches (see Jefferson, 1985) 
? Questioning intonation is indicated by a question mark 
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